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Human beings have long disagreed about the best way to live.  Of what significance 
is this fact for politics?  In this dissertation, I argue that it is of the utmost 
significance, and that substantial theoretical conclusions follow from our decision to 
take it seriously.  Arguing that few accounts of politics have given due consideration 
to the fact of persistent disagreement, among reasonable and well-intentioned 
individuals, as to what gives life meaning and value, I articulate what I hope to be the 
most defensible account of a politics that accommodates this fact.  Citing (in Part 
One) a variety of possible inferences we might make in response to this ‘fact of 
diversity’, I defend (in Part Two) a humble assessment of our cognitive abilities in 
this regard as the most charitable inference on offer.  Formulated from the perspective 
of those who would claim the right to exercise political power and authority, this 
epistemically-humble response to the fact of diversity issues in a principled refusal to 
endorse any particular account of the Good Life as authoritative for public purposes.  
The state manifests this principled refusal by adopting an attitude of ‘maximum 
 
feasible accommodation’ with respect to its citizens’ pursuits of their diverse 
conceptions of life’s meaning and value.  Such an attitude needs to be fleshed out in 
terms of policy, however, so in Part Three I articulate and defend, as the best practical 
expression of a stance of maximum accommodation, a principle that restricts the use 
of the state’s coercive power to only those measures needed to protect citizens’ 
‘expressive liberty’ – that is, their right to live lives that express their cherished 
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Introduction  
0.1 Giving Diversity Its Due 
Let us begin with the simple observation that human beings have long 
disagreed about the best way to live.  For ease of exposition, let us give this 
observation the name Diversity: 
 
• Diversity: Human beings disagree about the best way to live. 
 
We must be clear at the outset exactly what variety of disagreement we have 
in mind here.  What I mean by the phrase ‘disagreement about the best way to live’ is 
not the sort of pedestrian disagreement long understood to be the stuff of ordinary 
politics, such as disagreement among neighborhood residents as to the relative merits 
of using surplus tax revenues to build a theatre or to build a swimming pool.1  I mean, 
rather, disagreement about what we might term ‘matters of ultimate concern’ – 
disagreement about conceptions of what, in the final analysis, endows life with 
meaning and value.  Traditionally, and still probably most commonly, such 
conceptions have been provided by ‘spiritual’ worldviews, such as one finds in the 
world’s great religious faiths.  But an ultimate conception of life’s meaning and 
purpose need not be specifically religious or even spiritual in character.   
(Existentialism provides one example of a purely philosophical, ‘secular’ alternative; 
though see Thomas Nagel’s recent article for a probing discussion of the extent to 
which this question even actually admits of expression in purely secular terms2).  I 
                                                 
1 This example comes from Dworkin [1978, 235]. 
2 Nagel [2005].  
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shall use the phrase “conception of the Good” to refer to any such account, so as to 
avoid prejudging the issue in favor of religious understandings of life’s significance.  
(To avoid monotony I shall sometimes substitute in the definition itself: as in “ . . . 
but as we have already noted, folks differ radically in their conceptions of what gives 
life meaning and value.”) 
 
We can then ask, ‘How should polities respond to the truth of Diversity?’  For 
ease of exposition, let us give this question the name Political Question: 
 
• Political Question: How should polities respond to the truth of 
Diversity? 
 
As its name suggests, the Political Question is a question of political theory – 
though historically speaking, neither political theory nor political practice has tended 
to make this question central to a conception of politics.  Polities, and the traditions 
of political theorizing conducted within them, evolved against backdrops of relative 
cultural homogeneity that obviated the need to give this question its due 
consideration.  But the times, as they say, are a’-changin’.  Advances in transportation 
and information technology, an increasingly integrated global marketplace, increasing 
ease of human mobility across national borders, and the increasing empowerment of 
previously marginalized groups: these forces, and others besides, are all converging 
in such a manner as to bring to the fore the urgency of addressing Diversity.  For 
increasingly, it seems, polities will find it difficult to draw upon a modicum of shared 
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beliefs, values, or customs to guide them in the formulation of policy, legislation, or 
constitutional essentials – the result of their increasingly diverse citizenries.  In other 
words, the truth of Diversity is of increasing importance at the intra-polity level, 
whereas for much of our history its truth was primarily of interest at the inter-polity 
level. 
 
0.2 Why Give Diversity Its Due? 
 The claim we have labeled Diversity is, I take it, uncontroversial.  Human 
beings have long disagreed about the best way to live.  They have disagreed about 
which god, or gods, if any, should be worshipped and glorified.  Even when they have 
so agreed, they have differed in their views as to what, precisely, fidelity and 
devotion to that divinity entails.  Humans also diverge on their core value 
commitments: is a life of austere self-discipline the ‘best life for man’, or does human 
flourishing consist in the pursuit Epicurean delights?  Or is it perhaps, as Aristotle 
suggested, a little of both: a life that seeks all goods in moderation?  Finally, people 
have been divided as to how best to organize our social and communal life: should 
values of community and conformity and solidarity take precedence, or should 
individuals’ rights to self-expression and self-determination have pride of place?  
Should private property rights exist?  If so, how far might they extend?  Ought people 
to have property rights to the means of production, or to valuable natural resources? 
 But as the Dworkin-inspired example just invoked illustrates, disagreement is 
pervasive.  We disagree, not only about how best to live, but also over mundane 
matters of tax policy, public funding, and economics; not only about what endows life 
3 
with meaning and value, but also over what justice requires in the way of criminal 
law; not only about the Good, we might say, but also about the Right.  Why think that 
disagreement about the Good represents a distinctively important class of social 
disagreement, such that it merits a central place in our political theorizing?  For that 
matter, why think that disagreement about the Good represents even a distinctive 
species of disagreement?  Why not simply regard it as contiguous with other forms of 
disagreement – which, as we have just suggested, are everywhere we turn? 
 We might identify two distinct worries here.  The first we can term the 
‘Individuation Problem’: the challenge inherent in the task of individuating ‘accounts 
of the Good’, such that we may speak sensibly of disagreement about ‘the Good’ as a 
distinctive species of social disagreement, to which we might attribute special 
significance.  The second we might term the ‘Significance Problem’, and it is the 
challenge of articulating why disagreement about the Good (assuming for the moment 
that we can isolate such disagreement as a special category, if not as a natural kind) 
should bear any more significance for our political theorizing, than do our 
disagreements about science, economics, or justice.   
 Concerning the Significance Problem, we need only note that, with our 
articulation of Diversity, we are – almost by definition – focusing on disagreement 
about the sorts of matters that are of the greatest concern to people.  That is the point 
of using language such as “matters of ultimate concern” and “disagreement about 
conceptions of what, in the final analysis, endows life with meaning and value.”  
Phrases such as “in the final analysis” are not meant to be opaque, but are rather 
meant to illuminate the fact that we are concerned with issues that people find to be of 
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central or supreme importance in their lives.  Can there be any issue of more 
importance to a person, than the question as to how best she might best organize her 
life, or what might endow her life with meaning and value?  As evidence that the 
stakes are never raised higher than they are when we inquire as to how best to live, 
we need only point out that for many persons, answering this question correctly is a 
matter, not just of temporal significance – not simply a matter of flourishing during 
our mortal “three score years and ten”3 – but is a matter of eternal significance.  No 
less a matter than one’s salvation – one’s fate for all eternity – is at issue for many 
persons, as they try to work out their understanding of the Good, in fear and 
trembling before their God.  Though it cannot be denied that such issues are 
passionately contested, contemporary disputes regarding matters of science, 
economics, and even justice presumably do not approach this level of importance – at 
least, not for the large segments of the population for whom the question of one’s 
eternal salvation is a live one, and plausibly not even for many of the more secularly-
inclined folks who are little interested in such otherworldly concerns.  There is no 
reason why we should expect to observe such deep and divisive disagreement in this 
regard – but it is there, and it is a significant fact that must be reckoned with. 
 What of the Individuation Problem?  Why invite trouble by characterizing the 
familiar problem of disagreement about how best to live in terms of “accounts of the 
‘Good’”?  Why not simply rest content with the familiar, uncontroversial description 
of human disagreement set forth in the opening paragraph of this section?  Why posit 
entities called “accounts of the Good” – entities, various instances of which are 
evidently affirmed by various persons at various times and places, and such that each 
                                                 
3 Psalm 90:10, KJV.  See also A.E. Housman’s poem “Loveliest of Trees” in his A Shropshire Lad (1896). 
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person can (evidently) uniquely affirm one such doctrine, and so forth?  Our decision 
to do so seems immediately to raise the thorny question as to how we identify, 
distinguish, and count accounts of the Good, in the manner seemingly presupposed by 
our elucidation of Diversity in terms of doxastic heterogeneity with respect to the 
Good. 
 One response to this Problem may be to cite and to develop an analogy with, 
of all things, the philosophy of biology.4  Consider the relation between classical 
Mendelian genetics and our contemporary understanding of molecular genetics.  It is 
not clear exactly how the former theory relates to the latter.  Our study of molecular 
genetics has not revealed nice, neat, one-to-one mappings between the “genes” 
posited by classical Mendelian genetics, and the sequences of amino acids we now 
understand to be the transmitters of our genetic information.  Mendelian genetics is, 
in all likelihood, an oversimplification.  Nevertheless, learning Mendelian genetics 
remains a useful way of coming to understand the general principles of genetics, even 
though at the end of the day there may be no entities answering to the notion of a 
“gene” posited by that theory.  Mendelian genetics is a useful heuristic.  Similarly, for 
our purposes, we can treat the notion of an account of the Good as a heuristic – a 
notion useful in helping us to think about the sorts of disagreements that, in contrast 
to disagreements about, e.g., economic policy, matter most to people.  We can thus 
utilize this notion, even as we acknowledge that it is difficult (if not impossible) to 
individuate accounts of the Good.  At the end of the day, we can allow that there are 
no entities answering to the notion of an “account of the Good” – there are just lots of 
                                                 
4 Other examples from the philosophy of science, involving conceptual issues surrounding reduction and 
explanation, can no doubt serve my purposes here equally well (perhaps better?), but this is the example 
most familiar to me. 
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individuals with lots of constellations of beliefs and commitments.  In common with 
the Mendelian geneticist, we can maintain that, for purposes of illustrating something 
important about our subject matters, it is worth speaking in terms of (ultimately 
fictitious) discrete, individuable entites.  Our doing so is justified by the fact that such 
talk provides the basic conceptual framework and vocabulary with which we can give 
our arguments pithy expression. 
 Hopefully the reader is satisfied with my request that we can simply stipulate 
a tolerably precise notion of an ‘account of the Good’ adequate for our present 
purposes.  As I hope will become clear in section 8.4, our notion of an account of the 
Good need not be terribly precise in order to be serviceable: as we’ll see with our 
formulation there of a claim called “Legitimate”, nothing much hangs on what gets 
counted as a disagreement about the Good and what counts as another species of 
disagreement.  Because most any disagreement could turn out to have important 
implications for one’s conception of how best to live, most any disagreement is going 
to acquire the important status that we are presently attributing to disagreement about 
(our stipulative sense of) the Good.  The stipulation that there are individuable 
accounts of the Good winds up acquiring the status of an assumption in an indirect 
proof – one that is discharged once it has served its purpose in the argument.  (The 
meaning of these remarks may be obscure now, but hopefully they become clearer 
when the reader has reached the relevant portion of the argument in chapter eight.) 
 
 
0.3 Hasn’t Diversity Already Been Given Its Due? 
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Before proceeding, I should pause to address the incredulity doubtless 
provoked in the minds of many readers, with my assertion (at the end of section 0.1) 
that political theory and practice have tended not to make the fact of diversity central 
to their endeavors.  For one might (very reasonably) object that the small example of 
liberalism undermines this claim.  After all, is not liberalism the very tradition of 
theory and practice that arose precisely in response to the need to accommodate the 
truth of Diversity?  We can term this objection (or the incredulous stare5 that might 
be offered in its stead) the ‘Liberal’s Rejoinder.’  My response to the Rejoinder is that 
this understanding of liberalism is partially correct, for a characterization of 
liberalism that is itself only partially correct.  For ‘liberalism’ obviously cannot be 
plausibly regarded as a unitary political or philosophical movement.  While there are 
many dimensions along which we may seek to distinguish various forms and 
traditions of liberal thought and practice, for present purposes I will focus on a 
bifurcation identified by William Galston in his 1995 article “Two Concepts of 
Liberalism.”6  Here Galston articulates and defends a conception of ‘post-
Reformation liberalism’ that understands itself (in contrast with the autonomy-
promoting conception of liberalism associated with the ‘post-Enlightenment project’) 
as being oriented towards the accommodation of diversity, in much the way I seem to 
be denying that any understanding of politics has heretofore done.7  So, in Galston’s 
terms, the Rejoinder is accurate only with regard to post-Reformation liberalism, and 
not to its post-Enlightenment cousin.  Given its commitment to a robust notion of 
                                                 
5 See David Lewis [1986, 133ff.]. 
6 Galston [1995]. 
7 Other theorists have similarly identified and characterized such a cleavage in liberal thought and practice.  
See, e.g., Brian Barry’s discussion of the various ways of articulating this cleavage at his [2001, 118ff.]. 
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autonomy as a prerequisite of any life’s having any value for any person, we should 
not understand the post-Enlightenment project as being motivated to any significant 
degree by the need to respond to Diversity.  In this sense, the Liberal’s Rejoinder is 
appropriate to a conception of liberalism that is only partially correct; if we 
understand liberalism in terms of the post-Enlightenment project (in the terms in 
which it was understood by thinkers such as Kant and Mill, that is), the Rejoinder 
does not apply. 
Furthermore, as I have indicated, the rejoinder is only partially accurate, even 
with respect to the post-Reformation understanding of liberalism.  For the claim that 
post-Reformation liberalism takes as its central component the task of responding to 
diversity is partially inaccurate in at least two distinct (but related) ways.  These two 
ways are best uncovered by attending to infelicities concealed by the italicized words 
in the following (now suitably restricted) formulation of the Liberal’s Rejoinder: “In 
articulating their conception of politics, Post-Reformation liberals accorded a central 
role to the task of responding to diversity.”  In the first place, it is probably more 
accurate to say that, for early liberals in this tradition, the task of first importance was 
the attainment of a workable modus vivendi – not the articulation of a vision of 
politics properly responsive to diversity.  (Thus, post-Reformation liberals did not 
accord ‘response to diversity’ a central role in their conception of politics.)  In the 
second place, these liberals were probably interested, not in fashioning a conception 
of politics capable of accommodating generic ‘circumstances of diversity’ however 
they may manifest themselves, but rather with a very particular manifestation of 
social diversity – the experience of post-Reformation northern Europe – and with the 
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very particular civic and political challenges it engendered.  (Thus, post-Reformation 
liberals did not accord response to (generic) diversity a central role in their conception 
of politics; instead, their concern was to respond specifically to the proliferation of 
competing politico-theological sects in northern Europe in the sixteenth century.)  Let 
us consider each of these infelicities in turn. 
First, this conception of liberalism arguably did not make responding to the 
fact of diversity central to its understanding of politics, in the way I am suggesting 
needs be done.  To the extent that early liberal theory and (especially) practice were 
motivated by the need to attain civil peace, in the face of a theological diversity that 
was coming to be seen as an unavoidable and permanent feature of post-Reformation 
European life, this strand of liberalism probably tended to privilege whatever political 
arrangements seemed most productive of a workable modus vivendi among society’s 
competing sectarian factions.  Thus, while the fact of diversity constitutes the 
historical circumstance that occasioned the rise of (this flavor of) liberalism, we 
should not necessarily understand post-Reformation liberal theory or practice as 
oriented primarily towards giving central place to the need to respond to Diversity.  
Lest I incur the charge of sophistry with this exceedingly subtle distinction, I should 
flesh out this point with a real-life illustration.  This example is drawn from the 
history of political theory rather than political practice, but I believe it illustrates the 
general worry for both these facets of (post-Reformation) liberalism.  An important 
early work in the liberal tradition is John Locke’s On Toleration, in which he argues, 
among other things, for the exemption of matters of religious conscience from the 
legitimate provenance of public action.  His argument rests on a particular (and no 
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doubt contestable) theological understanding of salvation as dependent on an inward 
state of the believer’s heart and mind – a state which by its nature is impossible to 
bring about via coercion.8  For present purposes, the important point is twofold: (i) 
that Locke was (plausibly) moved to write in defense of religious liberty by the urgent 
need to secure civil peace, and by the seeming impossibility of securing said peace by 
means of one particular sect’s imposing its vision of Christianity on dissenters; and 
(ii) that Locke could and probably did avail himself of this theologically-grounded 
argument for civic liberty in the first place precisely because it appeared to him as 
one of the most salient and effective arguments available, given the shared 
theological assumptions that prevailed at the time.  Locke was in this regard very 
pragmatic.  That is, in his attempt to forge a workable social unity in the teeth of a 
then-disruptive theological diversity, Locke was more than happy to invoke common 
ground wherever he could find it.  In this sense, post-Reformation liberalism did not 
place the task of responding to diversity per se at the center of its understanding of 
politics.  Rather, its aim was more modest: it sought only to meliorate the divisive 
effects of a particular eruption of diversity as it manifested itself at a particular 
historical moment; there was no effort to fashion a politics capable of responding to 
any imaginable eruption of any kind of diversity at any particular historical moment.  
Plausibly, early liberals like Locke sought to revise existing political arrangements 
only insofar as such revision was necessary for effecting peaceable co-existence, and 
with an eye to effecting minimal disruption of the prevailing understanding of the 
relation between religion and politics.  That is, post-Reformation liberalism did not 
                                                 
8 For a general exploration of the extent to which Locke’s entire political philosophy rests and relies on a 
particular (liberal Protestant) theological framework, see Waldron [2002]. 
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undertake the more radical project of altogether decoupling public theological 
justification from public political justification; instead, it sought to limit the range of 
theological justifications that could be legitimately offered for political arrangements 
– e.g., allowing only generically Protestant or Christian considerations to hold 
currency in the political sphere, while simultaneously disallowing specifically 
denominational considerations, on the one hand, and (e.g.) dangerously atheistic 
considerations, on the other.9 
Related to this (stylized) historical example10 of Locke’s use of theological 
premises in his defense of religious toleration is the second infelicity contained within 
the Liberal’s Rejoinder as it applies to post-Reformation liberalism: that it did not 
reckon as its central motivation the need to accommodate diversity.  This accusation 
pertains to the depth and scope of the diversity in question.  As I shall argue in greater 
detail later, many understandings of liberalism (the ‘post-Reformation project’ 
conspicuous amongst them), and of politics in general, are best understood as being 
responsive to what we might term ‘shallow diversity’: surface disagreement occurring 
against a backdrop of shared belief and practice, where this backdrop is held to be of 
scope and substance sufficient to permit the identification and articulation (by skilled 
political agents, at least) of acceptable compromises on at least a wide range of issues 
that appear prima facie to be intractable.  Early liberals in the post-Reformation 
                                                 
9 For Locke’s views on the extent to which atheists are in a sense ‘beyond the pale’ when it comes to 
offering credible political arguments, see his discussion of atheists’ inability to engage in the practice of 
promising at [1990, 64]. 
10 I should probably take this opportunity to acknowledge that, in the foregoing example, I have most 
likely oversimplified greatly, and that a full account of the post-Reformation liberals – and of Locke’s On 
Toleration in particular – is likely to turn out far more nuanced, and probably far messier too (at least for 
purposes of making my point).  But I remain convinced that the broad thrust of my historical arguments 
are at least of sufficient accuracy and philosophical relevance to be worth including here, their 
acknowledged shortcomings notwithstanding. 
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tradition did not typically understand themselves as articulating a vision of politics 
adequate to circumstances of deeper and more divisive disagreement.  Instead they 
saw their task as that of fashioning political arrangements defensible in terms of the 
shared (theological and moral) commitments that lay beneath their disputed 
(denominational and sectarian) surface disagreements.  Accordingly, they saw no 
need to fashion a politics that aspired to accommodate future outbreaks of diversity.  
But when I claim that “neither political practice nor political theory has tended to 
make the question ‘How should polities respond to the truth of Diversity?’ central to 
a conception of politics,” I mean that no tradition of political theorizing has taken, as 
its point of departure, the aspiration to fashion a conception of politics properly 
responsive to diversity in any of its manifestations, and not merely responsive to this 
or that circumstance of diversity.  Fuller articulation of this point must await my 
discussions of the ‘Common Ground Model’ and ‘Methodological Radical Diversity’ 
in chapter seven below; for now I simply hope to offer the reader assurance that we 
should continue our exploration, even in the face of my seemingly outlandish claim 
that no tradition of political theory or practice – not even liberalism – has given due 
considerations to the need to respond to Diversity, in the manner I think is necessary.  
Assuming the reader has been given adequate assurance for the time being, we return 






0.3 Political Responses to Diversity: Perfectionism and Neutralism 
If we allow the question “How should polities respond to the truth of (intra-
polity) Diversity?” to provide our fundamental orientation with regard to conceptions 
of politics, we find that we can immediately divide political frameworks into two 
categories: what we might term (following the recent usage of political theorists) 
‘Perfectionist’ and ‘Neutralist’ approaches.  A government that embodies the former 
approach, and whose citizenry is diverse, permits itself to pass judgment with regard 
to the various conceptions of the Good Life holding currency amongst its citizens, 
privileging some proper subset of these conceptions and organizing itself according to 
the tenets of this favored conception(s).  (In this sense of the term, a culturally 
homogeneous state can of course also organize itself along Perfectionist lines.  Its 
decision to do so would not appear nearly as controversial as it might were its citizens 
to exhibit more cultural diversity – unless, of course, that state for some reason 
elected to organize itself along moral principles incongruous with those principles 
(unanimously) endorsed by its members.)  A government embodying the latter 
approach, by contrast, refrains from passing such judgment.  It seeks, rather, to 
accommodate, to a greater or lesser extent (depending upon its precise formulation) 
the range of conceptions of the Good Life that hold currency amongst its citizens. 
 
We have now given further refinement to the Political Question, by casting it 
as a choice between two broad approaches to politics.  Thus refined, we can 
reformulate the question as follows:  
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• Political Question′: How best should polities respond to the truth of 
Diversity – by organizing themselves along Perfectionist lines, or 
along Neutralist lines? 
 
In this dissertation, I explore the strongest case to be made for the Neutralist answer 
to this question, and articulate the vision of politics most congruent with that case.   
 But how might we decide whether to answer our question with a Perfectionist 
story or a Neutralist one?  And, assuming we can discover an answer to this Political 
Question′, how might we further decide which Perfectionist or Neutralist story is the 
most defensible one?  I suggest that a fruitful way to begin our response to this 
political question is to step back and investigate, as a preliminary matter, certain 
related philosophical questions.  So before answering the political question “How 
should polities respond to the truth of Diversity?”, let us ask the philosophical 
question “How should philosophers respond to the truth of Diversity?”   
 
0.4 Philosophical Responses to Diversity: Epistemology and Metaphysics 
“What are we – impartial, disinterested philosophical theorists – to make of 
the truth of Diversity?”  This question is frightfully vague, and admits of several 
interpretations.  We might wonder, for instance, exactly what sort of philosophical 
theorists we are to take ourselves to be.  And we might ask for an elucidation of the 
“makes of” relation, whose two relata are (apparently) philosophical theorists on the 
one hand, and the fact that people disagree about the best way to live, on the other.  
Keeping our purposes firmly in mind, though, we may find certain ways of 
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disambiguating this question to be more helpful than others.  For example, at the 
outset we can specify two types of pertinent ‘philosophical hats’ we might wear: that 
of an epistemologist, and that of a metaphysician.11   Thus we might, in the first place, 
ask the ‘Epistemological Question’:   
 
• Epistemological Question: What attitude ought we to take with 
regard to our epistemic abilities vis-à-vis knowing the Good?   
 
Or we might, in the second place, ask the ‘Metaphysical Question’:  
 
• Metaphysical Question: How many (if any) of the accounts of the 
Good, now holding currency, are true or valid?   
 
So as a preliminary matter, we are able to refine our broad, vague philosophical 
question into two tolerably precise questions – one epistemological, the other 
metaphysical.  Thus far, my treatment of the generically philosophical question 
“What are we – impartial philosophical theorists – to make of Diversity?” is not very 
rigorous – the epistemological and metaphysical dimensions of this question may not 
be mutually exclusive, and they are almost certainly not jointly exhaustive.  
Nevertheless, I believe that for present purposes, this split is serviceable.  So for the 
next two chapters, let us exchange our political theorist hats for those of philosophical 
theorists – delaying considerations of our Political Question′ till three chapters 
                                                 
11 I’ve always preferred the term “metaphysicist” (it invokes images of laboratory science, rather than 
clinical medicine), but practitioners of the craft themselves seem to prefer the term “metaphysician”, so I 
will follow their usage. 
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hence, after we have laid some preliminary philosophical groundwork.  We shall 
begin (in the initial chapter) with an exploration of the epistemological question, 
before turning (in chapter two) to matters metaphysical.  Hopefully, as we consider 
these two questions, the nature of the “makes of” relation, such as holds between the 
fact of Diversity and the theoretic interests of epistemologists and metaphysicians, 



















Chapter One:  The Epistemological Question 
 The first thing to note is that, at least as formulated, the Epistemological 
Question is an awkward one.  This is because, on its face, phrasing the question in 
the first-person plural seems at odds with the fact of Diversity itself – with the fact, 
that is, that ‘we’ often disagree (and sharply) as to the content of the Good Life.  How 
are we to assess our abilities to know the Good, when many of us profess to ‘know’ 
such different things about it?   
 (As an aside, I would suggest that, to the extent they have considered it, most 
contemporary political theorists have probably failed to recognize just how awkward 
the question really is.  I speculate that this failure results from many theorists’ 
assumption that, with the relevant scope of ‘we’, we do not actually disagree so much 
about the Good.  Given the primary audience for their writings, this assumption might 
be warranted: we should perhaps forgive political theorists for believing that all 
interlocutors in these debates share a common (more or less liberal, more or less 
secular) comprehensive moral outlook.  But, while this assumption may serve them 
well when they are writing for, and debating with, their fellow philosophers and 
political theorists, it becomes problematically contentious if one expands the scope of 
‘we’ to include all or most citizens in contemporary liberal democracies.  It becomes 
contentious, that is, if the dialogs internal to the political theory profession are to be 
extended so as to include within the dialog many of those persons that the dialog is 
supposed to be about.  If my assessment is correct, it is, I think, a poor reflection on 
the current state of the dialog.) 
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 Despite the awkwardness of the question, I propose we press forward and do 
the best we can to answer it anyway – bracketing for the moment the doxastic 
heterogeneity suppressed by our use of the first-person plural.  In reflecting on the 
Epistemological Question, I think we are apt to characterize a range of attitudes 
towards persons’ abilities to track truth in this domain, along the following lines: We 
may take a confident attitude, a pessimistic attitude, or a humble attitude.  (I believe 
that this conceptualization does represent a set mutually exclusive and jointly 
exhaustive theoretical alternatives.)   For ease of exposition, let us give each of these 
attitudes a name and a brief characterization: 
 
• Confident: Given the proper exercise of their mental faculties, it is fully 
within humans’ cognitive abilities to obtain knowledge about the best 
path(s) to human flourishing.  
 
• Pessimistic:  The opposite response from Confident, Pessimistic 
constitutes (ironically) a confident despair at humans’ abilities to come to 
know the Truth about life’s ultimate meaning and purpose.   
 
• Humble:  This final stance involves making a modest – yet not necessarily 
skeptical – assessment of humans’ epistemic abilities with regard to 
questions of Ultimate Concern.   
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Let us now give a more detailed exposition of each of these possible 
(epistemological) attitudes towards the fact of Diversity. 
 
1.1 Confident 
 This first attitude involves a commitment to regarding persons as capable of 
recognizing truth about the best way to live.  At first glance, such an attitude might 
seem to fly in the face of the very insight embodied in Diversity: how can one adopt 
a confident trust in humans’ abilities to track truth about the Good, given the fact of 
persistent disagreement about the Good?  (It seems that already, we must revisit the 
just-bracketed heterogeneity suppressed by our use of ‘we’ in the formulation of the 
Epistemological Question.)  We might call this worry the ‘problem of epistemic 
Confidence in the face of disagreement’ – or just the ‘Disagreement Problem’ for 
short.  How might we respond to the Disagreement Problem?  Two ways suggest 
themselves; each involves pointing out that Confident is not to be conflated with a 
similar, yet distinct, claim.   
 The first response to this worry is to insist that Confident not be confused 
with a claim we might name Easy: 
 
• Easy: Ascertaining the truth about matters of ultimate concern is easily 
within the grasp of all normally cognitively-functioning human adults. 
 
To say one is confident in one’s ability to track truth in a given domain – or that one 
is confident in one’s ability to do anything, for that matter – is not to concede that the 
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relevant task is easy, or that just anyone can do it.  Thus, a skilled archer might be 
confident in her ability to strike her target nine times out of ten, but this does not 
imply that just anybody can achieve 90% accuracy, or even that the archer herself 
regards the task as easy.  (It might require a great degree of sustained mental 
concentration, expert muscle control, and physical exertion – requirements which the 
archer finds difficult to discharge, even as she is confident in her ability to do so.)   
As with physical tasks, then, so also with cognitive tasks.  Thus, some ‘epistemically 
confident’ folks will (say) insist that they are nicely tracking truth in the domain of 
Ultimate Concern, even while subscribing to an ‘error theory’ which holds that those 
less competent to judge such matters often go astray.  And their so often going astray 
is precisely what constitutes the fact we’ve termed Diversity.   
 The second response to the worry created by the Disagreement Problem is to 
stress that Confident ought not to be conflated with another claim – namely, the 
‘monistic’ claim that there is only one true account of human flourishing, or only one 
path to the Good Life, or only one true account of life’s meaning and value, or what 
have you.  (We shall have occasion to explore the contours of this monistic value-
claim shortly, when we consider the range of available responses to the Metaphysical 
Question.)  One can be confident in her own – and indeed, in everybody else’s – 
abilities to track truth, and feel no discomfort from the fact of Diversity at all – just 
so long as one rejects this monistic outlook.  For example, were one a value pluralist, 
one would actually (confidently) expect that the free and unfettered exercise of 
human reason would yield a multiplicity of creeds and faiths.  For, since value (on 
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this view) is itself heterogeneous, one should expect human beings to reliably track 
this fact, and thus to cleave to divergent (though equally legitimate) schemes of value. 
 
1.2 Pessimistic 
 Proponents of the second attitude share with proponents of Confident a 
certain ‘meta-level’ confidence in their judgment as to human beings’ epistemic 
abilities vis-à-vis the Good.  Proponents of Confident are quite confident that at least 
some persons’ judgments reliably track truth in this regard – they may believe (if they 
are inclined towards monism) that only the adherents of one account of human 
flourishing get it right, or they may believe (if they are inclined instead towards 
pluralism) that adherents of multiple and rival creeds profess equally valid (if 
divergent and incompatible) understandings of life’s meaning and value.12  
Proponents of Pessimistic, on the other hand, are quite confident in their judgment 
that no person can know that his or her beliefs and commitments with respect to 
human flourishing ‘get it right.’  They have confidence in human beings’ inability to 
obtain knowledge about values, whether or not they exist. 
 Note that this is purely an epistemological claim – it should not be confused 
with the similar, metaphysical claim (which we will examine in more detail in section 
2.1 below) of nihilism, to the effect that there simply is no truth of the matter when it 
comes to questions of ultimate concern.  The Pessimist thinks that no one can know 
                                                 
12 In theory, a proponent of Confident might even remain agnostic as to the question whether any creeds 
‘get it right’, and if so which ones.  (Theoretically, even, someone could maintain Confidence in our 
epistemic abilities even as she flat-out denies that any extant creeds get it right, so long as she simply 
professes faith that someday we will come to discover the truth about how best to live.  For more on this 
possibility, see my discussion of the ‘Approximation Thesis’ in section 6.5 below.)  However, we may 
reasonably question wherein such a theorist’s confidence lies, given her inability to point to even one 
example of a creed she regards as verisimilitudinous. 
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the truth about the Good, not (necessarily) because there is no right answer here, but 
because there is no sense in which anyone could ever know the right answer, whether 
or not it’s out there.  We might therefore distinguish the ‘nihilistically-inclined 
Pessimist’ from the ‘non-nihilistically-inclined Pessimist’.  The latter variety of 
Pessimist might suspect that probably there are objective values, but that human 
beings are so cognitively defective as to remain forever unable to know them (though 
perhaps God knows them).  By contrast, a nihilistically-inclined Pessimist doubts the 
existence of objective value altogether.  However, she regards this negative 
existential claim to be of no real import, given humans’ inability to (say) access the 
contents of ‘Platonic Hyperspace’ – even were such a space to be populated by 
Values, Forms of Good, Beauty, and Justice, and the like.  (In all probability, the 
majority of Pessimists tend to be thus nihilistically-inclined.  But it is worth 
distinguishing these two varieties of the doctrine, just to have a clear view of the 
relevant conceptual landscape.) 
 To appreciate the difference between non-nihilistically- and nihilistically-
inclined Pessimists (which is to say, to appreciate the difference between the relevant 
epistemological claim and its closely associated, yet distinct, metaphysical claim), 
consider an example of the former.  A non-nihilistic Pessimist might suspect that 
indeed there is a fact of the matter in this domain, while simultaneously denying the 
possibility of our knowing it.13  The familiar figure of Euthyphro represents someone 
who affirms this pair of positions, albeit with respect to the domain of piety.  
Euthyphro famously asserted that what is pious is what the gods approve (and thus 
                                                 
13 In Christopher Peackocke’s terminology, such a person finds herself unable to resolve the ‘integration 
challenge’ with respect to her metaphysical and epistemological understandings of the domain of human 
value.  See his [1999]. 
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that there is a fact of the matter about what is pious, inasmuch as there is a fact of the 
matter about what the gods approve), while simultaneously admitting (though only 
after much Socratic prompting) that human beings have no access to reliable beliefs 
about that which the gods do, in fact, approve.  Someone who shares Euthyphro’s 
stance with respect to the competing conceptions of the Good Life currently endorsed 
by the world’s citizens might feel strongly (and in contrast to the nihilist) that at least 
some of the beliefs and customs associated with these various worldviews must be 
verisimilitudinous: perhaps she believes that widespread devotion to these 
worldviews could not possibly be sustained unless at least some of them were correct 
or accurate.  (“Six billion folks can’t all be wrong!”)  At the same time, however, she 
might endorse epistemic commitments (perhaps she has yet to hear that Logical 
Positivism has been discredited?) that proscribe the possibility of any human’s 
actually knowing anything about the Good.  It might happen that some lucky humans 
entertain true beliefs about the Good – it is, she feels, quite likely that they do.  But 
these persons lack full-blown knowledge of the Good, inasmuch as these beliefs – 
while true – are not (and could not be) justified.14  So the label ‘lucky’ for such 
persons is quite apt here: though these persons have correct beliefs about the Good,15 




                                                 
14 Let us assume the ‘Justified True Belief’ analysis of knowledge to be serviceable for present purposes. 
15 And recall that our Euthyphro-like skeptic does regard it very likely that some persons have such true 
beliefs – else (she reckons) we would be unable to explain the phenomena of persistent and fervent belief 
and practice regarding theGood. 
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 The Humble attitude with respect to our ability to know the Good is 
characterized primarily by its rejection of the ‘meta-level’ confidence that proponents 
of the first two epistemic attitudes share: the proponent of Confident is quite 
confident that humans can know the Good, while the Pessimist is quite confident that 
human beings cannot know the Good.  Someone who is Humble, though, steers a 
middle course between these positions.  She is neither unduly optimistic that she (or 
anyone else) knows the Truth of the matter, nor is she unduly skeptical of all humans’ 
claims in this regard.  With respect to our epistemic abilities vis-à-vis the Good, she is 
neither Pollyanna nor Scrooge; neither Descartes nor Hume. 
 In all likelihood, such Humble folk affirm their epistemic modesty on the 
basis of their judgment that, whatever the truth of the matter, ascertaining the best 
account of life’s meaning and value is a difficult task.  For ease of exposition, let us 
give this judgment the name Difficulty: 
 
• Difficulty: Determining which account(s) of life’s meaning and value are 
true (if any are) is a difficult task.16 
 
According to Difficulty, ascertaining the nature of the summum bonum – if such there 
even be (we need not prejudge the matter in favor of ‘monistic’ conceptions of the 
Good17) – is a difficult task.  Those who affirm this claim will no doubt invoke, in 
support of their judgment, the observation that several millennia’s worth of human 
                                                 
16 As will emerge later – and as the reader may already suspect – Difficulty is simply the denial of Easy. 
17 Note that Difficulty does not assume there is an objectively valid account of The Good.  Nihilism, for 
example, may be the correct account.  The point is only that (say) nihilism is not obviously true, in a way that 
renders all non-nihilists unreasonable for refusing to assent to nihilist doctrine.  Whether or not there’s a 
Truth of the matter, it’s difficult to come to know whether or not there’s a Truth of the matter (and, if so, 
what this Truth is). 
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investigation has yielded little consensus on the matter.  Further, they will observe 
that the longstanding theological, moral, and political disagreements that constitute 
the fact of diversity persist, even among reasonable and well-intentioned people, and 
even after such persons have been brought into full dialog with one another.  Such 
disagreements persist, even after such persons have been brought into full awareness 
of alternative conceptions of life’s meaning and value.  It is not as if divergent 
conceptions of the Good once persisted only because diverse communities evolved in 
relative isolation from one another, and that – upon coming into contact with each 
other – these societies tended to converge on philosophical beliefs and cultural 
practices.  If anything, the reverse might be true.  
 I note in passing that the invocation of such a ‘third way’ – neither 
epistemically confident nor skeptical – is a generally underappreciated 
epistemological alternative, in many domains of inquiry.  In many circumstances, 
theorists often proceed as if they confront only two choices with respect to the 
domain in question: affirmation of some positive account of knowledge-of-X, or 
skepticism regarding the possibility of knowledge-of-X.  But a stance of humility 
says: “We may know something about X; I’m not prepared to affirm skepticism in 
this regard.  On the other hand, I’m sufficiently impressed by the difficulty of the 
epistemic task at hand, that I stop short of affirming that some extant account of X is 
the right one.”  It would be an interesting inquiry – though one I cannot undertake 
here – to conduct a survey of the areas of inquiry in which the state of debate might 
be advanced considerably by the introduction of such a ‘third (epistemic) way’. 
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 We have now given further refinement to the Epistemological Question, by 
casting it as a choice among three possible positions.  Thus refined, we can 
reformulate the question as follows:  
 
• Epistemological Question′: What attitude ought we to take with regard to 
our epistemic abilities vis-à-vis knowing the Good – a Confident, 
Pessimistic, or Humble one? 
 
Having thus refined the epistemological interpretation of the question “What are we – 
impartial, disinterested philosophical theorists – to make of Diversity?”, let us turn to 
the metaphysical interpretation of this question. 
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Chapter Two:  The Metaphysical Question 
 The Metaphysical Question is considerably less ‘awkward’ than the 
epistemological one, so let us launch straight into a characterization of a range of 
answers to the question, “How many (if any) of the conceptions of the Good, 
currently holding currency, are true or valid?”  If we were to articulate the full range 
of logically possible objective scenarios, vis-à-vis the truth or accuracy of competing 
conceptions, that might undergird human beings’ varied and incompatible visions of 
the Good Life, we would recognize three relevant possibilities: perhaps none of the 
world’s competing conceptions are true, perhaps only one of them is valid, or perhaps 
several (and in the limit, all18) of them are.  (Here again, these possibilities stake a 
decent claim to being regarded as mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive.)  For 
ease of exposition, let us give each of these possibilities a name and a brief 
characterization: 
 
• None: Nary a single person who regards him- or herself as accurately 
tracking the Good with his or her value judgments is correct in this 
self-assessment. 
 
• One: There is only ‘One True Faith’: one true account of life’s 
meaning and value; one true characterization of human flourishing. 
                                                 
18 We should note here a difference between our way of quantifying over possibilities, and the standard 
way in which logicians understand quantifiers.  In quantifier logic, the universal quantifier is interpreted as 
‘all’, and the existential quantifier is interpreted to mean ‘at least one’; there is no special quantifier 
designated to pick out ‘one and only one.’  But the claims of those who profess to have identified the one 
and only true vision of the Good Life are going to play an important enough role in our subsequent 
discussion, that I think it worthwhile to work with a three-quantifier scheme of ‘none’, ‘(only) one’, and 




• Some: Despite deep differences in their patterns of living, in their 
beliefs and practices, adherents of rival and competing visions of the 
Good Life are still living lives of genuine truth and value.  (Not 
necessarily all such folks are, however – perhaps some are just plum 
mistaken in their beliefs about the Good.)     
 
Let us elucidate each of these possibilities. 
 
2.1 None 
 The metaphysical position represented by None has already been discussed in 
some detail in section 1.2, where we sought to distinguish the epistemological claim 
represented by Pessimistic from a metaphysical claim similar to the one we have now 
termed None.  Nevertheless, so as to preserve symmetry in the organization of these 
chapters and their sub-units, we shall accord None its own section for elucidation – 
slight though it may be.  Only one observation remains to be added to our discussion 
from section 1.2: there, we drew the contrast between a Pessimistic epistemological 
position and a nihilistic metaphysical position.  But we should note that, while a 
generically nihilistic19 metaphysical stance is sufficient to undergird the position set 
forth in None, it is not necessary.  The generically nihilistic metaphysical stance 
accounts for the truth of None by appealing to a natural explanation: no persons track 
the truth about the Good, for the simple reason that there just is no Good ‘out there’ 
                                                 
19 I write of a ‘generically nihilistic’ metaphysical stance in order to preserve a distinction between this 
outlook and the narrower, more precise sense of ‘Nihilism’ to be introduced in section 3.1 below. 
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for our judgments to track.  But notice that one need not necessarily embrace this 
negative existential claim about the Good in order to affirm None: one need only to 
deny that any extant conceptions of the Good resemble, in any meaningful sense, the 
true account of life’s purpose and value.  Such a denial is fully compatible with there 
actually being a summum bonum.  Perhaps God has not yet fully revealed Herself, and 
when She does, we will come to recognize all our past beliefs and conceptions about 
the good life as woefully inadequate.  Note that such a position is distinct, both from 
the generically nihilistic claim implied in section 1.2 and discussed just above, and 
from the Pessimistic epistemological stance that dismisses human beings as being 
forever incapable of obtaining knowledge of the Good.  This stance is an observation 
on the current state of human knowledge, rather than a claim about any possible state 
of human knowledge.  It is not a claim about human beings’ congenital cognitive 
endowment vis-à-vis the Good (as is the epistemological stance represented by 
Pessimistic), nor is it a negative existential claim with respect to the entities 
populating the ‘valuational universe’ (as is the generically nihilistic metaphysical 
stance).  True, there is something puzzling about characterizing this as a metaphysical 
position, or even as an apt response to something called a ‘metaphysical question.’  
But it does occupy part of the relevant conceptual possibility space, so it is worth 
mentioning.  However, in light of the likelihood that most or all adherents of None 
subscribe to this position on the basis of their generically nihilistic metaphysical 
proclivities, rather than on the basis of their expectation of a future revelation or 
discovery as to the true nature of the summum bonum, I propose that henceforth we 
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ignore this possibility.  Unless otherwise stated, in our future discussions of None, we 
may assume it to be held on the basis of a generically nihilistic metaphysics.20  
 Having thus accorded None its own section, and finding little more to say on 




 As was the case with None, the metaphysical position represented by One has 
already been discussed in some detail in the previous chapter.  Recall that in section 
1.1, we invoked the denial of a position much like the one we have now termed One, 
as a component of one possible response to the Disagreement Problem.  Specifically, 
we suggested that (contrary to appearances, perhaps) we need not regard a Confident 
epistemological stance as standing in tension with the fact of Diversity, so long as we 
do not conflate the Confident epistemological claim with the metaphysical claim 
represented by One.  In other words, we suggested that epistemic Confidence is 
perfectly compatible with doxastic Diversity, so long as one is prepared to affirm a 
metaphysical position akin to Some.  So with our three metaphysical possibilities 
now on the table21, we are in a position to offer a fuller characterization of the second 
response to the Disagreement Problem: one can simultaneously countenance the fact 
of Diversity and adopt a Confident posture vis-à-vis humans’ abilities to know the 
Good, so long as one rejects None and One in favor of Some.   
                                                 
20 Actually, I believe that – all things considered – it is more sensible to regard this possibility as a special 
instance of One – see my discussion of the ‘Approximation Thesis’ at section 6.5 below. 
21 Bearing in mind that full discussion of Some does not come until section 2.3. 
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 (Recall also that this was only the second of two possible strategies we 
suggested for reconciling Diversity and Confident.  The first involved denying that 
Confident entailed that the nature of the summum bonum was Easily ascertainable by 
all, without necessarily requiring the affirmation of Some.  On this view, None or 
One could very well represent the truth of the matter – it’s just that it’s very difficult 
for anyone to come to appreciate the truth of None or One.)   
 Having just recalled our prior invocation of a Some-like metaphysical claim – 
and finding little else to say in the way of elucidating One – let us now turn to an 
elucidation of this third metaphysical possibility.  The reader who has been troubled 
with the pithy elucidations set forth in the two prior sections will be relieved to learn 
that the length and detail of our discussion of Some will be more than sufficient to 
make up for this shortcoming.22   
 
2.3 Some 
 Some is the position one would affirm if one believed something like value 
pluralism to be the case.  Because the relationship between value pluralism and 
liberalism has been the subject of much recent, vigorous discussion among political 
theorists, the topic deserves special attention here.  Accordingly, let us examine the 
value pluralists’ thesis in some detail. 
 ‘Value pluralism’ is the name for the view, perhaps most famously associated 
with Isaiah Berlin, that at its most fundamental level, human value is irreducibly 
heterogeneous.  On this account, rival conceptions of life’s meaning and value – both 
                                                 
22 The reader who was quite appreciative of the aforementioned pithiness can content herself with the fact 
that – though the next section is long and detailed – overall this work is fairly short, as dissertations go. 
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religious and secular – are thought to represent equally valid, though mutually 
incompatible, modes of genuine human flourishing.  Such divergent values are said to 
be incommensurable – we cannot compare the worth of one to another, as they do not 
reduce to any common value, nor is there any common currency in terms of which 
their relative magnitudes can be expressed. 
 We might characterize value pluralism more precisely in terms of its 
commitment to three theses: the ‘heterogeneity thesis’, the ‘incompatibility thesis’, 
and the ‘incommensurability thesis’.  Let us examine each in turn. 
 
2.31. Heterogeneity 
 As we noted at the outset, human beings have long disagreed about the best 
way to live – an observation important enough to warrant its own title: Diversity.  
The value pluralist is one who rejects the explanations of this fact offered both by 
None and One.  Against the proponent of None (and, for that matter, against the 
Pessimist), the value pluralist holds that human beings can use reason to establish the 
validity of some theories of the Good, and to establish the falsity and invalidity of 
other conceptions.  Against the proponent of One, the pluralist also denies that there 
need be only one rationally defensible conception of human flourishing.  The pluralist 
sees disagreement about the good life persisting, then – not because some or all 
parties are deceived, or unreasonable, or unintelligent, or arguing in bad faith – but 
because even the most well-intentioned and proper exercise of human reason can lead 
us to divergent yet equally valid conceptions of human flourishing.  The genuine 
paths to human well-being, on this account, are multiple.  Rather than there being 
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One True Faith, there are Some True Faiths.  Nevertheless, there are still some False 
Faiths.  Value Pluralism does not imply that “anything goes” when it comes to 
conceptions of life’s meaning and value: some accounts of the Good Life are simply 
mistaken.  Value pluralists hold that the distinction between good and evil, between 
better and worse ways of living, is real and rationally defensible.  
 
2.32. Incompatibility 
 A further hallmark of pluralist thought is that these divergent modes of 
genuine human flourishing are not all co-possible.  This is true at both what we might 
call the inter-personal and intra-personal levels.  At the intra-personal level, the claim 
is that no single individual can live a life that embodies all (or even many) of the 
varied values available to human beings.  There are real trade-offs among different 
ways of life.  Attempts to live ‘comprehensive’ lives that embody a wide (or even the 
full) range of human values will either require sacrifices of some benefits that would 
normally accrue from a more full-bodied pursuit of some particular value, or else will 
fail altogether.  Quiet family life offers many advantages, as does a life devoted to 
high-stakes international espionage.  But it is doubtful that James Bond could reap the 
full benefits of domestic tranquility concurrently with the life of intrigue and danger 
he experiences on the job – something, somewhere, would have to give.  And it may 
be altogether impossible to simultaneously reap the advantages of ascetic self-
reflection – advantages which accrue to the life of the nun or monk, say – and social 
involvement and self-affirmation – the life of a political office-holder, say.  One 
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might simply find it impossible to hit the campaign trail during the day and retreat to 
the monastery during evenings and weekends, while deriving the benefits of either. 
 This insight holds at the inter-personal level as well: certain forms of society 
may be co-impossible within the same community.  For instance, folks who happen to 
be born members of the medieval European aristocracy might find that the 
embodiment of certain courtly virtues – chivalry, for example – makes their lives go 
much better for them.  A life of courtly virtue might represent a genuine mode of 
valuable human flourishing.  But individuals born into modern liberal democracies 
will find their efforts to live out an existence steeped in such virtues constantly 
thwarted.  Such an individual has available to him all the modes of human flourishing 
compatible with liberal democracy – but not the life of courtly virtue.  For such a life, 
while perhaps genuinely embodying value, requires as a prerequisite certain 
inegalitarian modes of social organization incompatible with modern ways of life. 
 
2.33. Incommensurability 
 The value pluralist denies that heterogeneous human goods can be realized in 
the same individual life, and further denies that they are co-possible within the same 
community.  But he goes even further, by denying that such divergent human ideals 
are co-possible even within a common evaluative framework.  That is, according to 
the value pluralist, competing conceptions of the human good are not only 
incompatible, they are also incommensurable.  To say that some values are 
incommensurable is to say that they do not even admit of direct comparison.  To 
understand this claim, it is helpful to contrast it with two views according to which 
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diverse values are commensurable.  One is a position according to which seemingly-
divergent values actually all reduce to a common value; another is a position 
according to which there is a common measure or currency in terms of which the 
magnitude of divergent values can be expressed and compared.   
 For an example of the former position, consider views according to which 
everything of value ultimately derives its value from the fact that it is valued by God.  
So, on this account, on the face of things we might identify many things as having 
value.  We might be tempted to say that some things – like faith, hope, love, and 
tithing – have value because they are activities that God commanded, while other 
things – like coffee, baseball, and crossword puzzles – are valuable simply because 
human beings value them.  But suppose we further stipulate that human beings have 
this ‘value-conferring status’ – their ability to make things (like coffee and baseball) 
valuable, simply in the act of valuing them – in virtue of the fact that God values 
human beings, and chooses Himself to regard as valuable any thing or activity that his 
valued creatures deem as valuable.  And suppose we also stipulate that God has 
commanded certain activities only because He finds them valuable.  Then we are left 
with the view that, in the final analysis, all value reduces (as it were) to a single 
value: being-valued-by-God. 
 Consider now the second position: that wherein – even if we don’t hold that 
all value ultimately reduces to a common value – we still hold there to be a common 
denominator in terms of which all these values can be measured.  A classical 
expression of this view is utilitarianism, which holds that all purportedly valuable 
activities can be evaluated in terms of their effects on human happiness.  Human 
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pleasure is the ‘currency’ in terms of which all values are to be compared.  An 
activity or action is valuable because – and to the extent that – it promotes or 
maximizes pleasure.  Thus, a utilitarian can agree with a value pluralist that human 
value is heterogeneous: she (the utilitarian) acknowledges that there are many 
equally-valid yet incompatible human activities and modes of living.  However, the 
utilitarian differs from the value pluralist in her assertion that rival claims to the Good 
can be compared, by comparing their effects on human happiness.  One form of life is 
more valuable than another (claims the utilitarian) if it results (on average) in a life 
more replete with ‘hedons’. 
 By denying there is any common value that all seemingly-divergent values 
reduce to, and that there is any common measure of genuinely heterogeneous values, 
value pluralists thereby assert the genuine incommensurability of the theological, 
ethical, and political disputes countenanced by Diversity. 
 
 We have now given further refinement to the Metaphysical Question, by 
casting it as a choice among three possible positions.  Thus refined, we can 
reformulate the question as follows: 
 
• Metaphysical Question′: How many (if any) of the conceptions of the 
Good, now holding currency, are true or valid – None, One, or Some? 
  
 Having set forth the seemingly relevant range of possible epistemological and 
metaphysical positions arising upon reflection on the truth of Diversity, we are now 
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in position to trade our philosopher’s hat for that of a political theorist, and return to 
our Political Question′: “How should polities respond to the truth of Diversity – by 
organizing themselves along Perfectionist lines, or along Neutralist lines?”  Let us 
begin this task by turning our attention to the variety of ways in which these 
epistemological and metaphysical positions can be combined.  Each of the pertinent 
combinations will constitute a distinctive epistemological/metaphysical hybrid 
position with respect to the fact of Diversity.  Apropos the fact that we are addressing 
a question of political theory, we will then express each of these positions from the 
perspective of those who would wield political authority and power – from the 
perspective of the state, that is. 
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Chapter Three: The Political Question 
3.1 Combinatorials 
 As political theorists, we might answer the question “What are we to make of 
Diversity?” by endorsing any of a variety of stances, each itself a hybrid of the 
various epistemological and metaphysical positions just surveyed.  So let us ask: what 
are these possible stances?  How might these various epistemological and 
metaphysical positions be combined?  Initially, we might suspect there to be nine 
possibilities: each of the three epistemological positions paired with each of the three 
metaphysical positions.  We might represent such a possibility space graphically as 
follows, with the epistemic possibilities arrayed in rows, and the metaphysical 
possibilities arrayed in columns: 
Table 1 
 None One Some 
Confident (1) (2) (3) 
Pessimistic (4) (5) (6) 
Humble (7) (8) (9) 
 
 However, as we shall see, the combinatorial logic of this domain renders only 
six theoretical possibilities truly worth distinguishing; for our purposes, at least, not 
all the cells (1) through (9) represent theoretically interesting 
epistemological/metaphysical combinations.  For ease of exposition, let us give each 
of the six worthwhile possibilities a name and a brief characterization: 
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• Nihilism: The conjunction of a Confident epistemology with the 
metaphysical claim that None of the conceptions of the Good on offer 
– and no possible future conception – are verisimilitudinous.  Nihilism 
is the confident conjecture that there is simply no truth of the matter 
concerning the human Good – no possible truth-makers for any sort of 
claim to the effect that human flourishing consists in X, or that life’s 
true meaning and value consists in Y. 
 
• Monism: The conjunction of a Confident epistemology with the 
metaphysical claim that only One conception of the Good is true or 
valid.  This stance holds that the persistence of disagreement 
represents nothing more than the persistence of error on some persons’ 
parts, and that reasonable and well-intentioned individuals (and 
institutions) can, with a sufficiently high degree of confidence, come 
to know the Truth about life’s ultimate meaning and purpose.23 
 
• Pluralism: The conjunction of a Confident epistemology with the 
metaphysical claim that Some (in our (more colloquial) sense of 
‘several’ – not in the logicians’ sense of ‘at least one’) of the 
conceptions of the Good Life currently on offer are true or valid.  This 
                                                 
23 Typically, a Monist will believe that one of the conceptions of the Good currently on offer is the true or 
valid one.  However, one might espouse Monism without committing to the claim that the true or valid 
conception is one that any person has hit upon yet.  Such a Monist accepts, as a matter of faith, that – 
while the intersection of the sets {extant conceptions of the Good} and {objectively valid conceptions of 
the Good} is the null set – the intersection of the sets {all possible conceptions of the Good} and 
{objectively valid conceptions of the Good} is a singleton. 
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stance regards the observed doxastic diversity as the expected outcome 
of the unfettered exercise of human reason, given that the nature of the 
‘valuational universe’ is itself heterogeneous.  On this account, 
genuinely valid modes of human flourishing embody 
incommensurable values, and thus are bound to conflict. 
 
• Skepticism: The conjunction of a Pessimistic epistemology with its 
concomitant agnosticism with respect to the question of which (if any) 
conceptions of the Good are true or valid. 
 
• Falliblism: The conjunction of a Humble epistemology with any of 
the metaphysical possibilities considered in Chapter Two.  Those with 
a strong affinity for splitting (as opposed to lumping) are invited to 
make the obvious further sub-division of Fallibilism into its three sub-
components: Fallibilist Nihilism, Fallibilist Monism, and Fallibilist 
Pluralism.  
 
• Abstinence24: The conjunction of a Humble epistemology with the 
decision to chastely demur at the prospect of making confident 
positive claims about what (if anything) endows life with meaning and 
value.   
 
                                                 
24 In employing this term I am consciously following the usage employed by Joseph Raz in his [1990]. 
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 With the recognition that certain of our epistemological possibilities 
recommend a principled restraint vis-à-vis endorsing any of our three metaphysical 
possibilities, we see the utility both of adding an extra column to the matrix 
representing our possibility space, and of ignoring certain of the cells in this matrix as 
theoretically uninteresting.  The result is that the relevant possibilities, originally 
suspected to be nine-fold, are actually exhausted by the six-fold possibility space 
represented in the updated matrix below: 
Table 2 
 None One Some Don't Know 
Confident Nihilism Monism Pluralism n/a 









where, for purposes of theoretical economy, we collapse the three ‘fallibilist’ 
positions indicated in parentheses into the single position characterized previously as 
Fallibilism.   
 A Pessimistic epistemology counsels agnosticism with respect to the three 
metaphysical possibilities we had considered; thus the possible 
epistemological/metaphysical hybrids represented by the first three cells in the second 
row make little sense.  (A fact represented by our use of ‘n/a’ in the relevant cells.)  
Similarly, a Confident assessment of our relevant cognitive abilities sits 
uncomfortably with a thorough-going agnosticism with respect to our three 
metaphysical possibilities; thus we also mark the corresponding cell (the upper 
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rightmost) with an ‘n/a’.25  Finally, note that on our conceptualization, a Humble 
epistemology is regarded as being consistent either with espousing one of our three 
possible answers to the Metaphysical Question (thereby yielding one of our 
Fallibilist positions), or with refraining from espousing any such answer (thereby 
yielding our Abstinent position). 
 
We have now given even further refinement to the Political Question.  More 
accurately, perhaps, we have identified an ‘intermediate’ version of the question, the 
answering of which will (hopefully!) assist us in deciding how to answer the Political 
Question′ (“Should states organize themselves along Perfectionist or Neutralist 
lines?”).  This intermediate version of the question casts the original, vague Political 
Question (“How should polities respond to the truth of Diversity?”) as a choice 
among the six ‘combinatorial’ possibilities just explored.  Thus refined, we can 
reformulate the question as follows: 
 
• Political Question″: How best should polities respond to the truth of 
Diversity – by affirming Nihilism, Monism, Pluralism, Skepticism, 
Falliblism, or Abstinence? 
 
So let us explore the Political Question″ in hopes that an answer to it might 
help us to answer the Political Question′.  That is to say, let us hope that resolving 
                                                 
25 Recall that we acknowledged the possibility of this position in section 1.2 above (in fn. 11), where we 
noted that “a proponent of Confident might even remain agnostic as to the question whether any creeds 
‘get it right’ … however, we may reasonably question wherein such a theorist’s confidence lies, given her 
inability to point to even one example of a creed that she regards as verisimilitudinous.” 
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the choice between Nihilism, Monism, Pluralism, Skepticism, Falliblism, and 
Abstinence helps us to resolve the choice between Perfectionism and Neutralism. 
 
3.2 The Axiological Question? 
 Before proceeding with this task, however, we should note that by thus 
arraying the relevant combinatorial possibilities, our epistemological and 
metaphysical theorizing has only barely begun.  For if we were to press on to 
completion, we would have to decide which epistemological and metaphysical 
positions are most defensible, and thus which combinatorial stance is best to endorse.  
As metaphysicians, presumably, we would not be content to suspend our theorizing 
with the identification of the relevant possibilities None, One, and Some – we would 
want to know which of these metaphysical possibilities is most defensible.  And as 
epistemologists, presumably, we would not be content merely to have identified the 
three possibilities represented by Confident, Pessimistic, and Humble – we would 
want to know which of these epistemic attitudes we ought to endorse and adopt. 
 Note further that we have been thus far approaching the question “What are 
we – impartial, disinterested philosophical theorists – to make of Diversity?” only as 
epistemological and metaphysical theorists – and not (yet, at least) as axiological 
theorists.  But presumably, as philosophers, deciding which 
epistemological/metaphysical hybrid stance we wish to adopt will not exhaust our 
theorizing impulse.  We shall also want to know which conception(s) of the Good is 
true or valid – at least if we affirm one of the hybrid positions that countenance the 
possibility of one or more such conception’s even being true or valid in the first 
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place.26  Thus, were we as epistemological/metaphysical theorists to endorse 
Monism, we would want to continue our theorizing on the axiological plane, 
investigating which conception, exactly, is the correct one.  Similarly, were we to 
endorse Pluralism, we would likely seek to distinguish the ‘legitimate’ visions of 
human flourishing from the ‘illegitimate’ ones, hoping to identify which worldviews 
and value schemes represent genuine modes of human flourishing, and which do not.   
 However, such theoretical exercises are costly, in terms of our time and 
energies; we ought to invest in their pursuit only if we believe the results of such 
inquiries will be germane to our purposes.  And we should observe that there are 
several ways in which further epistemological, metaphysical or axiological 
investigation could turn out to be useless, given our aims.  One way this could be so 
is if, upon completing our metaphysical theorizing, we saw fit to endorse something 
like Nihilism, thereby obviating the need for axiological theorizing (wherein we ask, 
“Which theory of the Good ought we to accept?”).  Another way further theorizing 
could be rendered unnecessary is if, upon completing our epistemological theorizing, 
we saw fit to endorse something like Skepticism – thereby obviating the need, not 
only for axiological theorizing, but even for metaphysical theorizing (wherein we ask, 
“Which possibility ought we to endorse – None, One or Some?”).  For once 
persuaded of a Pessimistic epistemology, we become persuaded as to the futility of 
such metaphysical investigations. 
 But perhaps the most salient possibility here is that, upon conducting our 
political theorizing, we discover the superfluity of further theorizing of any sort – 
epistemological, metaphysical, or axiological.  After all, we should keep firmly in 
                                                 
26 We would not thus inquire if, say, we were to affirm the Nihilist stance. 
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view the fact that, in this dissertation, our theoretic interests are primarily those of the 
political theorist – not those of the epistemologist, the metaphysician, or even the 
axiologist.27  Elucidation of the relevant epistemological and metaphysical 
possibilities (and their associated combinatorial possibilities) was, after all, conducted 
with the aim of assisting us in answering the Political Question: “How should 
polities respond to the truth of Diversity?”  Because our primary aim is to investigate 
this question of political theory, it is worth our while to investigate this latter 
possibility – the possibility that, apropos our purposes as political theorists, we have 
already conducted all the epistemological and metaphysical speculation we need.  
That is, we should ascertain the extent to which the combinatorial possibilities 
already set forth are sufficient for our (political-theoretic) purposes, thereby obviating 
the need for further investigation.  So with these possibilities now arrayed before us, 
we shall momentarily suspend our epistemological and metaphysical theorizing, 
postpone our axiological theorizing, and return to our question “How should polities 
respond to the truth of Diversity?”  We will return to more abstract philosophical 








                                                 
27 Except to the extent that political theory can be considered an axiological pursuit. 
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Chapter Four:  Charity 
We now have arrayed before us the various epistemological, metaphysical, 
and combinatorial possibilities that might obtain compatibly with the fact of 
Diversity.  Having addressed (in chapters one and two) our preliminary 
epistemological and metaphysical questions, we traded (in chapter three) our 
philosopher’s hat for that of a political theorist.  There we discovered that, as a 
preliminary means of addressing our Political Question′ (the choice between 
Perfectionism and Neutralism), we must confront the Political Question″ (the choice 
among the six combinatorial possibilities just set forth).  How to proceed? 
I suggest that a fruitful way to think about the Political Question″ is to ask 
first how we ought to regard adherents of the competing and conflicting worldviews 
countenanced by the fact of Diversity.  And I further suggest that we ought to regard 
them charitably.  This chapter elucidates the consequences, vis-à-vis the various 
epistemological and metaphysical combinatorials considered in the previous chapter, 
of our so regarding them.  
 
4.1 Charity 
Ought we to regard adherents of (at least some of) the competing and 
conflicting worldviews countenanced by the fact of diversity as themselves 
unreasonable?  Or can we assess most (or all) such adherents as being reasonable, 
even despite the fact that the employment of their rational faculties has led them to 
endorse sharply diverging conceptions of the Good?  Consider the fact that we do not 
always – or even typically – regard diversity of opinion on some topic as a significant 
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fact that needs to be reckoned with; we consider diversity of opinion rather to betoken 
the fact that at least some of the disputants are simply mistaken.  We do not regard the 
fact that, e.g., scientists often (passionately) disagree amongst themselves as to the 
relative merits of various hypotheses to be fraught with moral significance.  Instead, 
we simply conclude that some of those scientists are wrong in their views.  So before 
we proceed, we must first address the question as to whether the truth of Diversity 
constitutes prima facie evidence that some (if not all) the disputants in this matter are 
to be regarded as unreasonable, or at least mistaken (much as we regard the presence 
of disagreement among scientists as prima facie evidence that some – if not all – of 
them are mistaken), or whether the truth of Diversity instead reveals something 
important about the fully-informed and well-intentioned employment of humans’ 
rational faculties – viz., that such rational exercise cannot be expected to yield 
consensus on matters of ultimate concern.  If we affirm the latter hypothesis, we 
proceed with our investigation as to the most defensible political accommodation of 
this fact.  If we affirm the former, though, our strategy is this: we will seek to 
determine which account of human flourishing is the correct one, and then to 
articulate a conception of politics in accordance with this doctrine.  The fact of 
diversity, then, would come to mean nothing more than that some people remain in 
error as to the content of the Best Life for Man.  On this conception, polities might 
very well regard as one of their legitimate functions the task of enforcing conformity 
to the true understanding of the Good Life.  ‘Making men moral’ – hewing to Truth 
and correcting Error, whenever and wherever it manifests itself among citizenries – 
would be seen as a legitimate public purpose. 
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I suggest that rather than implicate widespread cognitive failure with respect 
to citizens’ pursuit of Truth in this domain, we ought instead to adopt a charitable 
stance with respect to their efforts to articulate and live out a defensible conception of 
life’s meaning and value.  For ease of exposition, let us give this stance the name 
Charity: 
 
• Charity: Ceteris paribus, we ought to assume that adherents of the 
conflicting faiths that constitute the circumstance of diversity are all 
reasonable and well-intentioned.  
 
Taking Charity seriously, then, commits us to an assessment of the fact of diversity 
that regards diverging opinions concerning the Good as constituting what we might 
term, following John Rawls, the fact of ‘reasonable diversity.’28   
 
4.2 Charity contra Nihilism and Skepticism 
 If we take on board a commitment to being Charitable, how does that impact 
our answer to the Political Question″?  How does it help us to adjudicate among the 
competing Nihilist, Monist, Pluralist, Skeptical, Fallibilist, and Abstinent 
approaches?  The first thing to notice is that by acknowledging that would-be polities 
confront the fact of reasonable diversity, we seem to commit ourselves to at least this 
                                                 
28 In Political Liberalism, Rawls uses the phrase “the fact of reasonable pluralism” to denote the 
circumstances that confront modern constitutional democracies: the fact (entailed by the conjunction of 
what I have termed Diversity and Charity) that “widely different and opposing, though reasonable, 
comprehensive doctrines” are a permanent feature of any such society [1996, 38].  I do not follow Rawls’s 
exact terminology here because I want to reserve our use of the term ‘pluralism’ to denote the more 
narrow claim, countenanced in our discussion of Pluralism above, that values in themselves are 
heterogeneous and incommensurable. 
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much: that various adherents of the conflicting, but reasonable, accounts of life’s 
meaning and value are not all mistaken – or at least, are not all systematically 
mistaken in the way they would have to be if either Nihilism or Skepticism were 
true. 
 To see this, let us take a moment to review some of the non-Nihilist and non-
Skeptical scenarios that have been suggested already.  One possibility is that there is 
an objectively existing, rationally defensible summum bonum (e.g., that Monism is 
true), and that some persons have accurately divined its nature.  A second Monistic 
possibility is that the human Good is objective and monistic, yet all or most human 
beings are only seeing through a glass darkly.  In this case, we might regard most or 
all adherents of conflicting faiths as giving (reasonable) expression to partial 
understandings of the Good.29  Yet another possibility is that the ‘valuational 
universe’ really is heterogeneous (e.g., that Pluralism is true).  In that case adherents 
of competing faiths might be regarded as equally reasonable even though their value-
commitments and practices diverge.  For according to value pluralists, each such 
adherent can be thought of as responding to one among several legitimate value-
schemes, none of which is fully compatible with any of the others.  Charity 
recommends that polities at least consider these possibilities before retreating to a 
Nihilistic or Skeptical stance with regard to their citizens’ efforts to articulate an 
understanding of the good, flourishing human life.  Nihilism and Skepticism each 
entail that all conceptions of life’s meaning and value are erroneous, at least to the 
extent that they regard as legitimate the wagering of any confident pronouncements in 
                                                 
29 This is a variation of the position first countenanced in section 2.1.  As I stated there (see fn. 19), this 
possibility will receive fuller treatment in section 6.5 below, where I introduce and discuss something I call 
the ‘Approximation Thesis’. 
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this domain whatsoever.  Charity, meanwhile, entails that both these stances are 
unduly critical of most persons’ abilities to formulate and carry out lives that 
genuinely respond to true values.   
 
4.3 Charity contra Monism 
 Put simply, the conclusion of our last section was that, if we regard the fact of 
diversity to represent a reasonable outcome of the well-intentioned and fully-
informed operation of the human intellect with regard to matters of ultimate concern, 
we are not apt to favor, as a suitable basis for political arrangements, a conception of 
politics that denigrates adherents of all conceptions of the Good Life as unreasonable.  
And seemingly, we would want to say the same thing about a conception of politics 
that denigrates adherents of all but one vision of the Good as unreasonable.  Yet 
presumably, such denigration is precisely what is implicated by the combinatorial 
position we termed Monism.  It seems our commitment to Charity stands in tension 
with the affirmation that one faith, and only one faith, is the True Faith.  For when we 
make this affirmation, it seems we cannot avoid the appearance that we are 
dismissing adherents of rival understandings of human flourishing as being either 
unreasonable, or unintelligent, or ill-intentioned, or some combination thereof. 
 Or can we?  Perhaps the appearance of such a dismissive attitude with respect 
to rival claimants to the Good is just that – mere appearance.  The attentive reader 
may have noticed that precisely this reply is available to the Monist.  I invoke the 
‘attentive’ reader here to highlight the fact that this very reply is latent in what has 
already been said in Chapter One.  Indeed, calling this reply ‘latent’ in the preceding 
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text may be putting it too mildly.  This reply – which we might term the ‘Monist’s 
Rejoinder’ – was spelled out quite explicitly in our discussion of the Disagreement 
Problem in section 1.1 above.  There, we noted that one might reconcile a Confident 
epistemological attitude with the truth of Diversity by insisting that Confidence in 
one’s epistemic abilities does not imply that every epistemic task is Easy.  An 
analogy between epistemic feats and athletic feats illustrates the point: Michael 
Phelps may be confident in his ability to win a gold medal in the 200-meter freestyle, 
but no one – least of all Mr. Phelps himself, who has acquired this confidence only at 
the cost of a lifetime devoted to disciplined training – will judge this feat to be easy.  
Similarly, perhaps, one of Plato’s Philosopher-Kings may be confident that he has 
acquired knowledge of The Good, but he will not think such knowledge easy to 
obtain: after all, it took him nearly fifty years of training in gymnastics, music, 
geometry and dialectic before he was able to leave the Cave.  So we can understand 
the Monist’s Rejoinder thusly: “So long as I deny the truth of Easy, there is nothing 
un-Charitable in my profession of Monism – just as there is nothing uncharitable in 
my judgment that few persons can swim the 200-meter freestyle in less than 1:43.  
Like the athletic feats of Michael Phelps, some epistemic feats are simply too difficult 
for most people to perform.  Nevertheless, I maintain confidence in the abilities of 
some persons to perform these cognitive tasks, just as I am confident in Phelps’s 
ability to shatter world records in swimming.”  Let us term ‘The Anointed’ those 
persons who regard their own cognitive powers, in matters of ultimate concern, as 
superior to those of the common lot.  (The Monist’s Rejoinder, then, may be offered 
by the Anointed, or it may be offered on behalf of the Anointed – perhaps by 
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someone who takes himself to be un-Anointed.)  The Anointed may agree that yes, 
the quest for Truth is difficult, the path thereto fraught with error, and the historical 
record littered with the creeds of those who failed to properly identify Truth.  But 
they may nevertheless insist that they are fortunate to possess the Vision of the 
Anointed, and to know the Truth even so.  These fortunate few will maintain that, just 
as ‘confident’ does not entail ‘easy’, so also does ‘difficult’ not entail ‘impossible’. 
 Nonetheless, I do not believe the Monist’s Rejoinder adequate to rescue 
Monism from our charge of un-Charitability.  Instead, I see this formulation of the 
Rejoinder as revealing a deeper difficulty confronting the Monist.  We might cast this 
difficulty as a dilemma, and call it the ‘Difficulty Dilemma.’  We name it thus, not 
due to a penchant for ungrammaticality and a recognition of the peculiar difficulty of 
this dilemma.  (Though I maintain it is particularly difficult.)  Rather, we name it thus 
as a means of invoking the claim of Difficulty, first introduced in section 1.3 above.  
A more apt name, then, might be the ‘Difficulty Dilemma.’ 
 The heart of this Dilemma consists in this insight: by appealing to a denial of 
Easy as a way to preserve a Monistic position compatibly with a Charitable stance 
with respect to citizens’ diverse conceptions of the Good Life, those offering the 
Monist’s Rejoinder are implicitly invoking the position we have termed Difficulty.  
For Difficulty is nothing more than the denial of Easy.  But recall the original context 
in which Difficulty was introduced: it was offered as an elucidation of the Humble 
answer to the Epistemic Question.  And recall further that a Humble epistemology 
grounds an Abstinent response to the Political Question″, rather than a Monistic 
one.  The Dilemma such a Monist confronts, then, is this: On the one hand, she may 
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deny Difficulty – in which case, it seems she no longer takes a Charitable stance 
with respect to the adherents of most conceptions of the Good.  (For if it is so Easy to 
identify which conception of life’s meaning and value is the correct one, then how 
else to explain the fact that so many people fail to so identify it, besides positing 
unreasonableness, unintelligence, or bad faith on the part of all those who do ‘fail’?  
But to posit such widespread unreasonableness, unintelligence, or bad faith, is 
seemingly to betray our Charitable regard for the majority of the world’s citizens.)  
On the other hand, she may endorse Difficulty.  This allows her to preserve her 
Charitable stance with respect to most (though not necessarily all) citizens, but has 
the further consequence that it (seemingly, at least) commits her to a Humble 
epistemology – and thus, to an Abstinent (rather than Monist) answer to the Political 
Question″.   
 So can the Monist defend her position by positing the existence of an 
Anointed class – folks who succeed at the difficult task of tracking Truth in matters of 
ultimate concern?  Can she simultaneously offer a charitable construal of the 
widespread failure to recognize Truth in this domain, on account of the fact that it’s 
just so plum hard to know the Truth of these matters?  That it is such a Difficult task, 
in fact, that we ought not expect the vast majority of folks to succeed in the endeavor?  
As I believe the Difficulty Dilemma demonstrates, the Monist cannot make such 
appeals: either she denies Difficulty – thus running afoul of Charity – or she 
embraces Difficulty – thus steering her away from the Confident epistemic attitude 
that grounds her monistic commitments.  There is no way to maintain Charity 
compatibly with Monism. 
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*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 I have suggested that a fruitful place to begin, when attempting to answer the 
Political Question″, is by adopting a stance of Charity with respect to persons’ 
efforts to articulate and defend their conceptions of the Good Life.  This seems a 
natural and intuitive move.  It carries certain consequences, though: namely, the 
elimination of several of the combinatorial possibilities set forth in Chapter Three – 
endorsement of which we have discovered to be un-Charitable.  So if we elect to be 
Charitable, we find that our Political Question″ has been reduced in scope.  It is 
now a choice among the remaining (Charitable) possibilities: Pluralism, 





Chapter Five:  Diplomacy 
5.1 Diplomacy 
Let us begin with Pluralism.  On its face, this seems a fairly Charitable 
stance: according to the Pluralist, of the rival conceptions of the Good now holding 
currency, several (perhaps many) are valid.  The Pluralist’s stance is, prima facie, a 
Charitable stance, inasmuch as it regards many (perhaps most) adherents of rival 
conceptions as accurately tracking truth about the Good.  However, further 
investigation reveals the Pluralist to be not so Charitable after all.  To appreciate 
this, consider how the Pluralist must adopt a somewhat ‘reconstructionary’ stance 
with respect to what we might term ‘True Believers.’  A True Believer is any person 
who regards his or her conception of the Good to represent the One True Faith – 
“Outside the Church, there is no salvation”, for example.  We take a reconstructionary 
stance towards a conception of the Good when we basically say to its adherents, 
“Look, I’m on your side here – I agree that your Faith has much to commend it.  I just 
don’t think your understanding of it – that it is the lone defensible account of the 
Good Life – is itself defensible.  Some other faiths are just as legitimate as yours.”  
Some (primarily, but not exclusively, the True Believers themselves) might regard 
such a stance as condescending or dismissive – even if it is put forth in a sympathetic 
spirit, by persons ultimately in agreement with the claim that the True Believers’ faith 
represents – subject to suitable reinterpretation, of course – a valid mode of human 
flourishing.  But Pluralism requires us to attribute a sort of ‘bad faith’ or ‘false 
consciousness’ to True Believers.   
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By way of contrast, consider the stance that Abstinence permits with respect 
to True Believers.  An Abstinent outlook frees one to basically say to such folks, 
“Look, you may be correct in your claim that yours is the One True Faith.  
Alternatively, the Pluralist may be correct that your Faith, while valid, is only 
properly understood in the context of a second-order stance of detachment that sees it 
as a – but not the – valid Faith.  But surely the matter is a difficult one to ascertain.  
So – while I do not necessarily share your confident assessment regarding your 
Faith’s monopoly vis-à-vis the path to salvation – I do genuinely and fully respect 
your judgment in this regard.”  
 Another way to put the point is to highlight one of the Pluralist’s restrictive 
metaphysical commitments: his anti-monism.  The simple fact is that many 
(reasonable, well-intentioned) folks understand their visions of life’s meaning and 
value in monistic terms; a great many people simply are, in our language, True 
Believers.  Profession of Pluralism puts one at odds with the monistic tendencies of 
these Believers.  The Pluralist must hold that any ‘exclusionary’ interpretation of an 
otherwise-valid conception of the Good – an interpretation of a conception that holds 
(incorrectly, according to the Pluralist) that it is the One True Faith – must be 
mistaken.  Only ‘inclusivist’ understandings of the various religious and secular faiths 
– understandings that recognize each such faith to represent only one among several 
divergent yet equally-valid modes of human flourishing – are accurate.  Exclusionary 
understandings are allowed to hold currency, but sophisticates will understand that 
only the ‘reconstructed’ versions of these faiths are truly accurate, given the 
heterogeneous nature of the ‘valuational universe.’  Notice, though, that the 
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combinatorial position represented by Abstinence is compatible with both the 
monism of the True Believer and the anti-monism of the Pluralist.  In remaining 
neutral or agnostic as to the dispute between monists and anti-monists, the Abstinent 
position reveals itself to be more ‘ecumenical’ than either the Pluralist position, or 
that of the True Believer. 
 In taking a reconstructionary stance, we seem to commit ourselves to a 
needlessly dismissive (and hence un-Charitable) stance towards those who do 
endorse one of the faiths countenanced as legitimate by Pluralism, but who do not 
themselves subscribe to the pluralistic understanding of their own faiths.  We might 
say that in doing so, we manifest a failure of a particular kind of Charity.  For ease of 
exposition, let us give this special variety of Charity a name: 
 
• Diplomacy: To the greatest extent possible, we should avoid engaging 
with citizens’ efforts to articulate and defend conceptions of the Good 
in terms other than those which the citizens accept. 
 
It seems natural and intuitive to say that we act Charitably in taking a Diplomatic 
attitude with respect to persons’ efforts to articulate and defend conceptions of the 






5.2 Coercion’s Burden 
 With the elimination of Pluralism as a non-Diplomatic (and hence un-
Charitable) stance with regard to a great number of persons who are, ex hypothesi, 
reasonable and well-intentioned, we seem to be left with only two viable answers to 
the Political Question″.  The combinatorial topics still on the table are Fallibilism 
and Abstinence.  At this point, we may appear to have reached an impasse: 
Fallibilism and Abstinence duel to a draw.  For a humble, Fallibilist endorsement of 
any of the three metaphysical positions (None, One, and Some) would seem to meet 
the criteria of Charitability and Diplomacy, every bit as much as does the 
epistemically-chaste response represented by Abstinence.  And were we still wearing 
our metaphysician’s and epistemologist’s hats, this appearance would be accurate.  
However, we do well to recall that we have since donned the hat of a political 
theorist, and to recall our stipulation in the closing sentences of Chapter Two.  There, 
we remarked that – apropos the fact that we are addressing a question of political 
theory – we will examine each of our combinatorial positions from the perspective of 
those who would wield political authority and power.  That is, we need to consider 
the viability of our remaining Fallibilist and Abstinent options, from the perspective 
of the state.  And when we do so, we see that sustaining a Fallibilist stance is not a 
very apt decision.  Why not? 
 To appreciate the impropriety of the state’s endorsing Fallibilism rather than 
Abstinence, let us attend to certain features of the state that become particularly 
salient in this context.  What feature (or features) of the state might warrant the claim 
that Fallibilism is an especially unsuitable stance for the state to take in response to 
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the Political Question″  – even though it might be a suitable stance for us to take as 
philosophical theorists?  I maintain that this stricture flows from the state’s claim to 
exercise a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion.  More specifically, the 
stricture flows from the possibility of the state’s coercively interfering in a citizen’s 
efforts to live out his or her cherished conception of life’s meaning and value.  For 
this possibility30 ‘raises the stakes’ – it imparts to the state a higher epistemic burden 
of proof that it must discharge before it can be justified in coercing an individual in 
the name of the One True Conception of the Good.  Call this heightened burden of 
epistemic proof ‘Coercion’s Burden’, or simply ‘Burden’ for short.  We need not 
formulate this burden specifically with reference to visions of the Good Life, or 
specifically with reference to states.  For ease of exposition, let us give it a general 
formulation thusly:  
 
• Burden: Morally speaking, whenever one agent claims the right to 
exercise coercion over another agent, in the name of some belief held 
by the claimant, that claimant thereby assumes a higher burden of 
epistemic proof, for establishing the truth of said belief, than that 
claimant would need to meet otherwise.   
 
An example will serve to illustrate.  Consider Zane, a devout Catholic.  Zane claims 
to have the right to coerce Yvette into living out a life broadly consonant with the 
principles of the Roman Catholic faith – at a minimum, say, of forcing Yvette to be 
                                                 
30 A possibility which, incidentally, persists regardless of whether or not the state intends to ‘legislate 
conceptions of the Good’.  For despite its best intentions not to do so, the state always runs the danger that 
it might thwart a citizen’s pursuit of his or her vision of life’s meaning and value. 
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baptized and confirmed in the Church.  Crucially, this claim rests (in some sense) on 
Zane’s belief that the Catholic religion represents the One True Faith, and that outside 
the Church there is no salvation.  Whatever evidentiary considerations ordinarily 
attend to this belief, Burden makes clear that – at least in the case of coercing 
Yvette’s baptism – Zane must discharge an extra-demanding burden of proof in order 
to demonstrate that his is a true belief.  The relevant baseline here is the burden he 
must discharge in order for his own actions in this regard (say, being baptized into the 
Church himself) to qualify as reasonable or justified.  So Zane need not offer as 
rigorous a defense of his own decision to live according to the terms set forth in the 
Catechism of the Catholic Church, as he must offer in defense of his decision to 
coerce Yvette to take part in the sacraments.  There is one burden of proof appropriate 
to Zane’s Zane-directed efforts, and in terms of which Zane’s efforts can be evaluated 
as reasonable or justified; there is quite another, more demanding, justificatory 
burden appropriate for Zane’s Yvette-directed efforts, and in terms of which Zane’s 
claim to a right to coerce Yvette can be evaluated as reasonable or justified.  So, 
perhaps, Zane might only need to establish that Roman Catholicism might be true to 
qualify as reasonable in his commitment to the Catholic faith.  But he might need to 
establish that Catholicism is extremely likely to be true in order for his efforts to 
coerce Yvette into Catholicism to qualify as justified.  These considerations apply to 
an even greater degree when we’re considering agents that claim a monopoly on the 
use of coercive force.  What is true of the (would-be coercive) relationship between 
Zane and Yvette is doubly true of the relationship between the state and its citizens. 
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 If something like Burden is true, and if it’s further true that the burden ‘scales 
up’ to reflect the fact that the state claims a monopoly on all legitimate coercion, then 
we have strong reason to believe that the state is situated so as to render any state 
endorsement of Fallibilism as inapt.  For built right into the very notion of a belief’s 
being held in a Fallibilist fashion seems to be an admission that the burden of proof 
set forth in Burden has not been discharged.  When the state claims for itself a 
monopoly on the use of legitimate coercive power, it raises the epistemic bar, apropos 
the justifications of its relevant beliefs, above the level countenanced by any 
Fallibilist stance.  Fallible beliefs can be justified, but there is at least a strong worry 
as to whether a Fallibly-held belief can justify coercion.  Unless – and until – this 
worry can be adequately dispelled, it seems we must conclude that the state cannot 
invoke a Fallibilist position.  This is the case, at least insofar as the state aspires to 
have justification for bringing its coercive powers to bear on behalf of its own 
Fallibly-held beliefs. 
None of this is to say that you are unjustified in affirming a Fallibilist 
Monism, or that I am unjustified in propounding a Fallibilist Pluralism, or that she 
is unjustified in subscribing to a Fallibilist Nihilism.  So long as we do not seek to 
coerce others in the name of our fallibilist faiths, any one of us is perfectly justified in 
professing whatever flavor of Fallibilism we may choose.  In our private activities, 
the Burden does not apply to us.  Nothing in our commitment to regarding others 
with whom we disagree Charitably, and nothing in our commitment to engaging one 
another Diplomatically, precludes our personal endorsement of a fallibilist version of 
our preferred answer to the Metaphysical Question′.  All this can be acknowledged.  
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I am not insisting that the balance of reasons ought to incline all of us towards total 
agnosticism with respect to the Good.  (Indeed, given my preoccupation with 
epistemic modesty, it would be odd for me to claim to know that no one else knows 
the Good31.)  Our position surely ought not to be construed as recommending 
everyone (or anyone) abandon as futile the quest to discover life’s true meaning 
(though it perhaps cautions that such a task should be undertaken only with fear and 
trembling).  We seek to disabuse, neither the Fallibilists of their (qualified) assertions 
regarding the Good, nor the agnostics of their right to abstain from making any 
pronouncements about the Good whatsoever.  Our position is instead that, while 
commitment to Charity and Diplomacy need not preclude us from expressing 
fallible Good-related judgments, there is another group of persons for whom these 
commitments carry much greater import, and bear very weighty implications.  This is 
the case for persons who would claim to exercise political power and authority – for 
those, that is, who claim to exercise a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion.   
   
                                                 
31 Even if I can claim venerable, Socratic precedent for such a stance. 
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Chapter Six:  Abstinence 
6.1 Modesty  
So with the elimination (in the previous chapter) of Pluralism as an un-
Diplomatic stance, and Fallibilism as a stance unable to bear its proper Burden, 
what remains?  Only one of our combinatorial positions survives; it seems we have 
finally answered our Political Question″!  How best should polities respond to the 
truth of Diversity, then?  To begin with, they should adopt an 
epistemological/metaphysical hybrid position like that of Abstinence.  For ease of 
exposition, let us formulate and name a version of this Abstinent response apropos 
the perspective of those claiming the right to exercise political power and authority: 
 
• Modesty: The state should take a humble attitude with respect to its 
own ability to make accurate judgments concerning the content of the 
true conception of the Good. 
 
At this point, I should pause to address two ancillary concerns that have 
doubtless arisen in the minds of some readers.  The first we might term the 
‘Anarchist’s Rejoinder’: the worry that, with my formulation of Modesty – and with 
our discussion of Burden in the preceding chapter – the state has made its first 
appearance quite suddenly, perhaps even rudely.  For some readers might protest that 
I have too hastily presupposed the legitimacy of monopolistic, redistributive 
dominant protective agencies, and that this too-hasty presupposition taints all 
subsequent analysis.  As for the second ancillary concern: we must confront head-on 
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the peculiarity of attributing attitudes, epistemic abilities, beliefs, and so forth to the 
state.  Are not these sorts of ascriptions proper only when performed with regard to 
individuals?  Are not state-directed epistemic attributions straight-forwardly 
meaningless?  Individuals have epistemic abilities, attitudes, and the like.  Collective 
entities like states do not.  What sense can we give to such notions as the state’s 
adopting an attitude of humility, with regard to its epistemic ability, and so forth 
(notions I appear crucially to rely upon, with my formulation of Modesty just above)?  
Call this the challenge of properly interpreting ‘agentive ascriptions’ to the state, or 
the ‘Ascription Problem’ for short.  We shall consider each of these challenges in 
turn. 
 
6.2 The Anarchist’s Rejoinder 
  In response to the Anarchist’s Rejoinder, I can reply only that my account 
does presuppose the existence and legitimacy of a state; my task is simply to 
investigate how polities (once they have established their legitimate right to exist) 
ought to understand themselves once they adopt, as their fundamental orientation, the 
need to respond to Diversity. So while it is my sense that the sorts of considerations I 
adduce in this dissertation could be re-assembled, supplemented by some auxiliary 
theses (concerning, say, the ineliminable need for centralized coercive power in the 
adequate provision of public goods), and appropriated, by someone keen to do so, for 
the purpose of defending the legitimate existence and limited scope of state 
institutions (against, say, philosophical anarchists on the one hand, and defenders of 
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Leviathan on the other), it is not my purpose to undertake any such task here.32  
Instead, I will simply assume the legitimate existence of a state, (provisionally) 
understood as that entity which claims a monopoly on the exercise of legitimate force 
or coercion, and among whose central tasks is (perhaps exclusively) the provision of 
public goods.  (Such a formulation, I believe, is not utterly dispositive of the question 
as to the scope of warranted state action, as the complement of public goods regarded 
as the legitimate objects of state action can be construed either quite broadly – so as 
to include a robust social safety net, aggressive protection of the natural environment, 
and so forth – or quite narrowly – so as to include only the most minimal safety nets 
and environmental protection.  Reasonable persons can disagree as to which public 
goods should be included in the list.  Any such list, though, is likely to feature the 
basic tasks of maintenance of public order, protection of citizens against threats both 
internal and external, enforcement of property rights and contracts, and the like.  But 
any conception of the state, such as can be defended from these premises, is highly 
unlikely to feature Perfectionist tasks – such as the promotion or maintenance of 
some particular theory of the Good.) 
 
6.3 The Ascription Problem 
As to the question of ‘agentive’ ascriptions to the state (the ‘Ascription 
Problem’), I will simply hold that any such attributions are to be regarded as 
shorthand for more complex descriptions that avert exclusively to the epistemic 
abilities and attitudes of individual persons wielding state power.  I buttress this 
                                                 
32 For engaging accounts along these lines, the interested reader is advised to consult Nozick [1974] and 
Schmidtz [1991]. The Limits of Government: An Essay on the Public Goods Argument. 
66 
position with the plea that, in this regard, I am no worse off than most other theorists, 
of either a Neutralist or a Perfectionist persuasion.  We now consider each element of 
this response in turn. 
 Let us term the ‘Reductive Thesis’ the claim that state-directed agentive 
ascriptions can be ‘reduced’ to – re-interpreted as – agentive ascriptions directed at 
the persons whose offices and actions constitute the state’s institutions and actions, 
respectively.  In this sense, ‘the state’ and its actions can be thought to supervene on a 
certain set of persons (and their actions) whose roles in society are typically regarded 
as serving as agents of the government.  The metaphysics of reduction and 
supervenience are subjects of large bodies of philosophical literature in their own 
right, and it would carry us too far afield to wade into them here.  For present 
purposes, it will suffice to focus on one aspect of the supervenience relation as 
capable of supplying illumination sufficient to clarify present difficulties.  This one 
aspect has to do with supervenience as an ‘asymmetric dependency’ relationship.  
That is, phenomena of type X are said to supervene on phenomena of type Y if it is 
possible that some change in Y effects no change in X, yet impossible that some 
change in X occurs in the absence of some corresponding change in Y.  So 
phenomenon X is dependent on phenomenon Y in a manner that Y is not dependent 
on X – hence the asymmetric dependency.  To take a familiar example (at least for 
philosophers), mental states are sometimes thought to supervene on brain states 
insofar as different types of brain states might ‘realize’ a given mental state,33 while it 
                                                 
33 Being in pain is the classic – albeit problematic – example of such a mental state; just as problematically, 
being in pain was often said to correspond – in normal humans – with the brain state of c-fiber firing.  Pain is 
thought to supervene on c-fiber firing (rather than being thought identical to c-fiber firing) just in case there 
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is at the same time metaphysically impossible for an individual to experience a 
change in mental states without thereby experiencing a corresponding change in brain 
states.  This notion is often explicated by positing the possibility that mental states are 
‘multiply realizable’: a single mental-state type (pain, say) might be ‘realized’ by 
either of two different brain-state types – c-fiber firings or b-fiber firings, for 
instance.  Thus, an individual’s experience of pain could be explained either because 
her c-fibers were firing or because her b-fibers were firing.  Perhaps a more intuitive 
(especially for non-philosophers) illustration of multiple realizability can be drawn 
from the example of computer software.  A single program – Microsoft Word, say – 
can be ‘instantiated’ on either a PC or a Mac.  In each case, very different things are 
going on at the level of ‘micro-description’ in terms of the hardware inside the two 
different types of computers.  But at the level of ‘macro-description’, the same 
program is being run. 
 It is beginning to appear that this excursion into the rarefied air of 
contemporary analytic metaphysics calls for some justification.  And here it is: the 
‘asymmetric dependence’ of ‘state-type phenomena’ on ‘person-type phenomena’ is 
to be understood on analogy with asymmetric dependency relationships that obtain 
between mind/brain and software/hardware.  Specifically, the agentive components of 
state action always supervene on the actions of the individuals that in some sense 
constitute the state; state actions are always instantiated in the actions of persons, and 
these instantiations are furthermore multiply realizable.  A concrete example will help 
to illustrate.  Imagine that the state reverses itself on the question as to the legality of 
                                                                                                                                           
are other ways for the mental state pain to be realized – as it might be if pain-states in dogs corresponded 
to the firing of their d-fibers. 
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second-trimester abortions, and it does so on the basis of a particular conception of 
the Good Life – specifically, on a specific interpretation of a specific passage of 
Scripture.  This is precisely the sort of state-directed agentive ascription to which we 
will repeatedly help ourselves throughout this study; it is our task here to offer up 
some picture of what this ascription could actually mean when we’re not being 
elliptical – a picture of how the ‘reduction’ of state-directed ascriptions to person-
directed ascriptions would work in practice.  The first stage in this ‘reduction’ is the 
identification of the specific organ of state ‘agency’ responsible for said reversal – in 
this case, let us suppose it is the state’s highest judicial body, its Supreme Court.  
“The state reversed course on the legality of second-trimester abortions” is, at this 
stage, interpreted as shorthand for “The Supreme Court reversed . . .”  But this line of 
reduction can be carried forward further.  For the Court is not an agentive entity in its 
own right, but is rather composed of (we might suppose) nine individuals 
(legitimately agentive entities all), any majority of whom can effectively determine 
the decision of ‘the Court’ when their judgments on a particular matter coincide.  And 
in this case, let us imagine that a mere five of these nine members converged on an 
opinion as to the legality of second-trimester abortions.  In such a scenario, we can 
further interpret “The Court reversed its earlier decision as to the legality of second-
trimester abortions” as “a majority – in this case, five – of the justices that presently 
constitute the Supreme Court has converged on an opinion that reverses a decision 
agreed to by a majority of the members of a previous version of the Court”, etc.  We 
can further specify this rendering if we enumerate all the justices (A through E, say) 
whose current opinion jointly constitutes ‘the Court’s’ current position and then 
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enumerate all the justices (1 through 7, say) of the previous version of the Court 
whose then-opinion jointly constituted the Court’s position, and so forth.  It is now 
easy to see how ‘state actions’ can be multiply realized, as well.  For, just as in 
actuality it was the convergence of justices A, B, C, D and E on a judgment regarding 
the legality of second-term abortions that served as the truth-maker for the claim “The 
state reversed its position on the legality of second-trimester abortions” originally 
considered, so might it have been the case that the convergence of justices A, B, C, D 
and F brought about this same result. 
 With the conclusion of this thought experiment, we can (mercifully) regard 
the case for the ‘Reduction Thesis’ as closed.  Henceforth, we shall unabashedly avail 
ourselves of agentive ascriptions to the state, confident that we could, if need be, 
painstakingly construct an account that cashes out our (shorthand) state-directed 
attributions of agency in terms of the complex of actions of persons whose activities 
constitute (at the level of ‘micro-description’) the state. 
 As to the second component of my defense of state-directed agentive 
ascriptions (the “but everybody else is doing it!” component): Perfectionists no less 
than Neutralists are seemingly in need of such ascriptions.  If the Perfectionist wishes 
to question the cogency of our entire endeavor on the basis of the questionable status 
of the Reduction Thesis, she thereby acquires the burden of supplying her own 
account of how it is we can make such agentive ascriptions to the state.  Either that, 
or (which is likely much more difficult) she must dispense with such attributions 
altogether, electing instead to proceed only in terms that invoke particular persons’ 
motives and actions in her defense of ‘the state’s’ properly ‘promoting’ the Good on 
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the basis of its ‘judgment’ as to the superiority of certain forms of life.  Our effort to 
articulate and defend the strongest possible Neutralist answer to the Political 
Question′ is not saddled with the ‘Ascription Problem’ to any greater degree than is 
the Perfectionist’s parallel effort. 
 
6.4 The Political Question′ Once More 
 Let us pause to take stock of where we are, and how we got here.  Our 
investigation began with consideration of the Political Question: How should polities 
respond to the truth of Diversity?  Citing the prevalence of two fundamentally 
opposed answers to this question in the contemporary literature, we immediately 
refined this question in terms of a choice between Perfectionist and Neutralist 
approaches to politics.  Hence, the Political Question′: How best should polities 
respond to the truth of Diversity – by organizing themselves along Perfectionist lines, 
or along Neutralist lines?  We noted that some preliminary philosophical theorizing 
would assist us in this endeavor, so – after a few chapters wherein we painstakingly 
identified all the relevant epistemological and metaphysical positions, and all their 
relevant combinations – we finally refined the Political Question′ into a choice 
among six epistemological/metaphysical ‘hybrid’ positions.  Hence, the Political 
Question″: How best should polities respond to the truth of Diversity – by affirming 
Nihilism, Monism, Pluralism, Skepticism, Falliblism, or Abstinence? 
 We suggested that a fruitful way to think about the Political Question″ is by 
asking how we ought to regard the adherents of the conflicting faiths that jointly 
constitute the fact of Diversity.  Our initial response – plausible, and (I hope) 
71 
uncontroversial – was that we should regard them Charitably.  That is, in the absence 
of strong evidence to the contrary, we ought to regard the adherents of conflicting 
conceptions of the Good as being both reasonable and well-intentioned.  What 
follows from the seemingly innocent and natural decision so to regard these persons?  
Chapters Four through Six argued that quite a lot follows from this decision.  Our 
investigations there revealed that a polity’s commitment to Charity – coupled with a 
recognition of the Burden imposed on any agent claiming a right to coerce others in 
the name of that agent’s beliefs – render all but the Abstinent response as inapt for a 
polity confronting the fact of Diversity.  Thus, we arrived at an answer to the 
Political Question″: polities ought to respond to the truth of Diversity by affirming 
an Abstinent position.  Formulated from the perspective of those who would claim to 
exercise political power and authority, this Abstinent position yielded the proposition 
we termed Modesty: The state should be humble in its assessment of its own ability 
to make accurate judgments concerning the content of the true understanding of life’s 
meaning and value. 
  
 We are now in a position to return to our Political Question′: should states 
organize themselves according Perfectionist or Neutralist lines?  In the remainder of 
this chapter, I will argue that our investigations heretofore strongly incline us towards 
a Neutralist answer. 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 
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 At the outset of this discussion, we should note a certain asymmetry that arises 
when we consider the possibility of establishing a Perfectionist answer to this 
question (and concomitantly refuting the Neutralist answer), versus the possibility of 
establishing a Neutralist answer to this question (and concomitantly refuting the 
Perfectionist answer).  The asymmetry is this: it is much more difficult to decisively 
refute the Perfectionist answer, simply because there are so many possible 
Perfectionist views.  And while there are correspondingly many different Neutralist 
views, it would appear (and here is where the asymmetry arises) that the successful 
defense of any one of the possible Perfectionist positions suffices to refute the 
Neutralist answer – whereas it seems not to be the case that successful defense of a 
Neutralist answer serves to refute any possible Perfectionism.  For there always 
remains the possibility of the neglected alternative: perhaps there is a Perfectionist 
defense out there, of sufficient strength to override whatever considerations might be 
marshaled in support of our Neutralist story.  Perhaps even this Perfectionist story 
still awaits identification, articulation and defense, by an abler mind. 
 Why suppose that there is such an asymmetry?  It seems that refutations of 
Perfectionist politics, if they are to be truly decisive, must proceed on a case-by-case 
basis – attempting to refute this or that Perfectionist view head-on, rather than 
attempting to undermine any possible Perfectionism toute courte.  Recall that our 
goal in this dissertation is to explore the strongest case to be made in favor of a 
Neutralist answer to the Political Question′, and to articulate the conception of 
politics most congruent with that case.  If what I have just said is correct, however, 
then at the end of the day our aim cannot be to decisively refute every possible 
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Perfectionist conception of politics.  Our goal, more modest, must be to simply 
motivate something like a ‘presumption of non-Perfectionism.’  So while I will not 
claim to have settled the manner in a conclusive fashion, I do begin my argument 
with a survey of the considerations favoring a general Neutralist orientation to the 
challenge posed by Diversity.  From there, I go on to build on these considerations 
(in Section Three) in order to illustrate the more specific features of the most 
defensible version of Neutralism. 
 
6.5 A Presumption of non-Perfectionism 
 With the combinatorial possibilities discussed in the third chapter now clearly 
in view, we might begin motivating a presumption of non-Perfectionism by noting 
that, of all the possibilities thus far considered, only one of them can serve to ground 
Perfectionism – the Monistic one.  Furthermore, the truth of Monism does not even 
guarantee the truth of Perfectionism.  While the truth of Monism might be a 
necessary condition for the justification of a Perfectionist approach to politics, it is 
not sufficient.  For endorsement of a Perfectionist conception of politics requires, not 
just assent to the epistemological and metaphysical views that are the constituent 
components of Monism (Confident and One, respectively), but also confidence in a 
further axiological claim, to the effect that this or that particular understanding of the 
Good happens to be the One True Faith.  Thus, a full-blooded Perfectionism would 
take something like the following form: “Mormonism is the True Faith.  [An 
axiological claim]  In fact, it is the only true faith.  [A One-like metaphysical claim]  
Furthermore the truth of Mormon Doctrine is easily accessible to all.  [A Confident 
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epistemological claim.] Thus, our political institutions should be erected in 
congruence with the main tenets of Mormonism.  [A claim of a Perfectionist political 
theory.]”   
 Yet some persons might reasonably affirm Monism without going the further 
step and venturing the confident axiological claim necessary to ground a Perfectionist 
politics.  That is, they may be more confident in their Monistic epistemology and 
metaphysics than they are in their (say) Mormon axiology.  As an illustration, 
consider the possibility that someone might endorse Monism concurrently with 
something like (what we might term) the ‘Approximation Thesis’.  According to the 
Approximation Thesis, human value is indeed objective and monistic, and it is well 
within the species’ epistemic abilities to grasp truth about it.  (Thus, the 
Approximation Thesis comports with the essential epistemic and metaphysical 
commitments of Monism.)  However, this Thesis maintains that – at least at present – 
we are all only seeing through a glass darkly.  (Thus, the Approximation Thesis 
abjures the axiological confidence which must be conjoined with Monism to license 
the inference to Perfectionism.) Accordingly, polities might regard most or all 
adherents of conflicting conceptions as giving (reasonable) expression to partial 
understandings of the Good.  On this account, rival value-schemes track the Good 
with roughly equal accuracy, while their divergent components represent the 
predictable result of their each giving priority and focus to different features of the 
Good.  Diligent application of human cognitive powers may eventually yield near-
universal consensus as to the one really true account of human flourishing – an 
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account to which all current accounts represent mere approximations.34  This 
consensus may not obtain for many generations hence.  When it does, we might 
affirm our axiological speculations with a degree of confidence sufficient to warrant 
profession of a Perfectionist politics.  But until then, the degree of confidence with 
which we affirm our Monistic epistemological and metaphysical speculations is, in 
itself, insufficient to warrant such a Perfectionist profession.  Theoretical physicists 
long for the day when a Grand Unified Theory of Everything allows us to dispense 
with the partial verities yielded by current theories like quantum mechanics and 
special relativity; these theories will in due course be appreciated as approximations, 
whose incompatible elements represent the predictable result of their each giving 
priority and focus to different features of the physical universe.  Likewise, those who 
affirm the Approximation Thesis look forward to far-off advances in human 
understanding.  They long for the day when sustained inquiry into the nature of the 
human Good has permitted us to obtain a full and true understanding of life’s 
meaning and value – an understanding that reveals all current attempts to articulate 
such an understanding to be partial approximations.  (It is worth noting here that I am 
not merely describing a possible world, among whose inhabitants are such 
Approximation-Thesis-subscribing persons.  I take myself to be describing the actual 
world.  My description of the Approximation Thesis-affirming Monist is not terribly 
off-base as a characterization of (among others), Unitarian Universalists (and 
                                                 
34 We might, then, say that we now face a “current account” deficit (or deficiency). 
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theological universalists35 and inclusivists more generally), adherents of the Baha’i 
faith,36 and many others.) 
 So, if something like the Approximation Thesis (or any similar claim to the 
effect that the One True Faith, while discoverable by the human intellect, is as yet 
undiscovered37) is true, even one’s profession of Monism would seem insufficient, 
on its own, to license one’s avowal of a Perfectionist politics.  Given that 
Perfectionism is grounded in only one ‘sub-possibility’ of the six 
epistemic/metaphysical combinatorial positions set forth in the third chapter, we seem 
to have some motivation for a presumption of non-Perfectionism.  At very least, it 
seems the Perfectionist assumes a daunting burden of proof.  Discharging this burden 
requires establishing the reasonability, in the face of all the other available options, of 
exclusively favoring the Perfectionist-grounding combinatorial – that is, Confidence 
supplemented with axiological confidence.  Coupled with our observation, in section 
4.3, that Monism is an un-Charitable stance to take with respect to many persons, 
we seem to have a pretty solid motivation for a presumption of non-Perfectionism.  In 
effect, we have arrived at an answer to our Political Question′, and that answer is 
Neutralism. 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
                                                 
35 See, for example, the writings of John Hick, especially his [1993]. 
36 Although Baha’is believe that divine revelation is required to assist human beings in this on-going quest 
of sharper and clearer spiritual discernment – it cannot be achieved solely by “diligent application of 
human cognitive powers”, or by “sustained inquiry into the nature of the human Good”. 
37 Note that endorsement of Monism in conjunction with the Approximation Thesis does not represent 
the sort of conjunction of a Confident epistemology with an agnosticism regarding metaphysics, such as 
we’ve already seen fit to lampoon – see section 1.2, fn. 11.  That position involved an agnosticism with 
respect to the metaphysical possibilities None, One, and All.  The position considered in the text just 
above involves an affirmation of One, conjoined with a humble assessment only of our (extant) axiological 
abilities to divine the full nature of the One True Faith. 
77 
At this point, even some of my most sympathetic readers may begin to grow 
agitated.  They will ask themselves – quite reasonably! – something like the following 
question: “Golly: if the best we can reasonably hope for, as an answer to the Political 
Question′, is to motivate a presumption of Non-Perfectionism, and if (as it appears, 
from the preceding several paragraphs) all we need to do in order to motivate such a 
presumption is to undermine Monism . . . then why did we bother also going to all 
the trouble to undermine Skepticism, Nihilism, Pluralism and Fallibilism as 
well?!?”  This is a fair question.  Fortunately, it has an answer: We sought to draw out 
the full implications of Charity because, in doing so, we now have ample material 
with which to tell our Neutralist story, and a firmer basis on which to ground it.  For 
convincing ourselves that we ought to incline towards Neutralism in preference to 
Perfectionism is one thing – and requires no more than undermining Confident – 
while telling a specific Neutralist story is quite another.  And as we’ve seen, the same 
considerations of Charity that undermined Monism (and with it, our inclination 
towards Perfectionism), also eliminate all but the Abstinent position: Modesty.  But 
what does a Modest polity look like?  It is the task of Section Three to answer this 
question in detail.   
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Chapter Seven:  Neutrality 
What does a Modest polity look like?  Its primary distinguishing feature is 
that it will chastely demur at the opportunity to endorse any particular understanding 
of the Good Life as authoritative for public purposes.  But here I begin to wade into 
dangerous waters.  For much has been written over the past several decades about the 
relative merits of various ‘neutrality theses’ – claims (like my Modesty) to the effect 
that states ought to strive for some sort of neutrality vis-à-vis citizens’ competing 
conceptions of the Good.  So in this chapter, let us turn our attention to the thorny 
issues surrounding this claim. 
 
7.1 Neutrality: An Overview 
Though a term of art whose use is endemic only to political theorists, ‘state 
neutrality’ (also commonly known as ‘liberal neutrality’38) nevertheless does refer to 
an important idea – and an idea that is easy to grasp, inasmuch as it is closely related 
to a more familiar notion.  That notion is the separation of Church and State.  We 
might aptly characterize the separation of Church and State as a ‘neutrality thesis’: 
viz., that the state ought to remain neutral with regard to – at least, ought not 
officially endorse, nor establish any institutional affiliations with – religious sects.  
                                                 
38 I prefer to avoid invocation of the term ‘liberal’ if I can help it, simply because the word can mean so 
many different things to so many different people.  In the hands of political theorists, though, the term is 
typically used to denote modes of governance that privilege individual liberties and rights, over and against 
state power.  The relevant contrast would be with authoritarian or fascist or totalitarian regimes.  The 
contrast, I take it, would not be with theocracy or dictatorship – for these can be authoritarian or they can 
be liberal.  (Though we probably expect liberal regimes to be democratic and illiberal ones to be dictatorial 
or theocratic or somesuch.  And some people may even insist that a democratic mode of governance is a 
constitutive requirement of any regime truly worthy of the adjective ‘liberal’ – though this may be open to 
debate.)  Philosophers’ debates on the matter are often cast in terms of ‘liberal neutrality’, I suppose, 
because the thought is that only liberal states incur the obligation to strive for neutrality, if any do.  But I 
prefer to leave it open whether or not illiberal states can be ‘neutral’ states, and to leave it open whether a 
state’s liberal character in fact requires neutrality (as some argue is true of the relationship between 
liberalism and democracy). 
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(As understood by the original framers of the Constitution, this thesis probably 
ranged only over various denominations of the Christian religion; perhaps even more 
specifically, only over various Protestant denominations.)  When we generalize the 
notion of the separation of Church and State, thus understood, such that its scope now 
includes, not just various specifically religious doctrines and various non-state 
institutions (like the various organized religions), but any conception of what gives 
life meaning and value, we get something like the ‘state neutrality’ thesis that is the 
focus of my investigation in this chapter, and which has figured prominently in 
discussions among political theorists for the past twenty-five years.   
Though generally in agreement on the merits of disestablishmentarianism, 
theorists diverge in their judgments as to whether or not the state ought to strive for 
full-fledged neutrality, thus conceived.  Some – the Perfectionists – argue that the 
state need not or ought not strive for neutrality; some further argue that the state could 
not attain neutrality even if it tried.  Others – the Neutralists – argue that the state can 
and should be neutral.  Among Neutralists, a variety of understandings of the 
neutrality thesis hold currency.39  This variety can be categorized under two headings: 
what I shall term the ‘mechanics’ of neutrality and what I shall term the ‘defense’ of 
neutrality.  Roughly, understandings of neutrality that differ with regard to mechanics 
vary in their answers to the question as to how the state ought to remain neutral, while 
understandings of neutrality that differ with regard to its defense vary in their answers 
to the question as to why the state ought to remain neutral.  The two are obviously not 
unrelated: a particular defense of the neutrality thesis may carry with it certain 
                                                 
39 A state of affairs among political theorists exactly analogous to the state of affairs amongst modern 
polities’ citizens, which state of affairs gives rise to the various neutrality theses in the first place. 
80 
implications vis-à-vis the mechanics of neutrality, while a certain picture of the 
mechanics of neutrality might commit us to a certain range of possible defenses, or 
may not permit us to make use of a certain range of others.  Nevertheless, it remains 
possible to consider each heading in isolation. 
Various understandings of the mechanics of state neutrality hold diverging 
positions on each of the following issues, among (potentially) others: (1) the subject 
of the neutrality principle; (2) the interpretation of ‘neutrality’; (3) the scope of the 
neutrality principle; and (4) the formulation of the neutrality principle.  I’ll briefly 
describe each of these, before moving on to consider various understandings of the 
defense of the neutrality principle.40   
The question as to the subject of the neutrality principle is in many ways the 
most important and the most difficult.  We can get an appreciation for the issue at 
hand by returning to our original exposition of the neutrality thesis in terms of a 
generalization of the familiar notion of the separation of Church and State (henceforth 
the ‘(dis)establishment thesis’).  Recall that the elements of a natural understanding of 
the Constitution’s (Dis)Establishment Clause include (i) the state and (ii) the 
‘Church’: (established, organized) religious sects.  Recall also the natural extension of 
this disestablishmentarianism to all conceptions of what gives life its meaning and 
value – religious or otherwise, established and institutional or otherwise.  But now 
notice that the elements of our new, wider-scoped neutrality thesis are no longer as 
clear as they were in the case of our original, First Amendment-derived doctrine of 
disestablishment.  One element – that of the state – remains, and presents no 
                                                 
40 The following discussion of the various issues involved in articulating the mechanics of neutrality owes 
much to George Sher’s discussion in chapter two of his [1997]. 
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particular difficulty.41  But the other element – that of a religious sect – has 
disappeared, and has been replaced with a more nebulous notion: that of a conception 
of the Good.  It remains to us to characterize this more nebulous notion in a manner 
that renders it serviceable.  But for now it must suffice to note that while sects – 
religious denominations, theological traditions, faith-based institutions, and the like – 
are easy to identify, name, and count, conceptions of The Good are harder to 
individuate.  (Do Trinitarian and Unitarian Christians share a common conception of 
The Good?  Do atheists and agnostics?  Act-utilitarians and rule-utilitarians?)  Thus, 
fixing – in at least rough terms – the subject of the neutrality principle is of 
paramount importance.  For to fix our characterization of conceptions of the Good too 
loosely is to confirm the Perfectionist’s suspicion that no state possibly could 
conform to the doctrine of state neutrality (because, if we allow convictions about, 
say, speed limits to qualify as an element of a conception of The Good, then it seems 
few states could ever hope to meet the demands of neutrality).  Meanwhile, to fix our 
characterization too stringently (as we would if we were, say, to restrict questions of 
The Good to affirmations or denials of God’s existence) renders the neutrality 
principle too weak to be interesting.  
Neutralists typically fall into either of two categories when it comes to the 
proper interpretation of ‘neutrality’: those who advocate neutrality of effect (or 
outcome), and those who advocate neutrality of justification.  Comprising the vast 
majority of neutralists, those in the latter camp point out the difficulty inherent in 
securing outcomes that qualify as ‘neutral’ as among rival conceptions of The Good – 
                                                 
41 For now, at least – consideration below of the proper understanding of the scope of the neutrality thesis 
will reveal that this element is not without its interpretive difficulties. 
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whatever exactly ‘neutrality’ might turn out to mean under this interpretation.  Thus, 
they maintain that the justifications offered for government policies, not the effects of 
them, are properly the sorts of things that should be neutral.  Though decidedly in the 
minority, ‘outcome-neutralists’ nevertheless can defend their position as one to be 
taken seriously by adverting to the powerful consideration that justifications of state 
policies, no less than conceptions of The Good, can be disparate, conflicting, shifting, 
overlapping . . . in short, justifications can be as difficult to individuate as are 
conceptions of The Good.  The ‘justificatory neutralist’, on this interpretation, faces 
just as difficult a task in her exposition of the interpretation of ‘neutrality’ as she does 
in her characterization of the subject of the neutrality thesis. 
Internecine debates among neutralist regarding the proper scope of the 
neutrality principle revolve around the following sorts of questions: should the 
neutrality stricture apply only to (what John Rawls calls) the state’s ‘basic structure’: 
to its constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice?  Or should it apply more 
broadly: to legislation? to policy?  For that matter, to whom does this stricture apply?  
Only to framers of the state’s constitution? to all its legislators? (and if so, does this 
include their advisors?) to anyone who wields state power, from the chief executive 
down through the entry-level administrative bureaucrat? to anyone who advocates in 
the public sphere? (and if so, does voting count as advocating in the public sphere, 
such that even ordinary citizens are subject to the demands of neutralism?)  
Discussion of these questions has yielded less in the way of consensus than we have 
seen emerge from the debates on the interpretation of neutrality; nonetheless, details 
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concerning the proper scope of the neutrality stricture obviously play an important 
role in anyone’s full conception of a neutrality thesis. 
Questions surrounding the formulation of the neutrality principle ask: what 
sorts of promotion of The Good are (in)admissible?  Must the state merely refrain 
from coercively imposing its preferred vision of the Good Life?  May the state seek to 
promote (a specific conception of) virtue, so long as it does not do so coercively?  If 
so, is the state’s supplying positive incentives for those who live the Good Life 
acceptable, so long as it does not apply sanctions to those who fail to conform?  Can 
the state seek to create conditions favorable to (its preferred conception of) a life of 
virtue, so long as it stops short of wielding coercion to discourage vicious living?  
And so forth. 
Turning now to defenses of the neutrality principle, we find, following Steven 
Wall and George Klosko42, that they cleave along two dimensions: call these 
dimensions the (non)neutrality dimension and the (non)deductivity dimension.  The 
‘neutrality dimension’ of defenses of the neutrality principle has to do with whether 
the proposed defense of the neutrality principle itself aspires to be somehow a 
‘neutral’ one.  The ‘deductivity dimension’, meanwhile, has to do with whether or not 
the proposed defense avails itself of some (usually quite minimal) set of moral 
considerations, or whether instead it seeks more ‘shallow’ foundations.  Combining 
these two dimensions, we find four possible families of justification to result: 
neutral/deductive, non-neutral/deductive, neutral/non-deductive, and non-neutral/non-
deductive, as follows: 
                                                 
































Let us examine examples of each one, in turn. 
 
(1)  ‘Ecumenical’ approaches to defending the neutrality principle are neutral and 
non-deductive; they are so-called because – while adducing a variety of possible 
justifications for the neutrality principle, from a variety of possible moral, 
philosophical and theological perspectives – they chastely abstain from endorsing any 
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particular justification or perspective.  Bruce Ackerman43 provides an example of 
such a strategy; on one interpretation44, so does the later John Rawls.   
 
(2) What we might term ‘minimalist’ approaches are neutral and deductive; they are 
so termed because they purport to justify neutrality from a minimal, putatively 
uncontroversial set of moral commitments said to be shared by all.  They are 
considered neutral insofar as the moral premises they utilize are not thought to be 
peculiar to some specific, controversial understanding of the human good; they are 
rather thought to be universal in some sense.  Nevertheless, these moral premises are 
thought to play a crucial role in providing the conceptual foundation for the neutrality 
claim; thus this approach is called ‘deductive’ rather than ‘non-deductive.’  Charles 
Larmore45 and Gerald Gaus46 adopt such a tactic in their defenses of neutrality; on 
another reading, the earlier Rawls might also be described47 as offering such an 
account.  
 
(3) Since we keep mentioning Rawls, we might borrow the terminology he sets forth 
in his later work48, and dub as ‘comprehensive’ the approaches, of those like Ronald 
Dworkin49, that are non-neutral and deductive.  Such accounts happily help 
themselves to robust and controversial value claims in their defense of neutrality; 
                                                 
43 Ackerman [1980]. 
44 One that regards his notion of an ‘overlapping consensus’ among a society’s ‘reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines’ on a ‘political conception of justice’ as the long pole of his argument: see his [1996]. 
45 Larmore [1987]. 
46 Gaus [2003]. 
47 By focusing on his account of the ‘primary social goods’ as the heart of his argument; see especially his 
[1999, 78 – 81], but see also his [1996, 187-90]. 
48 See especially his [1996]. 
49 Who, in his [2000, 250-4], bases his defense of neutrality on his famous ‘challenge model of ethics’, and 
who elsewhere (see his [1985a]) defends neutrality as issuing from each citizen’s more basic and 
fundamental right to equal concern and respect. 
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their proponents are under no illusion that these value-claims are universally 
accepted, or thin, or minimal.  Attempts to ground state neutrality in the value of, or 
respect for, autonomy50 also get classified under this heading, just as do efforts to 
derive the neutrality principle from the truth of value pluralism.51   
 
(4) Finally, we might describe as ‘pragmatist’ the accounts of those, like John Gray, 
who regard state neutrality as necessitated by the need for a modus vivendi – a 
workable compromise among adherents of competing conceptions of The Good, none 
of whom are in a position to impose their preferred way of life on others (at least not 
without intolerable cost).  Such accounts are non-neutral and non-deductive: 
neutrality is counseled on prudential grounds, rather than being deduced from moral 
premises – hence the non-deductivity.  Meanwhile, in offering such counsel, these 
accounts need make no pretensions of neutrality vis-à-vis the rival conceptions of the 
Good competing for control of the polity.  Adherents of each such conception can 
accept the merits of the modus vivendi justification for neutrality simultaneously with 
their firm convictions as to the superiority of their own Faiths, and with their supreme 
confidence in their suitability to rule, if only such rule could be secured at tolerable 
cost.  Hence the non-neutrality of the pragmatic account. 
We are left, then, with the following picture: 
                                                 
50 See Macedo [1990]. 
51 See Galston [2002] and [2004] for arguments that are in this vein, even if not explicitly conducted in 

































The preceding discussion of the various understandings of the principle of 
neutrality, I take it, is a fairly accurate summary of the ‘state of the art’.   
 
7.2 Neutrality: The Defense 
So if, as I have claimed, acceptance of Modesty urges the state to embrace 
some version of a neutrality thesis, how exactly is this neutrality thesis to be 
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formulated, in light of all the considerations, distinctions, and arguments just put 
forth?  Unsurprisingly, our formulation will set forth a characteristic vision of both 
the defense and the mechanics of neutrality.  We shall begin with the former because, 
as the discerning reader has no doubt surmised, the defense of our neutrality thesis 
will center around Modesty.  Such a defense does not graft cleanly onto the four-fold 
categorization of accounts portrayed in Figure 2 above.  For the conceptual terrain on 
which defenses of the neutrality principle are usually located, as constituted by the 
two dimensions of (non)neutrality and (non)deductivity, obscures the existence of a 
rival – and, I believe, far more defensible – approach to defending a neutrality thesis.  
And that is a defense that rests on broadly epistemic grounds, like the one I am 
developing in this chapter.  So I demur at the suggestion I locate my project on the 
landscape presupposed above. 
But there is more to my defense of a neutrality thesis than simply citing how 
naturally it seems to flow from Modesty.  For perhaps there are independent 
considerations that may be brought to bear in our defense of a neutrality thesis, and 
perhaps one of these considerations might resonate with our account as thus far set 
forth.  At this point I wish to buttress the epistemically humble response to Diversity 
by noting the congruence of Modesty with just such a principle, one that is perhaps a 
bit more controversial: 
 
• Authenticity: A life lived in accordance with the (or a) valid 
conception of human flourishing is, ceteris paribus, of more value to 
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the person living that life when that life is freely chosen.  Such a life is 
of less value when it results from external imposition. 
 
This claim is of the following relevance to the state: even were the state to feel 
confident about the true nature of the Best Life for Man, it would be better, all things 
considered, to refrain from explicitly endorsing or enforcing this way of life on its 
citizens.  Taken in tandem, Modesty and Authenticity impute to the state an attitude 
that might be expressed as follows: “In light of the fact that the efforts of so many 
reasonable and well-intentioned individuals has failed to yield any consensus on the 
matter, we – the duly-appointed representatives of the people – are loathe to endorse 
any particular conception of the Good Life as the correct one.  In any event, even if 
we did think we had it figured out, we still would refrain from explicitly endorsing it 
as the correct one.  For then our coercive imposition of the Truth would rob it of 
much of its potential to confer meaning and value upon the lives of those forced to 
live it.”52  Taken in tandem, that is, Modesty and Authenticity offer a powerful 
defense of a neutrality principle.  Granted, such a stance places our state at odds with 
those of its citizens who hold visions of the Good that in fact endorse precisely this 
sort of imposition of the Truth upon unwilling un-believers – visions that deny the 
truth of Authenticity, that is.  (This consequence is more fully explored in the 
                                                 
52 Consider the following four scenarios: (a) A citizen comes to endorse the One True Faith of her own 
accord; (b) A citizen comes to endorse one False Faith of her own accord; (c) A citizen comes to endorse 
the One True Faith via (coercive) external imposition; and (d) A citizen comes to endorse one False Faith 
via (coercive) external imposition.  In attributing the above attitude to the state, I am attributing a 
preference that ranks these four scenarios in the order {(a)>(b)>(c)>(d)}, rather than a preference for a 
{(a)>(c)>(b)>(d)} ranking.  This is the import of Authenticity – one who accepts it reckons (b) 
preferable to (c), and is not indifferent between (a) and (c).  Of course, it must be allowed that some folks 
will rank (c) as preferable to (b).  However, such folks do not grant the full force of Authenticity, as I am 
understanding the claim, and my appeal to its ‘buttressing’ force is not addressed to them.  I am indebted 
to William Galston and Judith Lichtenberg for pressing me to clarify the precise role the Authenticity is 
playing here. 
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Appendix.)  Our reply can only be that we accept this result.  For the first time in our 
exposition, we are forced to retreat a bit from the diplomatic stance (some no doubt 
felt it to be excessively diplomatic) that sought to avoid offending any persons by 
disputing elements of their favored visions of the Good.  But giving such offense is 
no doubt inevitable at some point.53 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
So far I have argued that Charity leads us eventually to Modesty, and that 
Modesty disposes would-be state actors towards a stance of neutrality.  Furthermore, 
I have just suggested that Authenticity buttresses the considerations of epistemic 
humility that favor Neutralism.  Our formulation of the defense of neutrality is 
complete, but what of our account of the mechanics of neutrality?  Our discussion of 
this aspect of our neutrality thesis will occupy the remainder of this chapter. 
 
7.3 Neutrality: The Mechanics 
I begin the task of rendering the mechanics of our version of neutralism by 
positing a model of politics that, seemingly, any state aspiring to neutrality must 
emulate: call this the ‘Arbitration Model.’  The Arbitration Model finds its most 
natural expression within that conception of politics that sees as its central task the 
adjudication of disputes among the citizens of a polity.  But the Arbitration Model is 
severely limited in its capacity to accommodate, not the sorts of pedestrian, low-level 
                                                 
53 At this point, one might be tempted to inquire as to the various fashions in which Modesty and 
Authenticity can be combined so as to constitute – either jointly, or individually – a defense of a 
Neutrality Thesis.  I should know – I myself succumbed to just this temptation!  The interested reader is 
invited to turn to the Appendix for a detailed presentation of my investigations – results which, while 
interesting, are too disruptive of the main flow of the argument to merit inclusion in the main text. 
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disputes that we earlier observed to constitute the ordinary ‘stuff of politics’ (such as 
the dispute as to whether surplus tax revenue should be appropriated for the task of 
building a swimming pool or a theatre), but rather the sorts of disputes countenanced 
by Diversity: disputes concerning what, in the final analysis, endows life with 
meaning and value.  Why, then, do I choose to begin our sketch of the proper 
mechanics of neutrality with a model of politics I acknowledge at the outset to be of 
limited application to our present task?  This decision is motivated by methodological 
considerations: it is only by coming to see the inadequacies of the Arbitration Model 
that we can come to a full appreciation of the desiderata for any account of the 
mechanics of neutrality that is to be fully adequate to the task.  That is, we need to see 
how it is that disagreement about the best way to live is not amenable to adjudication 
according to the model of dispute resolution associated with the Arbitration Model, 
before we can see how it is that any such disagreement might be arbitrated.  So, it is 
to an elucidation of this model of politics, and its associated model of dispute 
resolution, that we now turn. 
 
7.31 The Arbitration Model 
The Arbitration Model is an ‘instrumentalist’ conception of politics.  Other 
visions of the political sphere, such as those articulated by Aristotle54, ‘civic 
humanists’ like Hannah Arendt55, or ‘civic republicans’ such as Phillip Petit56, are not 
                                                 
54 See Aristotle’s Politics, especially Bk. III Ch. 5, where he restricts the status of ‘true citizen’ to he “who 
has a share of office.” 
55 See her [1958].  According to Maurizio Passerin d’Entreves [d’Entreves 2006], for Arendt, “political 
activity is not a means to an end, but an end in itself; one does not engage in political action to promote 
one’s welfare, but to realize the principles intrinsic to political life, such as freedom, equality, justice and 
solidarity.” 
56 See Petit [1997]. 
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instrumentalist in our sense.  This is because they regard political activity and 
participation as ends in themselves: as Frank Lovett puts it in his characterization of 
the classical Republican tradition, “The goods of active political participation, civic 
virtue, and so on, are to be understood as intrinsically valuable components of human 
flourishing.”57  Instrumentalists, by contrast, regard political activity as a means to 
the end of securing the social conditions indispensable to any person’s ability to 
pursue his or her own ends – where these (private) ends, and not the (public) means 
thereto, are considered to be the primary bearers of intrinsic value.58  As such, 
instrumentalists recognize political arrangements as necessary to arbitrate the 
conflicts that inevitably arise when diverse citizens all pursue diverse projects that 
each reckons as valuable.  Outside a Kantian ‘Kingdom of Ends’, it is not to be 
expected that the disparate projects of distinct individuals will cohere in such a 
fashion that social harmony will result spontaneously.  Political arrangements are 
required, then, to condition and coordinate each person’s pursuit of private advantage, 
so as to ‘arbitrate’ conflicts amongst citizens both (a) ‘preemptively’, by antecedently 
prohibiting certain types of activity (theft, murder, and so forth) that are reasonably 
esteemed as disruptive of any person’s pursuit of her ends, and (b) ‘retroactively’, by 
adjudicating the remaining conflicts that arise amongst citizens on an individual, 
piecemeal basis.  
 
7.321 The Common Ground Model 
                                                 
57 Lovett [2006]. 
58 Of course, this is not to exclude the possibility that on certain persons’ conceptions of life’s meaning 
and value, political participation will have intrinsic value for them. 
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Plausibly, this model of ‘politics as arbitration’ – especially in its ‘retroactive 
arbitration’ dimension – relies on a model of dispute resolution we might call the 
‘Common Ground Model.’  According to the Common Ground Model, a proper 
response, when one is confronted with a seemingly intractable dispute concerning 
values, is to retreat to some ‘common ground’ of values that all the disputants share, 
and to draw upon these common values to delineate a neutral framework within 
which this dispute (and all others relevantly similar) can be adjudicated.  So, to return 
to our example of neighborhood residents split on the issue as to whether to use 
surplus tax revenues to build a theatre or a pool: the residents may disagree as to the 
relative merits of cultural enrichment versus physical exercise, but they all agree (we 
may assume) as to the merits of majoritarian decision-making.  Thus, all citizens, 
despite their divergent individual preferences vis-à-vis the proper use of the available 
funds, may nevertheless converge on a willingness to abide by the will of the 
majority.  In this case, the common commitment to deference-to-majority-will (at 
least with regard to the appropriation of surplus funds) provides the common 
framework for neutral arbitration of the dispute in question, and all parties agree to 
conform to the outcome of a vote.  To take a slightly more stylized example from 
state-craft and constitution-writing, we might think of the task of formulating the 
principles of a specifically liberal democratic polity as the task of identifying 
common ground as to the question of the proper scope of democratic decision-
making.  Here, the citizens of a liberal democracy are to be regarded as holding 
divergent opinions about a whole range of possible ‘lower-level’ democratically-
enacted measures, but a collective commitment to the legitimacy of such 
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democratically-enacted measures (irrespective of whether such measures conform to 
their personal preferences), and a collective commitment to a conception of the 
proper limits of democratic, majoritarian decision-making.  And not surprisingly, the 
most illustrative examples of the Common Ground Model in action are actual (albeit 
still slightly stylized) instances drawn from history.  The paradigm case, of course, is 
one we already encountered in our survey of the literature on liberal neutrality: the 
U.S. Constitution’s framers’ decision not to adopt an official religion for the federal 
government.  Plausibly, the strategy of maintaining neutrality vis-à-vis competing 
religious sects was available to the Founders only to the extent that they could advert 
to some shared beliefs and values that – even in the absence of an established Faith – 
could provide a serviceably determinate guide to the formulation of policy, 
legislation, and constitutional essentials.  This complement of shared beliefs and 
values was simultaneously neutral (inasmuch it refrained from privileging any of the 
competing (mostly Protestant) conceptions of the Christian Faith holding currency in 
the former colonies) yet serviceably determinate (inasmuch as anyone – Reformed or 
Anglican, Congregationalist or Baptist, Methodist or Presbyterian, Lutheran or 
Catholic, even Theist or Deist – could agree on, e.g., the right to bear arms, the 
permissibility of capital punishment, the rights of free assembly and free press, and 
(unfortunately) the disenfranchisement of women and the less-than-fully-human 




                                                 
59 Three-fifths human, it would seem. 
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7.322 Inadequacy of the Common Ground Model 
But for all its merits in modeling dispute resolution in cases (actual and 
hypothetical) like those considered above, the Common Ground Model is inadequate 
to the task of effecting adjudication of the sorts of disputes we noted at the outset of 
our argument – disagreements vis-à-vis the best way to live.  Why is this?  It is 
because disagreements as to the merits of competing conceptions of the Good Life are 
in some sense ‘fundamental’ disagreements: the tenets of a person’s vision of the 
Good Life are the ‘bedrock’ of that person’s beliefs; if citizens’ beliefs with regard to 
these tenets clash, there is no ‘sub-bedrock’ to which one may advert to forge 
common ground.  (In making this point no particular work is done by my 
characterization of a ‘conception of the Good.’  Presumably the point is quite general 
– if a society is characterized by genuine diversity of thought and opinion, then by 
definition, at some point, with regard to at least some issue, we will inevitably 
uncover intractable dispute.)  So in a society characterized only by what may be 
called ‘surface disagreement’, astute political agents may be able, in every case of 
(apparent) dispute, to uncover some common ground that makes resolution of the 
conflict possible.  Similarly in a society characterized only by what we might call 
‘factual disagreement’, which serves to obscure an underlying ‘normative consensus’: 
every putative moral disagreement might turn out, under careful scrutiny by able 
arbitrators, to be nothing more than a factual disagreement.  (We may all agree to the 
normative proposition that, above a certain threshold, causing needless pain to 
innocent creatures is wrong, but simply disagree about factual claims as to which 
sorts of creatures feel pain, and to what extent.)  Thus, in moral matters, common 
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ground is always available.60  But (back in the real world) any society characterized 
by genuine (as opposed to merely ‘surface’ or ‘factual’) heterogeneity vis-à-vis 
understandings of the Good is bound to expose the limits of the Common Ground 
Model sooner or later.  And this limit manifests itself whenever we are unable, due to 
a paucity of common ground, to erect ‘neutral’ means of resolving disputes. 
We might furthermore note that a seeming consequence of the application of 
the Common Ground Model to a polity displaying the ‘fact of reasonable diversity’ is 
the inevitable ascendancy of a Perfectionist politics.  For consider: plausibly, if state 
actors (whether drafting policy, law, or constitutional essentials) are to be able to 
advert to some backdrop of shared beliefs and values, such as would make possible a 
mutually-satisfactory framework for the arbitration of disputes, this backdrop would, 
in at least some respects, constitute (or be a constituent of) some conception of the 
Good.  This would arise via something like the ‘law of unintended consequences’: 
lawmakers proceeding in a piecemeal fashion, invoking this bit of common ground 
here for one case, and that bit of common ground there for another case, will 
seemingly eventually find that they have – without ever intending to – articulated a 
vision of Life’s Meaning and Value as authoritative for public purposes.  The tenets 
of this doctrine, then, would come to be embodied in official state decree, via the 
formulation of the ‘neutral’ arbitration framework.  Equally plausibly, that state 
would come to be seen as reposing on the foundation provided by that particular 
vision of the Good.  Initially this may not appear to pose a problem: after all, if 
lawmakers do invoke common ground in just this (piecemeal) way, would we not 
                                                 
60 ‘Moral nativists’ who posit a universal, innate ‘moral faculty’, sometimes argue as though they’re 
committed to such a position vis-à-vis all putative moral disagreement.  See, e.g., the work of Susan Dwyer 
and John Mikhail. 
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expect the resulting ‘officially favored’ conception of the Good to be 
unproblematically uncontroversial?  In fact, we might even be tempted to recommend 
this piecemeal, common-ground-seeking procedure as the most satisfactory means of 
accommodating the fact of reasonable diversity, or of identifying the uniquely 
suitable Vision of the Good for a diversely-peopled Perfectionist state to endorse.  
Yet the fact of persistent disagreement as to the true account of the Good Life for 
Man, even (and especially) among reasonable and well-intentioned persons, poses a 
challenge to any political regime that seeks to understand itself in terms of any one 
particular (and, ex hypothesi, reasonably contestable) conception of life’s meaning 
and value – even when such a regime happens to alight upon a conception sufficiently 
uncontroversial to serve as authoritative for public purposes.  For any such consensus 
is potentially only temporary; in fact it is likely to be so.  Especially in polities that are 
open, democratic, and diverse (as are most in the developed world today), it is nearly 
inevitable that principled dissenters will eventually sprout up.  Such dissenters, living 
under such a regime, will not share the state’s notion of the Good Life, a notion that 
will inevitably motivate and suffuse much of that regime’s policy and law.  This 
presents, at a minimum, a practical difficulty: any viable political regime relies 
crucially on the freely-offered consent of (at least a very large portion of) its citizens, 
and any state that relies too heavily on a too-controversial understanding of life’s 
meaning and value is bound to forfeit an unfortunate degree of its citizenry’s loyalty.  
But the fact of reasonable pluralism presents a moral difficulty as well, for those 
sensitive to such considerations: even if a ‘non-neutral’ state can manage to avoid the 
threat of instability (can manage to avoid the practical problem, that is), it remains the 
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case that such a state stands in an improper relation to those among its citizens who 
do not share its official conception of the Good Life.  The impropriety here is not 
generated by the mere fact of disagreement between two agents or sets of agents; 
indeed, no impropriety is involved in the mere fact that people will disagree on issues 
of ultimate concern.  The impropriety stems, of course, from the state’s unique claim 
of authority over the individual – the state’s claim that it is entitled to issue directives 
that its citizens are then obligated to obey.  Specifically, the concern is that the state 
claims a monopoly on the use of legitimate force or coercion; for such an agent to 
then wield this monopoly on behalf of a particular conception of the Good Life is to 
manifest patent disrespect for those persons who do not share this conception of the 
Good, and whose forced compliance with its tenets they experience as odious, and as 
a violation of their most basic human liberties. 
Much the same point can be made in historical terms: traditionally, political 
regimes emerged and evolved out of, and ranged over, conditions of relative cultural 
homogeneity.  Nation-states, for example, evolved as convergences of, well, nations 
and states: nations – persons bound together by the ties of culture, language, history, 
tradition, religion, and geography – came to be bound together further by a shared 
polity: the state.  Traditionally, a political regime understood itself in the terms of a 
particular vision of the Good Life – specifically, the same one (informed by religion, 
culture, tradition, etc.) that mediated the relations among the citizens of that regime’s 
respective nation.  Presently, though, polities find it increasingly difficult to orient 
themselves with reference to some particular (contentious) theory of the Good Life – 
the result of contemporary polities’ ever-increasing diversification and cultural 
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heterogeneity.  So whereas before, in the ‘golden age’ of the nation-state, political 
agents could always rely on the possibility of retreating to common ground when 
disputes got too difficult to adjudicate directly, it seems that is decreasingly the case. 
All this, to say that the limitations of the Common Ground Model are being 
revealed: despite the fact that it is a model of dispute resolution, it is (somewhat 
ironically) only a viable model of political adjudication under conditions of relative 
homogeneity – conditions that are vanishing under the pressures of immigration, 
globalization (especially advances in travel and information technology), and the 
increasing empowerment of previously marginalized groups.  It is, we might say, only 
a model for the adjudication of surface-level disagreement occurring in the context of 
foundation-level hegemony. 
 
Thus, due to its apparent reliance on this now-discredited model of dispute 
resolution, the Arbitration Model – at least insofar as it aspires to be a full-blooded 
account of politics – stands in significant tension with Diversity.  Constructing a rival 
conception adequate to the task of accommodating diversity, then, we might term the 
‘Challenge of Accommodating Diversity,’ or simply the ‘Challenge of Diversity.’  I 
propose that, if we stay within the broad confines of the Arbitration Model here61, we 
understand our available options to this challenge as falling into either of two general 
categories.  One the one hand, there is a ‘Defeatist’ strategy that infers from the 
inadequacy of the Common Ground Model the conclusion that no model of dispute 
                                                 
61 Of course we need not do this.  But the only alternatives I can see that depart from a broadly 
Arbitration-ist understanding of politics all also involve a departure from an instrumentalist understanding of 
politics: with its affirmation of the intrinsic value of political participation, Civic Humanism (for example) 
takes us afield of the Arbitration Model.  But it, like any other account that sees in the essence of politics 
anything other than the expedient production of the conditions of peaceable co-habitation, constitutes a 
Perfectionist understanding of politics, and thus falls beyond the purview of our argument. 
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resolution could be adequate to the Challenge of Diversity, and counsels instead a 
more ‘restrictive’ model of dispute resolution that recognizes any possible 
adjudication among conflicting conceptions as being arbitrary.  The Defeatist strategy 
accepts this result, however, and endorses the privileging of one or another particular 
conception – seemingly arbitrary though the state’s selection among the options may 
be – as a necessary means of maintaining public order.  (We might term this the 
Hobbesian strategy.)  On the other hand, there is the ‘Optimistic’ strategy that 
endeavors to replace the Common Ground Model with a more expansive model of 
dispute resolution that may perhaps be adequate to the Challenge of Diversity.  
Unsurprisingly, I urge us to explore the latter alternative. 
 
 
7.33 Methodological Radical Diversity 
But if the Common Ground Model is no longer adequate to the task of modern 
politics, what will take its place?  This section endeavors to find out.  We begin by 
exploring the prospects for conflict-adjudication, not under conditions that permit 
retreating to common ground (as happens according to the Common Ground Model), 
but rather under conditions as prohibitive of this as possible.  Thus, we arrive at a 
methodological principle of ‘radical diversity’: that is, we consider the structure of 
dispute resolution suited to conditions in which no overlap, no common ground, and 
no basic framework can be presupposed.  Successful discovery there of practical, 
deliberative principles will, it appears, provide as robust a theoretical basis as possible 
for the important task of guiding political theorizing in this age of ever-increasing 
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cultural heterogeneity.  So let us investigate this circumstance of radical diversity, and 
see what we can discover. 
The first thing to note is the picture of the collectivity endemic to the 
Common Ground Model, and to note further that this picture disappears when we 
consider circumstances of radical diversity.  This is a vision of the collectivity on the 
analogy of the individual agent, wherein ‘we’ – the collective, the citizenry of the 
polity – have purposes and aims.  What we are said to have, then – since really the 
collective is nothing over and above the aggregation of the individuals who constitute 
it – are shared aims or purposes: individual aims or purposes, universally held.  On 
this picture, the quest for ‘common ground’ (as it manifests itself in, say, dispute 
resolution) is the quest to find suitably broad and general purposes and aims, of which 
it can be said (truthfully) that we all share them.  But let us think of the circumstance 
of radical diversity as one wherein, for any putative shared, universal, ‘public’ 
purpose, there is at least some (we might suppose reasonable) citizen in that polity 
who does not share that purpose.  What are we to do under such circumstances?  We 
must move from a ‘shared purposes’ understanding of the collectivity (which requires 
finding suitably general purposes – a task whose difficulty increases as a function of 
the diversity of a polity62) to a ‘live and let live’ model, wherein we presuppose no 
shared purposes.  The main drive animating the organizing of the public sphere in this 
case, then, is that of creating as ample a space possible for all individuals to live out 
their individual purposes (as well of course as purposes they share with those with 
whom they choose to associate).  If we want to make this space as ample as possible, 
                                                 
62 And the relationship is probably closer to exponential than linear. 
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we will want to make maximum feasible accommodation of citizens’ efforts to live 
out their individual (and freely shared) purposes. 
So fortunately, it seems our investigation of the conditions of ‘radical 
diversity’ does provide us with an alternative interpretation of the Arbitration Model, 
to replace the discredited Common Ground Model.  For ease of exposition, we can 
formulate this model of dispute resolution and give it a title:  
 
• MFA: Fully cognizant of the force of Modesty and Authenticity, the 
state should adopt an attitude of ‘Maximum Feasible Accommodation’ 
with regard to its citizens’ efforts to live lives in accordance with their 
diverging conceptions of life’s meaning and value. 
  
The term “maximum feasible accommodation”, first popularized (to my 
knowledge) by William Galston in his 2002 book Liberal Pluralism: The 
Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice, provides the 
practical political content for the theoretical notion of epistemic modesty: it provides, 
that is, the account of the mechanics of a neutrality thesis whose defense relies on 
considerations such as Modesty and Authenticity.  We are thus finally in a position 
to execute the central aim of this chapter: viz., the formulation of an adequate 
principle of neutrality: 
 
• Neutrality: The state’s most appropriate response to Diversity is to 
strive for neutrality with regard to the conflicting conceptions of the 
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Good holding currency amongst its citizens.  This neutrality is to be 
defended by appeal to Modesty and Authenticity, and is to be 
conducted according to the principle of MFA. 
  
In the next chapter, we turn our attention to the elucidation of the principle of 
maximum feasible accommodation, arguing that the state’s attitude of maximum 
feasible accommodation should issue in a policy of limited government.   
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Chapter Eight:  Coercion  
8.1 MFA: Particular and General 
As its name suggests, Neutrality holds that a state acts neutrally to the extent 
that it strives for maximum accommodation of the conflicting conceptions of the 
Good Life holding currency among its citizens (as well as accommodation of other 
possible conceptions that just happen not to hold currency among its citizens at the 
time).  But as thus far formulated, MFA (our principle of maximum accommodation) 
admits of multiple readings; there are, we might say, multiple ‘levels’ at which MFA 
might apply.  Let us distinguish at least two: the ‘particular’ and the ‘general.’  At the 
level of the particular, we might say that MFA is a legal (or jurisprudential) notion: 
its formulation is designed to guide lawyers and judges in cases where they must 
consider the claims of individuals or groups seeking exemption from laws or 
regulations, the scope of which are otherwise presumed to be universal.  So, for 
example, a judicial system motivated by a desire for maximum feasible 
accommodation would seek to exempt Sikhs from mandatory motorcycle helmet 
laws, if that is what they were to request, out of deference to their religiously-based 
custom that requires men to don appropriate headwear.  Such a desire would take 
something like the following form: were the Sikhs to oppose the statute, the judiciary 
would willingly assume the burden of proof for establishing (if they can establish it) 
that the state’s interference with the Sikhs’ liberty (to wear ceremonial headwear in a 
manner required by their rules of religious observance) is licensed by a compelling 
state interest.  That is, an MFA-guided judiciary would not place the burden of proof 
on the Sikhs to establish why they should get to be exempt from the law.  Again: the 
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law is presumed to have universal applicability, but if an individual (or group) can 
demonstrate that that law legitimately impedes her (or their) ability to live life 
according to her (or their) vision of life’s meaning and value63, then the burden 
suddenly shifts to the state to try to demonstrate why such an infringement of liberty 
is permissible.   
We should pause at this point to give expression to a certain picture lurking in 
the background here, and to define a certain term of art that will help us give this 
expression.  The term of art is ‘expressive liberty’, which we can understand as a 
person’s liberty to live, free from undue interference, a life that expresses his or her 
conception of what ultimately endows life with meaning and value.  I’ll reserve the 
term ‘expressive liberty’ for this freedom itself, and speak often of a right to 
expressive liberty, a right that I shall defend as central to our Neutralist vision of the 
state.  The picture lurking in the background is one in which most laws – while 
certainly involving a restriction of liberty on some level – do not involve an undue 
restriction of expressive liberty.  So we have here something like a tripartite division 
of behaviors – those that are forbidden by one’s conception of the Good, those that 
are permitted by one’s conception, and those that are required by one’s conception.  If 
a statute proscribes an individual’s or group’s Good-required action, or prescribes a 
Good-forbidden action, then that individual or group is entitled to petition the state 
for an exemption from said statute.  But on this picture we must imagine that in the 
vast majority of cases for most people, a statute’s requisite restriction on liberty 
                                                 
63 And we should note that individuals and groups cannot discharge this responsibility merely by asserting 
that a given law or policy unduly burdens them; they must rather have a genuine case to make on behalf of 
their claim. 
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applies only to otherwise-permitted actions, the prohibition of which does not thereby 
constitute an undue restriction of expressive liberty.   
Thus characterized, the ‘particularist’ interpretation of MFA might also be 
termed an ‘ad hoc method’ of MFA: it allows the legislature to pass any statute it 
wants, unconstrained by considerations of MFA, and then says to deal with the 
putatively impermissible restrictions on citizens’ expressive liberty on a piecemeal 
basis, by considering all the petitions made by those who feel that a given statute 
unduly restricts theirs.  (Of course, just because an individual or group seeks 
exemption does not necessarily mean she or they will get it.  The judiciary may judge 
that the law serves a compelling state interest – compelling enough to warrant 
overriding the normally-decisive demonstration that a citizen’s right to expressive 
liberty is being violated.) 
But in this way, particular-level MFA leaves the actual enactment of law and 
policy – whether at the policy level, the legislative level, or even the level of 
constitutional essentials – as a sort of ‘black box’: anything can be the output of the 
policy/legislative/constitutional process; if it happens to interfere with expressive 
liberty, well, that’s an issue for the Courts to adjudicate.  But of course, we can also 
bring MFA to bear on the ‘general’ level – at the level of law and policy and 
constitutional essentials.  There seem no good grounds not to do so, and in fact, good 
prudential grounds to do so: the more neutrally-crafted our legislation and policy is to 
start with, the less work the Courts will have to do later, in adjudicating the claims of 
alienated citizens. 
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As wielded by Galston, MFA seems mostly to be a jurisprudential notion.  
While most of his discussion of the notion is fairly abstract, his most concrete, 
practically-oriented discussion of the topic64 reveals that he has, predominantly, this 
particular-level conception in mind.  Thinking through the implications of general-
level maximum feasible accommodation, though, yields some pretty drastic limits on 
the proper scope of state authority, as I shall argue later. 
But first, let us turn our attention to the question as to the relation between 
these two levels of MFA.  Put simply, those guided by the spirit of maximum feasible 
accommodation at the general level should see it as their goal to minimize the need 
for instances of particular-level MFA-style adjudications.  In the ideal scenario, a 
properly- (that is, neutrally-) formulated constitutional framework, together with 
properly-enacted legislation and properly-crafted policy, would eliminate any need 
for citizens (whether individually or collectively) to seek exemption from any of the 
state’s directives on grounds that their right to expressive liberty is being violated.  
We might hold it to be constitutive of ideally-crafted neutral constitutions, laws, and 
policies that they never give rise to a citizen’s legitimate complaint that her 
expressive liberty is being unduly interfered with; this might simply be our analysis 
of ‘neutrality’ as it applies to politics.  Note: this is not the same as saying that 
sufficiently neutral policies will never result in a citizen’s expressive liberty being 
duly interfered with: there may be compelling state interests that trump even some 
citizens’ expressive liberty; more to the point, many actions that express a citizen’s 
identity may require an impermissible interference with another citizen’s expressive 
                                                 
64 See his [2004, chp. 11]. 
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liberty, and the state is legitimately permitted (nay, required) in these circumstances 
to impede the former’s liberty for the sake of protecting the latter’s.   
 
8.2 Legitimate Coercion 
So when might the state have a compelling interest, strong enough to override 
a citizen’s claim to live her life in accordance with her cherished understanding of the 
Good?  That is, when might the state legitimately proscribe certain actions, even 
when such actions are prescribed by a citizen’s understanding of life’s meaning and 
value?  Answering this important question will occupy us the remainder of this 
chapter.  But if the reader wants a preview of coming attractions, I can tell her that 
I’ve already given the answer, just above: the seeds of our account are already evident 
in the observation that sometimes, an action expressing one citizen’s identity requires 
the maltreatment of a fellow citizen.  For I shall argue that a state may interfere with a 
citizen’s expressive liberty, only to the extent that doing so is required to prevent that 
citizen from performing actions that “require an impermissible interference with 
another citizen’s expressive liberty,” as I put it in the preceding paragraph.   
To make this thought more precise, let us posit that to truly qualify as a rights-
violation (and not merely as a disruption or a frustration of a person’s ends – as you 
may disrupt my end of having the most popular barbershop in town by opening one 
that out-performs mine), an interference with a person’s expressive liberty must 
involve coercion, or the threat of force, on the part of the violator.  Any time one 
citizen tries to coerce another citizen, the former is violating the latter’s right to 
expressive liberty.  To prevent this, the state intervenes, violating the liberty of the 
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would-be liberty-violator if need be.  In this way, the state claims for itself a 
monopoly on the use and authorization of legitimate coercion: pursuant to his or her 
right to expressive liberty, each citizen is entitled to live a life in accordance with his 
or her conception of life’s meaning and value, free from the coercive interference of 
others (be they fellow citizens or agents of the state).   
The state can enact its stance of maximum feasible accommodation with 
regard to its citizens’ coercion-free efforts to live valuable lives, then, in either of two 
ways.  First, it refrains from coercively intervening in its citizens’ efforts to live lives 
informed by their conceptions of life’s meaning and value.  Second, the state 
intervenes in circumstances in which one citizen’s actions (call him Citizen 2) violate 
another citizen’s (call her Citizen 1) right to expressive liberty.  It can intervene to 
prevent the coercive actions undertaken by Citizen 2 in either of two ways: 
preemptively, in the issuance of general proscriptions of said behavior-types, or 
‘reactively’, by responding to specific violations on an individual basis.  These 
interventions are permissible even when such intervention constitutes a violation of 
the expressive liberty of Citizen 2.   
Consider just such a case, where the state’s denial of (an aspect of) Citizen 2’s 
expressive liberty is warranted by the imperative to protect Citizen 1’s expressive 
liberty.  Following Rawls here, we might say that insofar as Citizen 2’s account of the 
Good requires said action-types, such that elements of his pursuit of the Good warrant 
legitimate state interference, Citizen 2’s understanding of the Good is not a 
reasonable one.  (This is a fine way of putting it – but we should note the way in 
which our account is not question-begging in the manner Rawls’s is.  For for Rawls, 
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the doctrine of political liberalism requires an “overlapping consensus”, of a society’s 
reasonable “comprehensive moral doctrines,” on a conception of justice for the 
regulation of social life – where the notion of “reasonable” appears incapable of any 
more determinate characterization than “amenable to an overlap on the conception of 
justice preferred by political liberalism.”)  But while we may be content to say that – 
insofar as it requires the coercive interference with another citizen’s life, Citizen 2’s 
conception of the Good is unreasonable – we should resist the temptation to say that 
the state’s interference with Citizen 2’s efforts to live in full compliance with the 
tenets of his conception of the Good does not constitute an interference with his 
expressive liberty.  We should maintain, rather, that the state is interfering with his 
expressive liberty here, but that such interference is a warranted interference; that it 
serves a ‘compelling state interest’, in the formulation we gave it several paragraphs 
above.  
  The state should seek, so far as to possible, to relegate all such instances of 
expressive-liberty-interference to the ‘pre-emptive’, rather than ‘reactionary’, 
category: more on this below.  In the limit, this implies that the state should craft law, 
legislation and policy so as to pre-empt, on the part of its citizens, all and only 
behavior-types that constitute these sorts of interferences with expressive liberty.  
Thus, for ease of exposition, we can formulate and name the state’s practical 
policy of neutrality as follows: 
 
• Coercion: As a means of implementing its attitude of maximal 
feasible accommodation with regard to its citizens’ efforts to live, free 
111 
from coercive interference, lives that accord with their preferred 
visions of life’s meaning and value, the state claims for itself a 
monopoly on the authorization of the legitimate use of coercion.65  
 
Coercion, then, relies on an auxiliary hypothesis: 
 
• Legitimate: The use of coercion is legitimate only when necessary to 
prevent a person’s coercively impeding another person’s efforts to live 
according to his or her conception of life’s meaning and value – only, 
that is, to prevent one person’s violating another person’s right to 
expressive liberty. 
 
Thus formulated, the conjunction of Coercion and Legitimate bears affinities with 
Mill’s famous ‘Harm Principle’, the dictum stating that “the sole end for which 
mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of 
action of any of their number, is . . . to prevent harm to others.”66  But noting the 
affinities with Mill’s Harm Principle doubtless raises a host of questions, as much has 
been written on the interpretive difficulties besetting this principle.  In particular, two 
questions may arise as to the claim that Coercion (formulated with reference to 
Legitimate) constitutes the best interpretation of MFA.  The first of these pertains to 
                                                 
65 The state authorizes legitimate coercion when, for instance, it allows potential victims to use force to 
ward off their would-be attackers, or when it allows persons to use coercive measures to protect their 
property rights, and so forth.  But the state claims sole authority (a ‘monopoly’) to authorize persons to use 
coercion in these fashions.  I am indebted to Christopher Morris for pressing me to recognize the 
difference between the state’s claiming a monopoly on the use of legitimate coercion, and the state’s 
claiming a monopoly on the authorization of legitimate coercion. 
66Mill [1978, 9]. 
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the formulation of Coercion; the second to the formulation of Legitimate.  These 
questions are, respectively: 
 




(2) Why single out only Good-directed behaviors for special protection in our 
formulation of Legitimate?  That is, why specify that coercion is legitimate 
only when necessary to prevent coercive interference with a person’s efforts 
“to live according to his or her conception of life’s meaning and value”?  Why 
not simply state that coercion is legitimate only when necessary to prevent 
another person’s coercing another, full stop? 
 
So let us examine these two questions in turn – beginning, in section 8.3, with the 
former question, before proceeding to address the latter in section 8.4.  Section 8.5 
will briefly consider the implications of our argument for the extent of legitimate state 
power, setting the table for the discussion in the reminder of the dissertation. 
 
8.3 ‘Coercion’, Rather than ‘Harm’? 
 What advantage is conferred by formulating our interpretation of MFA in 
terms of coercion?  Is this anything other than an arbitrary choice?  The best reply 
here is that the use of ‘coercion’ instead of ‘harm’ renders the resulting formulation 
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serviceably determinate, in contrast to the famous vagaries inherent in Mill’s original 
principle.  For consider the standard example, countenanced above in my discussion 
of our rival barbershops, of economic competition: when you open up a store and 
drive mine out of business, in some sense certainly you have harmed me – but 
seemingly not in a way we find intuitively objectionable.  But what in Mill’s 
formulation of his principle precludes our concluding that this sort of harm “warrants 
our collectively . . . interfering with [your] liberty of action . . . to prevent harm to 
[me]”?  The proper response to this question is subject to much debate, the depths of 
which we might want to plumb.  But for now we need simply note that on our 
formulation, we do one better than Mill by avoiding any such conclusion.  We avoid 
the counter-intuitive result because – though you have perhaps harmed me by out-
performing me economically – you have certainly not coercively interfered with my 
ability to live a life in accordance with my preferred vision of life’s meaning and 
value.  And this is all Coercion proscribes. 
 
8.4 The scope of expressive liberty 
 Legitimate is formulated specifically with reference to expressive liberty – 
under a scheme of MFA, citizens are said to be protected against undue interference 
with their expressive liberty.  But which liberties fall under the heading ‘expressive 
liberty’?  And does it even matter?  Question (2) above poses the challenge that 
perhaps it does not matter – perhaps the most natural expression of Legitimate 
proceeds in terms of generic coercion, and not in terms of coercive interference of 
citizens’ efforts to pursue their visions of life’s meaning and value. 
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 The quick answer to this question is that, for all intents and purposes, this is 
what our formulation of Legitimate amounts to.  The logic of the argument thus far 
developed favors an expression in terms of conceptions of the Good: our project, after 
all, is the investigation of the proper formulation of a Neutralist approach to politics – 
an account that takes as its fundamental orientation the need to respond to the fact of 
intra-polity diversity vis-à-vis citizens’ understandings of the Good Life.  But how 
can we ever hope to identify all and only instances of coercive interference of a 
person’s efforts to live a life according to a conception of the Good, as opposed to 
instances of coercive interference simpliciter?  It should seem that such a task is 
obviously hopeless – any behavior might plausibly be required (or proscribed) by 
some doctrine of the Good.  Any liberty might be properly regarded as qualifying as 
an instance of expressive liberty.  But that is exactly the point!  It appears that, in 
practical terms, the formulation of Legitimate: 
 
• Legitimate: The use of coercion is legitimate only when required to 
prevent a person’s coercively impeding another person’s efforts to live 
according to his or her conception of life’s meaning and value 
collapses into the formulation of Legitimate′: 
• Legitimate′: The use of coercion is legitimate only when required to 
prevent a person’s coercive interference with another person’s 
behavior, period.67 
                                                 
67 As thus formulated, Legitimate′ cries out for further elaboration.  The question that arises, of course, is 
this: under what circumstances does Citizen 2’s action constitute ‘coercive interference’ with Citizen 1’s 
behavior?  Particularly difficult is the challenge posed by property: presumably, I act coercively towards you 
if I threaten force – not only against your person – but also against your property.  Specifying the precise 
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Thus, in restricting the use of its own coercive power to those types of behavior 
licensed by Legitimate′, the state adopts a very demanding standard for permissible 
state action. This, I take it, is a point of great theoretical significance: a politics 
oriented to the task of accommodating disagreement about matters of ultimate 
concern, and thereby committed to a stance of neutrality regarding its citizens’ 
competing understandings of the Good Life – and not disposed to promulgate any a 
priori strictures as to the contents of ‘acceptable’ or ‘reasonable’ accounts of the 
Good68 – finds that the scope of its legitimate action is severely restrained.  This is so 
on grounds that there is no a priori basis on which the state can determine whether or 
not one of its contemplated laws or policies might (whether now, or in the future) 
effect undue interference with some of its citizens’ expressive liberty.  Its best course 
of action, then, is to ‘play it safe’ by endeavoring to do as little as possible.  So it 
appears that one quite natural elaboration of the Neutralist response to the Political 
Question′ – perhaps the most defensible one – leads to a conception of politics that is 
‘classically liberal’ in spirit, even if it perhaps arrives there via a slightly different 
route than the ones typically urged by people working in this tradition. 
 (As an aside, we should note here that by recognizing the equivalence of 
Legitimate and Legitimate′, we have given effect to our earlier suggestion – in our 
discussion of the Individuation Problem in section 0.2 – that our positing entities 
called “accounts of the Good” acts in a manner akin to an assumption in an indirect 
proof.  By identifying Legitimate and Legitimate′ as equivalent ways of elucidating 
                                                                                                                                           
conditions under which Citizen 2’s behavior qualifies as a violation of Citizen 1’s property rights can be 
quite difficult, of course.  I mention the issue only to recognize its importance; full discussion of the topic 
falls outside the scope of this dissertation.  We can take solace in the fact that this difficulty is not unique 
to our present inquiry. 
68 As is, e.g., the view of the later Rawls. 
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MFA, we have effectively “discharged” this assumption.  It turns out that nothing 
hangs on whether and to what extent we can identify the beliefs and commitments 
that serve to constitute an individual’s conception of the Good, and distinguish these 
from her beliefs and commitments simpliciter.  Inasmuch as Legitimate′ proscribes 
coercive interference with an individual’s liberty,69 full stop, our inability to so 
discriminate is inconsequential.  Nevertheless, the heuristic value of positing such 
entities – it affords us a pithy means of expressing our central contentions – justifies 
our availing ourselves of such talk.) 
As to the prudence of the state’s ‘play it safe’ attitude towards enacting 
(potentially expressive-liberty-thwarting) statutes: a contemporary example might 
help to illustrate my point.  Early last century, when state governments in the United 
States began to enshrine traditional notions of the institution of marriage into official 
law and decree, thereby conferring benefits and advantages upon some (heterosexual 
couples) that were not open to others (homosexual couples), these governments were 
– though they did not realize it at the time – privileging certain understandings of the 
Good over others.  (Specifically, the argument goes, the states were acting so as to 
disadvantage persons whose understandings of a flourishing human life countenance 
permanent, loving, monogamous same-sex partnerships – though obviously more 
must be said to establish that, insofar as it simply fails to confer certain advantages 
and privileges upon same-sex couples as it does on heterosexual couples, the state 
actually unduly interferes with the homosexual couples’ expressive liberty per se.)  
They were, that is, acting non-neutrally: not with regard to any account of the Good 
                                                 
69 Save for instances in which such coercive interference is warranted to prevent an individual’s coercing 
another individual, of course. 
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that held currency in the culture at the time (at least, none that held much currency in 
the public forum, even if many citizens might have harbored such notions privately), 
but – as is quite clear today – with regard to a conception of the Good that, at some 
future date, came to ascendancy.   
 
8.5 Beyond Minarchism? 
 In arguing for such robust limits on state action, I will have to answer a 
version of what we might term (following George Sher) the ‘paralysis’ argument: the 
argument that, in our effort to protect citizens from the Perfectionist intrusions of a 
‘non-neutral’ state, we will inevitably endorse a right to expressive liberty so robust 
as to effectively ‘paralyze’ the state.  The strictures on permissible state action, if we 
are to adopt the Neutralist’s aspirations for the state, are so strong as to prohibit the 
state’s doing virtually anything.  Having just noted the seeming affinities between our 
version of Neutralism and classical liberalism, we will of course allow that many 
theorists will be all too happy to accept this result: particularly those who hold an 
antecedent sympathy for the principles of extreme libertarianism or philosophical 
anarchism.  But I don’t wish to pre-judge the issue either way: though in the 
paragraph above I noted our position’s seeming affinity with classical liberalism, at 
this point in our argument this is little more than an affinity.  I want at least to allow 
for the possibility that a state organized according to the principle of maximum 
feasible accommodation – even if it is inevitable that such a state will be of fairly 
limited scope (certainly, we would probably say that we are now committed to a 
liberal conception of politics) – need not, of necessity, be an ‘ultra-minimal’ state; 
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that such a state, at very least, does not suffer from the sort of paralysis that Sher 
envisions.70  And as I noted above (in section 6.2), while the state’s power may be 
limited in scope – to, e.g., the provision of public goods – there remains latitude for a 
wide range of views as to the precise ‘content’ of this scope.  We might, for instance, 
all agree that the state must restrict itself to the provision of public goods, and might 
even agree as to precisely which public goods should be provided – but disagree as to 
the scale to which these goods ought to be provided.  We may, for instance, disagree 
a great deal about how robust a ‘social safety net’ is proper. 
 But a challenge lurks here.  Given the conclusions reached thus far, how could 
anything more extensive than an ultra-minimal state be justified?  Does not the very 
exercise of centralized coercive power, inherent in the task of providing public goods, 
run afoul of the strictures on permissible state action countenanced by, e.g., 
Legitimate?  When the state taxes some citizens in order to benefit others (as it must 
do, presumably, if it is to erect and maintain a ‘social safety net’, regardless of scope), 
does it not violate the principle we’ve named Coercion?  Is not our professed desire 
to “allow for the possibility that a state organized according to the principle of 
maximum feasible accommodation … need not, of necessity, be an ‘ultra-minimal’ 
state” simply disingenuous?  Given our premises, how could we arrive at anything but 
minarchist conclusions? 
 The response to this worry lies in the recognition that there are certain 
minimal social preconditions that must be met before persons can be considered free 
to pursue their conceptions of the Good in any meaningful sense, and that the state’s 
facilitation of these preconditions is consistent with its attitude of maximum feasible 
                                                 
70 Sher [1997, 114-7]. 
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accommodation.  In one sense, obviously, utter and total compliance with the 
strictures set forth in Legitimate and Coercion would bar the state from conducting 
any but the ‘reactive’ functions articulated at the outset of section 8.2 above.  Such a 
state would be severely constrained in its efforts to collect the tax revenues required 
for the maintenance of, e.g., institutions productive of the rule of law – institutions 
that are required if the state is to take the ‘pre-emptive’ action of enforcing 
proscriptions on the behavior-types (violence, theft, fraud, etc.) that typically 
constitute coercive interference with expressive liberty.  So it appears that the 
strictures set forth in Legitimate and Coercion only become operative once a certain 
‘threshold’ has been met with respect to securing the minimal social preconditions for 
the enjoyment of expressive liberty.  In their efforts to secure these preconditions, 
states can exercise coercive power in certain ways – ways that would be condemned 
by Coercion and Legitimate, were this threshold not met.  Thus, we are not to 
interpret the strictures set forth in Coercion and Legitimate so strictly as to render 
any state action impermissible. 
 So we require certain social preconditions if any person’s pursuit of the Good 
Life is to be accommodated at all.  For one thing, we must be free from the threat of 
aggression, whether ‘external’ (from foreign armies) or ‘internal’ (from our 
neighbors).  We require the rule of law, that is.  Public institutions are often required 
to secure these preconditions, and provision of such public institutions often bears the 
hallmarks of collective action problems.  That is to say, such public institutions are 
often ‘public goods’, in the economists’ technical sense of the term – they plausibly 
require the use of concentrated coercive power to overcome the natural obstacles that 
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preclude their spontaneous provision in the marketplace.  Even the staunchest of 
minarchists makes this allowance; nor does such an allowance seem to significantly 
undermine the minarchist project.  Thus, for example, Robert Nozick can devote one-
third of his minarchist treatise to an explanation of how we can “back into a state 
without really trying”71, consistently with his libertarian principles. 
 But besides the basic requirements of rule of law, what exactly are the social 
preconditions that must obtain prior to any person’s being meaningfully positioned to 
pursue her conception of the Good – the facilitation of such preconditions being the 
legitimate ends, even of states organized according to the principle of maximum 
feasible accommodation?  Besides rule of law, do we also require a certain level of 
environmental protection?  Do we require a sufficiently-immunized populace?  Do 
we require a sufficiently well-educated populace?  Do we require the assurance that 
all persons will enjoy a minimally adequate level of material well-being, and the 
insurance of knowing that we will never fall into an utterly destitute state, no matter 
what misfortune befalls us?  Do we require public institutions for the provision of 
some or all of these public goods?   
 On these questions, I am supposing, persons attracted to our Neutralist story 
can still disagree.  For consider: that there is scope for such legitimate, reasonable 
disagreement, even among those inclined towards classical liberalism, seems to be 
allowed by most classical liberals themselves.  Consideration of Nozick’s 
libertarianism is once again instructive in this regard.  For consider the formulation of 
his preferred vision of the minimal, ‘night-watchman’ state: he speaks of a state, 
“limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, and fraud, 
                                                 
71 The subtitle of the first section of his [1974]. 
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enforcement of contracts, and so on.”72  With the qualification “and so on”, Nozick 
seems to allow room for disagreement, even among devotees of the minimal state, as 
to precisely which functions the minimal state will perform.  Judith Lichtenberg has 
alleged73 that any state organized according to the principle of MFA – elucidated 
with reference to Coercion and Legitimate – will be such as to leave many of its 
citizens “without satisfaction of basic needs, without access to the goods necessary to 
human flourishing on almost any conception of the good.”  But this allegation simply 
begs the question against our conception of Neutralism, by presuming that there is a 
clear, a priori constraint on the scope of Legitimate state action, such that public 
institutions which aim to secure the satisfaction of everyone’s basic needs are 
precluded from the very start.  This is not the case. 
 Nonetheless, while our sympathizers might reasonably and legitimately 
disagree among themselves as to the proper suite of public goods that will be offered 
in a Neutralist state, all will agree that, once the basic social preconditions for 
anyone’s having a meaningful opportunity to pursue the Good have been met, further 
state action is rendered presumptively illegitimate.  There is a threshold of social 
order that the state may secure (must secure, perhaps), compatibly with the spirit of 
MFA.  But beyond this threshold, further state action is likely to effect undue 
interference with some citizens’ pursuit of their own Good.   
 Attempting to identify where this threshold lies with anything approaching 
precision might require a dissertation in its own right.  But we can make one brief 
suggestion that serves to illustrate the distinctive content of our Neutralist story.  This 
                                                 
72 Nozick [1974, ix], emphasis added. 
73 In personal correspondence 
122 
suggestion is that there is something special in the character of public goods, such 
that their provision via coercive state power is justifiable despite the fact that such 
provision requires state actions that constitute a prima facie violation of the 
constraints set forth in Coercion and Legitimate.  While the claim is not undisputed 
(some theorists, many of whom would call themselves “anarcho-capitalists”, will 
reject it74), it is commonly thought that coercive state power is required if we are to 
solve collective action problems – most notably, those collective action problems 
which beset the efforts to erect social institutions productive of rule of law.  But no 
such special property attends to the provision of non-public goods.  Where such 
provision can be effected privately, a state committed to a principle of MFA will 
abstain from providing them.  For its decision to do so constitutes a violation of the 
strictures set forth in Coercion and Legitimate, and the prima facie constraint on 
violating these strictures is not overridden, as it is overridden in cases of public good 
provision.   
 The reason for this is as follows: the public provision of non-public goods is 
fraught with the danger that some citizens will (reasonably) experience such 
provision as an undue interference with their expressive liberty.  (Of course, the 
provision of some public goods will be similarly fraught, but insofar as the state’s 
provision of such goods constitutes an ineliminable means to the end of securing 
expressive liberty’s vital preconditions, this danger is one we simply must bear.75)  
This interference can be experienced in at least two distinct ways.  First, some 
citizens may judge that certain public enterprises place them at a disadvantage in their 
                                                 
74 See, for example, Taylor [1987] 
75 I assume, though, that with respect to most of our vitally essential public goods – rule of law, e.g., - this 
is not a tremendous danger. 
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efforts to forge lives fully expressive of their cherished notions of life’s meaning and 
value.  To take one prominent example: when states promulgate policies of 
compulsory school attendance for children under a certain age, certain persons – e.g., 
members of religious organizations such as the Old Order Amish – may perceive such 
policies to be disruptive of their commitment to live in relative seclusion from 
modern, secular society.76  (This conflict becomes even more acute when the state 
itself assumes direct responsibility for the curricular content of the mandated 
education.)  The provision of (public) education in a Neutralist state will receive 
fuller attention in section 10.32 below; for now I merely hope to gesture at one way in 
which a state’s ‘over-reaching’ – via the provision of non-public goods – can pose 
problems for a Neutralist state: such overreach creates tension with its commitment to 
maximum feasible accommodation of citizens’ efforts to pursue their own Good.  
Past the point of public good provision, state action is apt to become counter-
productive: it affords less than maximum feasible accommodation.  (It becomes, if 
you will, a policy of ‘SOFA’: ‘Sub-optimal feasible accommodation.’) 
 A second way in which some citizens might (reasonably) experience state 
provision of non-public goods as an undue interference with their expressive liberty 
has to do with the extent to which some citizens will be brought to subsidize activities 
which they find to be objectionable, and which they do not wish to subsidize.  Such 
(forcible) subsidization results from the fact that public enterprises are publicly 
funded.  The extent to which government funding of a given activity might constitute 
a case of impermissibly forcing unwilling citizens to become (abashed) patrons of 
                                                 
76 The famed Yoder case in the U.S. (Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)), and the case of Gypsy 
responses to the United Kingdom’s Education Act, both speak to this exact conflict.  For a discussion of 
these cases, see Kukathas [1992] Galston [1995]. 
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that activity – and the circumstances in which government funding will not represent 
such an impermissible forcing – will receive further elaboration in our discussion of 
‘soft paternalism’ in section 9.4 below.  For now, though, I simply want to illustrate 
this worry by gesturing at some suggestive examples. 
 The United States’ ‘Culture Wars’ of the 1990’s revealed the fact that many 
citizens take firm exception to the use of public monies to fund certain artistic 
projects which they find to be morally and religiously objectionable.  When the 
National Endowment for the Arts funded the work of Robert Mapplethorpe, Andres 
Serrano, and others, it was using those citizens’ contributions to the public coffers, 
and was subsidizing those artists in those citizens’ names.  Plausibly, then, such 
citizens can claim that this instance of public provision of a non-public good 
represents an undue interference with their expressive liberty.  Though as a 
quantitative matter, each such citizen’s subsidy of the NEA is very small77, the fact 
that the government funding of the arts is, in a very real sense, done in each citizen’s 
name78, may be sufficient to establish the state’s non-Neutrality in this regard. 
 This case is familiar to many readers, but we must note that similar reasoning 
extends also to other cases of public funding of non-public goods.  Consider funding 
for medical research, for example.  Inasmuch as some persons – Christian Scientists, 
for example – might object to certain forms of medical research on moral and 
religious grounds, they too might have grounds for complaint.  When we see that their 
tax dollars are used to subsidize, in their names, research programs to which they 
                                                 
77 For FY08, the NEA’s budget was $128.4 million, whereas all federal outlays totaled $2.902 trillion.  That 
means that .000044% of the federal budget was allocated to the National Endowment for the Arts.  In 
other words, .0044% of each penny of each tax dollar went to fund the NEA.  Tabulated from data 
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy08/browse.html.  (Accessed December 1, 2008). 
78 In a democracy, at least, this claim is plausible. 
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have deep objections, we once again recognize why Neutralist states ought to regard 
such public projects as fraught with peril.  (It bears mentioning that – apropos this 
second kind of interference with expressive liberty forming the subject of this 
paragraph – this peril only arises insofar as a putatively objectionable activity is 
subsidized out of (coercively) extracted tax revenue.  Again: the extent to which 
states may dedicate voluntarily-contributed revenues to such projects is another 
matter, to be taken up in chapter nine.)  Very many other forms of seemingly-benign 
public action might fall to this same logic.  Dedicated environmentalists may find 
cause to decry public subsidies to the automobile industry, which subsidies they 
contend work at cross-purposes with environmentalists’ efforts to curb greenhouse 
gas emissions.  (Many such subsidies are ‘hidden’.  An example might the massive 
public spending on infrastructure projects like roads, to the detriment of other forms 
of public transportation – which serves to artificially inflate consumer demand for 
cars relative to demand for alternative, cleaner forms of transportation, such as 
bicycles or various forms of mass transit.)  Dedicated vegetarians or vegans may find 
cause to decry massive public subsidies to the agricultural sector, which they regard 
as cruelly contributing to the extant practice of wholesale ritual slaughter of innocent 
beings, causing pain and suffering on a massive scale.  Indeed, it is not too difficult to 
imagine that, several generations hence, it will be the unanimous opinion of 
reasonable persons that meat is, in fact, murder.  Those future generations will look 
back with horror on our present generation, with its public endorsement and 
governmental support of such mass murder, much as today we look back in shame 
upon our previous public support for the institution of slavery.  In this vein, it is not 
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difficult to imagine a future generation of polyamorist activists who – having 
succeeded in effecting a normalization of their multi-partner unions, both with respect 
to public policy and with respect to the wider society’s acceptance – look back upon 
today’s same-sex marriage activists with a mixture of respect and dismay.  (Respect 
for such activists’ trailblazing efforts to normalize some non-traditional romantic 
relationships; dismay at their failure to recognize polyamorous relations as deserving 
like recognition.)  Such mixed feelings would be akin to the ambivalence some today 
are apt to feel with regard to our nation’s Founding Fathers – who, while exquisitely 
sensitive to the equal moral standing of all white males, were disappointingly 
insensitive to considerations of the same rights and liberties with respect to females 
and non-whites.  (The reader skeptical of this forecast is invited to imagine the 
response that likely would have greeted a similarly foreword-thinking early twentieth 
century prognosticator.  “The current movement to enlist public policy in the service 
of recognizing exclusively heterosexual marriages only invites trouble,” she may 
have warned.  “Someday these policies will come to be regarded as objectionable, 
inasmuch as they discriminate against same-sex couples.”) 
 The point is that very few – if any – state activities are immune from these 
sorts of worries.  For any given public policy, if it is difficult to imagine a present-day 
constituency that regards this policy as effecting an undue burden on its expressive 
liberty in one of the two manners detailed above, it is not too difficult to imagine 
some future constituency that might make the same complaint.  And even if it is 
possible to identify which state activities are presently immune from this worry, it is 
impossible to predict which policies will remain so immune (as the example of same-
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sex marriage vividly illustrates).  The lesson to be drawn from these observations is 
that a Neutralist state will want to err on the side of caution.  Beyond its provision of 
that suite of public goods minimally required to secure the social preconditions for 
expressive liberty,79 the Neutralist state will endeavor to do as little as possible – the 
better to secure maximum feasible accommodation of a diverse citizenry’s80 
conceptions of the Good. 
 Again, as I said above, a full discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation.  My comments in this section are meant to be merely suggestive.  I 
hope, however, to have convinced the reader that, while the Neutralist story 
developed so far does not generate a commitment to philosophical anarchism, or even 
necessarily to minarchism, it is not devoid of content.  It does entail substantive 
conclusions with respect to the scope of legitimate state action.  At present, the best 
we can say is that our premises do generate a presumption against any state action, 
beyond that public-good-provision which is necessary to secure the minimum social 
preconditions of any person’s exercising his or her expressive liberty – even if we 
must, for now, allow scope for disagreement as to precisely when this threshold has 
been crossed.  The remaining chapters in this dissertation will hopefully shed more 
light on the precise picture of legitimate state action that emerges from our Neutralist 
account. 
 
                                                 
79 And recall that, concerning the scope of such provision, we allow that there can be reasonable 
disagreement. 
80 Inter-generationally diverse, as well as intra-generationally diverse. 
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Chapter Nine:  Accommodationism 
 We are thus finally in a position to give terse expression to the conception of 
politics we have been exploring.  For ease of exposition, let us term this conception of 
politics Accommodationism, and formulate it thusly: 
 
• Accommodationism: By restricting its actions to those licensed by 
Coercion, the state embraces a stance of Maximum Feasible 
Accommodation with regard to its citizens’ efforts to live according 
to their competing conceptions of life’s meaning and value – the result 
of its Modest assessment of its own ability successfully to ameliorate 
the fact of Diversity by any other means. 
 
Accommodationism is a neutrality thesis.  As such, as per our overview of neutrality 
theses in chapter four, we are entitled to expect of it an account of the following four 
things, aspects of the mechanics of neutrality theses all: (1) the subject of the 
neutrality principle; (2) the interpretation of ‘neutrality’; (3) the scope of the 
neutrality principle; and (4) the formulation of the neutrality principle.  A distinctive 
account of each of these four elements of the mechanics of neutrality flows naturally 
from the Accommodationist thesis as we have thus far defended it.  Let us examine 
each of these four elements in turn – at long last making good on our promise to fully 
articulate a vision of the mechanics of a neutrality thesis whose defense rests on 
Modesty and Authenticity. 
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9.1 The Subject of Accommodationism 
 When characterizing the challenge of rendering the subject of a neutrality 
thesis in chapter seven, we expressed the challenge as one that results from the 
attempt to generalize the United States Constitution’s (dis)Establishment Clause.  
Recall that the elements of a natural understanding of the Disestablishment Clause 
include (i) the state and (ii) the ‘Church’: (established, organized) religious sects.  
Recall also the natural extension of this disestablishmentarianism to all conceptions 
of what gives life its meaning and value – religious or otherwise, established and 
institutional or otherwise.  We then observed that the elements of a neutrality thesis 
arrived at in this way are no longer as clear as they were in the case of the original, 
First Amendment-derived doctrine of disestablishment.  One element – that of the 
state – remains.  But the other element – that of a religious sect – has disappeared, 
and has been replaced with a more nebulous notion: that of a conception of the Good.  
The Neutralist, we had said, bears the burden of characterizing this more nebulous 
notion in a manner that renders it serviceable. 
 But now recall our observation in the last chapter to the effect that practically 
“any behavior might plausibly be required (or proscribed) by some conception of the 
Good,” and that by “restricting the use of its own coercive power to those types of 
behavior licensed by Legitimate, the state adopts a very demanding standard for 
permissible state action.”  It seems the Accommodationist in fact no longer needs to 
offer any such specification, any such means of individuating conceptions of the 
Good.  For the very recognition of the vagaries inherent in this notion supplied a 
major motivation for the Accommodationist’s endorsement of severe limits on the 
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scope of permissible state action in the first place.  The realization that, in nearly all it 
does, the state runs the risk of coercively interfering with a citizen’s expressive liberty 
is what led us to MFA, Coercion and Legitimate, and Accommodationism.  Let the 
notion of a conception of the Good be as nebulous or expansive as you like; allow the 
range of beliefs and behaviors thought to be proscribed or prescribed by visions of the 
Good Life to be as broad as you wish: by limiting permissible state action to the 
(preemptive or reactive) effort to prevent coercion, we arrive at an understanding of 
the subject of Accommodationism that is determinate and serviceable enough.  By 
thus restricting the scope of legitimate state action, even a notion as vague and 
nebulous as our ‘conception of the Good’ is rendered serviceable enough, for by 
almost anyone’s lights, actions proscribed or prescribed by their cherished 
conceptions will enjoy protection against state encroachment. 
 
9.2 The Interpretation of Accommodationism 
 Recall that Neutralists were said to generally fall into one of two camps when 
it comes to the interpretation of the neutrality thesis: those who advocate neutrality of 
effect (or outcome), and those who advocate neutrality of justification.  Those in the 
former camp hold that government policy should never have the effect of advantaging 
or disadvantaging adherents of a particular conception of the Good relative to the 
adherents of rival conceptions.  Policies that do have this effect are to be avoided, or – 
if they are unavoidable – the state is licensed (perhaps required) to intervene in the 
resulting state of affairs, either to redress the (dis)advantage unduly accorded some of 
its citizens, or else to offer compensation to those adversely affected by the state’s 
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non-neutral policies.  Those in the latter camp point out the prohibitive difficulty 
inherent in securing outcomes that qualify as ‘neutral’ as among rival conceptions of 
the Good; thus, they maintain that the justifications offered for government policies, 
not the effects of them, are properly the sorts of things that should be neutral.  How 
do Accommodationists come down on this issue? 
 We can begin with the simple part of this answer: Accommodationists do not 
advocate neutrality of effect or outcome.  Neutrality of effect is a ‘patterned’ notion.  
Accommodationists accord prime importance to liberty – expressive liberty, in 
particular – and thus follow Robert Nozick in the conclusion that “liberty upsets 
patterns.”81  Maintenance of a certain pattern of social outcomes (in this case, an 
outcome where all of a polity’s competing faiths find that public policy ever and 
always advances or retards their fortunes in perfectly equal measure) is secured by 
government interventions, except in rare cases where it might persist by sheer 
coincidence.  By and large, such interventions tend to be inconsistent with 
Accommodationists’ insistence that each citizen enjoy the maximal degree of 
expressive liberty consistent with a like degree of liberty for all. 
 The natural conclusion to draw is that Accommodationists therefore favor the 
‘neutrality of justification’ interpretation of neutralism.  But it is here that we begin to 
find the view more interesting.  For by antecedently positing strict limits on the scope 
of permissible state action, the Accommodationist avoids the need to invoke the 
problematically ethereal notion of a ‘neutral justification’ in her characterization of 
the mechanics of her view.  For if the range of state activities is sufficiently restricted 
                                                 
81 See Nozick’s famous “Wilt Chamberlain” example in his [1974, 161-3]. 
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to start with, political actors do not need to ‘trim’82 their deliberations and public 
advocacy for the sake of conforming to the requirements of neutrality.  Rather, 
citizens and politicians alike are free to offer up the strongest reasons for their favored 
policies, as they themselves understand these reasons, irrespective of the putative 
‘non-neutrality’ of their content.  Citizens and politicians need not feel any pressure 
to offer, in bad faith, reconstructed (and inevitably distorted) versions of their favored 
policies expressed in a ‘neutral’ language or framework.  It makes little difference if 
the motives of those whose political proposals win the day are sectarian; so long as 
the policies they advocate conform to the strictures set forth in Coercion and 
Legitimate, there is no worry that they will be ‘non-neutral’ in any objectionable 
sense.  The non-neutrality of a policy’s advocates does not necessarily confer non-
neutrality on the policy itself.  As Kent Greenawalt has put it, “Fairness consists not 
in exclusion [of religious and other such ideas in public discourse], even self-
exclusion, but in everyone’s relying on what each thinks is most convincing”; 
neutrality is exemplified “by allowing people to rely on whatever reasons they find 
most persuasive.”83  Thus, for instance, evangelical Christians on the right of the 
political spectrum, and Marxists on the left, may both support public measures to 
protect the natural environment from further degradation.  Let us suppose that neither 
contingency’s reasons for supporting the measure are ‘neutral’ in any respect: the 
evangelicals favor green policies out of a scripturally-based sense of divinely-
ordained environmental stewardship, while the Marxists favor environmental 
regulation as a way of constraining, to at least some degree, the otherwise profligate 
                                                 
82 On the project of ‘trimming’ ‘thick’ conceptions of the Good so that they’re suitable for public 
consumption, see Bellamy [1999, chp. 2] 
83 Greenawalt [2003, 269, 275]. 
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beast of advanced global capitalism.  It matters not that either rationale runs afoul of 
the justificatory neutralist’s canons of proper ‘public reason.’  If the proposal is 
allowable on the Accommodationist’s conception of permissible state action84, it is 
‘neutral’ in the only sense relevant here.  The Accommodationist can thus endorse the 
outcome-neutralist’s main criticism of ‘justificatory neutralism’ – to the effect that 
justifications of state policies, no less than conceptions of The Good, can be disparate, 
conflicting, shifting, and overlapping – without also taking on board the outcome-
neutralist’s troublesome commitment to patterns.  The insight here is that 
Accommodationism embodies a commitment to neutrality by espousing a robust 
restriction on the scope of legitimate state action, a restriction that antecedently 
minimizes the state’s prospects of coercively interfering with citizens’ efforts to live 
out their cherished notions of life’s meaning and value. 
 
9.3 The Scope of Accommodationism 
 This same insight guides the Accommodationist in her account of the proper 
scope of official state neutrality.  An antecedent restriction on the scope of state 
activity, aimed at eliminating (or at least minimizing) the possibility that government 
policies will run afoul of citizens’ expressive liberty, obviates the need to demarcate a 
realm of state activity uniquely subject to the neutrality constraint – just as it obviated 
the need to explicate a notion of ‘neutral justification’ in the interpretation of 
Accommodationism.  We need not argue about whether to regard all state activity, or 
                                                 
84 As plausibly it would be – environmental protection representing a paradigm case of a ‘public good’ in 
the sense that its spontaneous provision in the marketplace is precluded by a collective action problem, 
and public good provision representing a fairly ‘easy case’ as a candidate for legitimate state action on our 
Accommodationist account. 
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to regard only legislation, or to regard only constitutional essentials, as being subject 
to the neutrality requirement.  Likewise we need not bother to answer the question as 
to whom the neutrality constraint applies.  (Only legislators?  All citizens?)  Just as 
was the case for the Accommodationist’s account of the proper interpretation of 
neutrality, ‘all bets are off’ here.  Any aspect of the neutral state may be based on any 
considerations lawmakers and citizens see fit, so long as the state restricts its 
activities as required by its adherence to Coercion and Legitimate.  In so doing, the 
state ensures that it will be ‘neutral’ in the relevant sense, at whatever level we decide 
to apply our analysis.  Similarly with persons: not only the ordinary citizen, but any 
government official, is free to advocate and deliberate about public policy as he or 
she sees fit, in accordance with the dictates of conscience.  A state organized along 
Accommodationist lines is arranged so as to allow such free and unfettered 
deliberation and debate; citizens are protected from ‘non-neutral’ policies, not 
because their fellow citizens’ and their elected leaders’ public conversations and 
deliberations are hamstrung by dictates of ‘public reason’ intended to stifle any non-
neutrality at the starting gate, but rather by the principled limits on the scope of state 
action.   
Kent Greenawalt’s analysis again applies here.  In asking “whether, when they 
resolve political issues within liberal democracies, citizens and officials properly rely 
on religious conceptions that inform moral judgments, which in turn bear on political 
resolutions,”85 Greenawalt cites with approval the contemporary accepted practice.  
He finds that the current convention, whereby there is no accepted understanding that 
legislators “should avoid giving any weight to their own religious convictions and to 
                                                 
85 Greenawalt [2003, 267-8]. 
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those of constituents in the formulations of their positions,” even while they 
“typically do not make religious arguments on the floor of Congress or before their 
constituents,” represents a “sound accommodation of the needs of a religiously 
diverse citizenry with the inclination of legislators to bring all they believe to bear on 
political problems.”86  (Citing the fact that – while it might be easy to restrict one’s 
public advocacy to discourse that might qualify as neutral – it is difficult (if not 
impossible) to constrain one’s internal deliberations to putatively ‘publicly 
acceptable’ principles, Greenawalt does allow that “if any self-exclusion [in reason-
giving] is justified, it is self-exclusion for officials in their public statements.”87)  
 
9.4 The Formulation of Accommodationism 
 The proper formulation of Accommodationism is the one that best answers 
questions like the following: What sorts of promotion of the Good are (in)admissible?  
Must the state merely refrain from coercively imposing its preferred vision of the 
Good Life?  May the state seek to promote (a specific conception of) virtue, so long 
as it does not do so coercively?  If so, is the state’s supplying positive incentives for 
those who live the Good life acceptable, so long as it does not apply sanctions to 
those who fail to conform?  Can the state seek to create conditions favorable to (its 
preferred conception of) a life of virtue, so long as it stops short of wielding coercion 
to discourage vicious living?  And so forth. 
 The Accommodationist locates the crux of her argument in the moral 
constraints that regulate the proper exercise of coercive power – especially 
                                                 
86 Ibid. 273. 
87 Ibid.  
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monopolized coercive power.  Accordingly, the ‘neutrality constraint’ that flows from 
the Accommodationist position only bears on efforts to coercively impose a vision of 
the Good.  It would thus appear that non-coercive state efforts to promote the Good – 
supplying incentives for those who embrace the favored conception, creating 
conditions favorable to the flowering of a range of favored conceptions, and so forth 
– are legitimate in the Accommodationist state (subject, as always, to the constraint 
that such efforts comport with the requirements of Coercion).  However, a 
complication arises from the fact that even such putatively non-coercive measures do 
involve coercion at a certain point: namely, they are only possible in the first place to 
the extent that the state claims for itself the right to collect taxes – a right it can 
enforce with the threat of sanctions.  Any non-coercive efforts to promote a particular 
conception of life’s meaning and value will be financed by tax revenues.  Citizens’ 
contributions to public coffers are not a matter for their own discretion; thus, those 
citizens whose favored conceptions are ones the state intentionally discourages (or at 
least are not the ones that it intentionally encourages) find that their property is being 
redistributed in a manner they might legitimately regard as ‘non-neutral.’  Their 
income is being transferred to support the efforts of those adhering to rival 
conceptions of the Good; perhaps this represents a coercive interference with these 
citizens’ Good-guided behavior after all.  For such citizens’ efforts to live out lives 
that accord with their visions of the Good are impeded in at least two ways: (1) 
resources these citizens might devote towards the expression of their deepest 
identities and commitments are diverted elsewhere (this represents a sort of 
opportunity cost for such citizens); and (2) such citizens find the relative position of 
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their Faith, vis-à-vis rival Faiths, is artificially disadvantaged, pursuant to the state’s 
subsidization of its favored account(s) of the Good.  And coercion is implicated in 
each of these impediments – can such citizens legitimately claim that the state is 
violating their rights to expressive liberty? 
 Let us begin our investigation of this issue by dispensing with one 
unsatisfactory response.  It might be proposed that non-coercive state measures to 
promote the Good are acceptable to the extent they are financed by non-tax- (and thus 
non-coercively-) generated revenue.  The state reserves for itself the sole right to 
exercise coercive power, but this does not mean that all state action must ultimately 
repose on its ability to use force.  Just like other actors, the state can engage in 
activities not dependent on its right to wield coercion.  The state might engage in its 
own fundraising efforts (as it does when it offers taxpayers the opportunity to 
contribute to environmental protection or campaign finance when filing their tax 
returns), and the proceeds from these efforts might be legitimately applied towards 
non-coercive Perfectionist measures.  Or, rather than rely on donations, the state 
might even enter the marketplace, providing a service to customers and raising 
revenues that way (as the U.S. government currently does with its administration of 
the now-profitable U.S. Postal Service). 
 The problem with this approach to grounding ‘soft paternalism’ lies in the 
observation that money is fungible.  Funds supporting a state’s efforts to non-
coercively promote the Good free up revenues for use elsewhere; more damningly, 
tax revenues collected under threat of compulsion make the ‘freely raised’ funds 
available for use in soft paternalism.  It is thus impossible to disentangle the state’s 
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coercively-gained revenue from its non-coercively-gained revenue, when endeavoring 
to justify its funding of softly paternalistic measures.  But is not this problem side-
stepped by insisting that tax-generated and voluntarily-generated revenue be literally 
divided into separate accounts?  The answer is: only partially.  It is true that diverting 
voluntarily-raised monies (accruing, say, from the extra, voluntary donations made by 
taxpayers when filing their returns, or from USPS profits) to separate funds, and then 
limiting the state’s financing of its pet Perfectionist projects to only that which is 
permitted by the size of these funds, solves the problem of fungibility.  But even here, 
two complications remain: (i) there are still (tax-revenue-financed) administrative 
costs to creating and preserving said accounts, and to promoting the cause and 
collecting donations to it88; and (ii) there is the opportunity cost involved: time and 
effort and funds devoted towards the promotion of such non-neutral causes are time 
and effort and funds the state might devote towards neutral causes – ones that do not 
unduly disadvantage members of faiths disfavored by the state’s softly paternalistic 
aspirations.  That the state even sees fit to act in ways that promote a certain Faith-
related agenda – even when the state takes great pains to so act without availing itself 
of its monopolistic coercive power – might be regarded as objectionably non-neutral 
by citizens who do not find their interests promoted by the state’s Perfectionist 
endeavors. 
 Despite the inadequacy of this attempt to justify non-coercive perfectionism 
by appeal to the state’s capacity for non-coercion-implicating behavior, I do think that 
such soft paternalism is consistent with a broadly Accommodationist approach (even 
if it might be inconsistent with certain, perhaps more extreme, formulations of 
                                                 
88 Though of course these costs could be recouped out of the fund as well. 
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Accommodationism).  The reason for dispensing just now with this particular flawed 
defense of non-coercive Perfectionism (besides the value of considering it for its own 
sake) is that the proper understanding of such a Perfectionism displays this same 
notion of fungibility.  For, while money may be fungible, coercion is not.  Simply 
noting that coercion is implicated at some point ‘upstream’ of a given state policy or 
action, does not suffice to establish that the taint of that coercion flows ‘downstream’ 
to render that action or policy ‘coercive.’  So long as the action or policy in question 
is not in itself coercive, it can embody a form of soft paternalism free of the charge 
that it constitutes the ‘coercive imposition’ of a given way of life – even if the 
policy’s or action’s ability to promote certain ends is made possible in the first place 
only by the coercive imposition of tax policy.  In some cases, of course, coercion does 
‘flow downstream’ this way.  I believe any activities financed out of public coffers 
that are even partially filled with coercively-generated tax revenue – in light of the 
fact that money is fungible – do thereby incur the ‘taint of coercion.’  There is a 
genuine sense in which money’s fungibility entails that, in a softly paternalistic state, 
any given citizen’s tax contributions go to support its non-coercive Perfectionist 
measures.  Accordingly, citizens who do not identify with the conceptions of the 
Good favored by such a state find that they are coercively being made to subsidize 
ways of life they find foreign or alien, perhaps even odious.  Furthermore, that citizen 
will experience a coercively-imposed opportunity cost to the extent that she has that 
much less of her own resources to devote towards efforts that might give expression 
to her cherished notion of the Good Life.  This is a genuine concern.  However, the 
same concern does not apply to state activities financed out of non-coercively-
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generated funds.  The mere fact that some small degree of coercion was implicated 
somewhere in the process of collecting these funds (for we might concede the point 
that the state would have been unable in the first place to make the initial investments 
required to erect the means of soliciting these donations, or of reaping these profits, 
were it not for its right to collect tax revenues89) does not suffice to render the whole 
endeavor a ‘coercive’ one.  The well is not that easily poisoned.   
 The foregoing discussion may strike some readers as out of keeping with the 
general tone of the defense of Accommodationism thus far.  I believe these readers 
are accurate in this judgment.  Nevertheless, it remains a (perhaps surprising) result of 
our account’s reliance on the moral constraints regulating the use of coercive power 
that the view has little to say about the state’s use of non-coercive power – even when 
such usage is intuitively at odds with the generally epistemically-modest spirit of this 
vision of an Accommodationist politics.  But this need not be of much concern for us, 
as our anti-Perfectionist instincts only range over coercive state actions.  The 
Accommodationist need not have (and in most cases will not have) any commitments 
to the effect that it is good that society more broadly construed should preserve 
conditions that appear ‘neutral’ as among citizens’ competing understandings of the 
Good Life.  Indeed, our commitment to liberty might be thought to entail that, in the 
free and consensual exchange of arguments – the ‘marketplace of ideas’ – visions of 
life’s meaning and value be permitted to flounder or flourish according to their 
merits, with no post hoc intervention by anyone (or at least not the state) seeking to 
                                                 
89 Of course, it may be pointed out that the government need not gain the necessary ‘start-up’ revenues 
from taxation.  It may do what the private sector does – enter the capital market and borrow assets.  True 
enough: but this just pushes the issue back one more step: some coercive measures were presumably 
necessary before such an entity, capable of issuing bonds and borrowing on capital markets, could get up 
an running in the first place. 
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preserve beliefs and practices that would not otherwise survive on their own.  This is 
in fact one key difference between our Accommodationist account – otherwise quite 
‘Milli-ian’ in spirit – and the liberalism of John Stuart Mill himself.  The latter sought 
to protect the “liberty of thought and expression” from the efforts of “Society” to 
restrict this liberty, where by “Society” he was often not careful to distinguish the 
state from civil society.  In fact, he thought interference with individual autonomy 
from the latter source to be in many ways more insidious than official state 
interference – censure from the ‘court of public opinion’ is more difficult to detect 
and harder to resist, etc.90  Our ‘Mill-ian’ liberal, by contrast, is likely indifferent to 
the effects that civil society and the marketplace of ideas might have on the fortunes 
of various conceptions.  When Visions of the Good fare well or fare poorly in this 
sphere, they do so on a (hopefully) ‘level playing field’, and of their own merits – 
their fates are not artificially impacted by an actor’s use of (monopolized) coercive 
power to influence the outcome of the free interplay of ideas.  Our Millian may 
concede that the waning of some forms of life in these circumstances can be 
regrettable, but it is at least not unjust. 
 The key insight here is to recognize that, for the Accommodationist, it is the 
use of coercive power, and particularly its potential to effect undue violations of 
citizens’ expressive liberty, that calls for careful regulation by moral principles.  
There is no concomitant pressure to correspondingly enshrine protection of citizens’ 
expressive liberty from the forces of influence, persuasion, demonstration, argument 
and example.  There is likewise no concomitant pressure to protect citizens from the 
influence of the state per se.  Accommodationists are animated by the drive to protect 
                                                 
90 On these points, see Mill [1978, chp. IV] 
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expressive liberty from undue coercive interference, and the state (on this as on most 
pictures of state authority) claims a monopoly on the use of legitimate coercion.  So 
the Accommodationist is naturally assumed to draw her sword against all, and only, 
governmental efforts to promote the Good.  But this formulation is sloppy: the 
Accommodationist opposes all and only coercive interferences with citizens’ 
expressive liberty (except when such interferences are required to prevent one 
citizen’s coercively interfering with another).  Some such coercive interferences may 
be attempted by non-state actors (in which cases the state is legitimated in intervening 
to prevent such interference), and some state actions may not be coercive – a 
possibility we countenanced several paragraphs above.  So it does turn out to be true 
that, when the state can engage in soft paternalism in ways that entirely avoid 
coercion,91 the Accommodationist has no principled beef.  Any feelings regarding the 
seeming counter-intuitiveness of this result should be dispelled by the recognition that 
– when acting in a non-coercive manner with the support of monies financed in a 
non-coercive manner (i.e. not from taxes) – the state is really just another part of civil 
society.  Its actions and influences in these arenas (say, promoting environmentalism 
by channeling funds voluntarily contributed by taxpayers who checked ‘yes’ on the 
‘Would you like to contribute $3.00 to the Save the Chesapeake Bay Foundation?’ 
box) are to be regarded as exactly on par with those of voluntary associations, 
corporations, the media, or the academy.   
One final point bears mentioning: throughout this description of the 
mechanics of Accommodationism, we have observed the effect of its chief advantage 
                                                 
91 Though it should still be stressed that this is no easy task, as the considerations regarding fungibility 
above demonstrate. 
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over other forms of Neutralism.  For in other discussions of the topic, it is common to 
find the Neutralist saddled with certain argumentative burdens, putatively essential to 
any successful defense of Neutralism.  These burdens are placed on the Neutralist, not 
only by opponents of the view, but sometimes also by its proponents.  For example, 
George Klosko regards it as incumbent upon the neutralist to formulate a distinction 
between “conceptions of the good” and “other, nonsectarian value claims”, such that 
neutral state policies may permissibly draw upon the latter but not the former.92  
Likewise, Kent Greenawalt presupposes the efficacy of a distinction between 
“religious” and “ordinary, secular” reasons,93 but does not spell out how this 
distinction is to be drawn.  The inability so to demarcate is an important motivation, 
not only for those (like some Perfectionists) who argue the ideal of neutrality to be 
incoherent or unobtainable, but also those (like myself) who argue that we need to 
dispense with neutrality as the fundamental ordering principle in this debate.  A 
worthy feature of our account is that it circumvents the need to wade into the murky 
waters of these debates.  
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 
  
At this point, the discerning reader may have noticed an affinity between the 
Accommodationist account we have been developing, and a view variously termed 
‘Pluralist Liberalism’94 or ‘Liberal Pluralism’.95  ‘Pluralist Liberalism’ (as I shall 
henceforth refer to it) is the position of those who seek to ground and defend liberal 
                                                 
92 Klosko [2003, 167].  
93 Greenawalt [2003, 266]. 
94 By George Crowder 
95 By William Galston 
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political institutions on the basis of the value pluralist thesis, first encountered in 
section 2.3 above.  Pluralist Liberalism has recruited a number of very able defenders 
over the past decade.  And the charge that our Accommodationist account is 
indiscernible from Pluralist Liberalism is an important one, as our vision of politics 
does on the surface bear many resemblances to the pluralist’s view.  Either of these 
two reasons is sufficient to give the matter our due attention; given that both reasons 
obtain, we shall accord the subject its own chapter.  In the closing pages of this 
dissertation, then, we shall see how Accommodationism is immune to certain 
foundational challenges that plague the Pluralist Liberal view, and that – even were 
the Pluralist Liberal able to overcome these foundational difficulties – he would be 
led to an understanding of liberal institutions which is, in practice, indistinguishable 
from the Accommodationist’s story about the practice of liberalism.  In the course of 
our exposition, the Accommodationist version of Neutralism will be given greater 








Chapter Ten:  Accommodationism in Action 
 Recently, several authors have turned to the theory of value pluralism in hopes 
that it might provide a fruitful basis upon which to defend a conception of liberal 
politics.  Representative of this trend are three books that I’ll draw upon for purposes 
of this chapter: George Crowder’s Liberalism and Value Pluralism (2002), William 
Galston’s Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political 
Theory and Practice (2002), and Galston’s The Practice of Liberal Pluralism (2004).  
Galston uses the phrase ‘liberal pluralism’ to refer to the conception of liberalism 
drawn from value pluralism, while Crowder prefers ‘pluralist liberalism’; I shall use 
the latter formulation to refer to this view. 
 The pluralist liberal argues from a particular metaphysical thesis – value 
pluralism – to a particular vision of politics – liberalism.  Accordingly, his account 
will feature two separable, but interrelated, components: a distinctive justification of 
liberalism, and a conception of politics with distinctive content.  I shall argue that the 
pluralist liberal’s case is hampered by four difficulties – difficulties our 
Accommodationist story does not share.  Two of these difficulties challenge the 
justification of liberalism in terms of value pluralism, and two of them plague the 
particular understanding of liberalism to which the pluralist is led.  I will term the 
former difficulties ‘Justification Challenges’, and the latter difficulties ‘Formulation 
Challenges’.   
This chapter proceeds in three sections.  In the first two, I articulate the two 
Justification Challenges and the two Formulation Challenges (respectively) that 
hamper the pluralist liberal’s efforts to defend liberalism with reference to value 
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pluralism.  In the third section, I’ll make the further case that – not only is 
Accommodationism not hampered by the two Formulation Challenges – but that our 
version of Neutralism is in fact nicely equipped to handle such difficulties.  Far from 
befuddling the Accommodationist, as I argue they befuddle the pluralist liberal, these 
criticisms actually provide an opportunity for us to showcase the powerful and 
innovative resources of our theory.  I thereby conclude that, even if value pluralism 
can be used to defend liberalism – even if the two Justification Challenges can be 
met, in other words – the most defensible and workable way to construe a pluralist 
liberal politics is along lines provided by the Accommodationist model.   
 
10.1 Justification Challenges 
The two Justification Challenges are as follows: 
(1) One might wonder how the pluralist liberal can privilege preeminent liberal 
values – individual rights and liberties, autonomy, and expressive liberty – as 
foundational elements of his political morality, consistently with his 
commitment to value pluralism.  For a true commitment to value pluralism 
seemingly requires recognizing as legitimate at least some political orders 
organized according to fundamentally illiberal values.  Call this the 
‘Incoherence Challenge’. 
(2) Second, there is a certain practical difficulty attending efforts to erect value 
pluralism as the founding principle of a political morality.  For in any diverse 
polity, many citizens’ conceptions of life’s meaning and value are Monistic – 
their orientations are such as to be inimical to value pluralism’s central claim 
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that genuine human goods are heterogeneous, and thus that there is no single, 
rationally-defensible summum bonum – no one best way for human beings to 
live.  Thus pluralist liberalism has only limited appeal as a public philosophy.  
Call this the ‘Diplomacy Challenge.’ 
Let us examine each of these difficulties in turn. 
 
10.11 The Incoherence Challenge 
 This we might nickname the ‘John Gray’ worry, after its most noted 
proponent.  In essence, the worry is this: how can one privilege preeminent liberal 
values – individual rights and liberties, autonomy, and (particularly) expressive 
liberty – as foundational elements of one’s political morality, consistently with one’s 
commitment to value pluralism?  A true commitment to pluralism, it seems, requires 
recognizing as legitimate at least some political orders organized according to 
fundamentally illiberal values.  But, pursuant to the central tenets of value pluralism, 
these illiberal values might be every bit as valid as the preeminent liberal values.  If 
human values are truly diverse and heterogeneous, then surely also diverse and 
heterogeneous forms of governance can embody equally valid and incommensurable 
modes of human flourishing.  It seems the value pluralist can at most only allow that 
liberalism is one member of a set of equally-valid political moralities. 
 
10.12 The Diplomacy Challenge 
 We have already encountered this Justification Challenge in Section 5.1, 
where we first discovered Pluralism to be unduly Diplomatic with respect to the 
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many citizens (and presumably, there are very many such citizens) who understand 
their cherished conceptions of life’s meaning and value in Monistic terms.  We may 
now distinguish two versions of this criticism: the ‘narrow version’, or the 
‘philosopher’s qualm’, and the ‘broad version’, or the ‘layman’s qualm.’  The narrow 
version is this: value pluralism may itself suffer from some internal theoretical 
difficulties.  It may be incoherent, for example.  Plenty of detractors have found 
plenty of reasons to criticize it.96  Value pluralism is unlikely, at any rate, to 
command the widespread assent of philosophers and reflective laypersons as the 
founding principle of a political morality. 
 But forget philosophers for a moment.  The ‘broad version’ of this challenge 
says this: many ‘True Believers’ are also unlikely to accept the truth of value 
pluralism.  Many persons subscribe to belief systems that are incompatible with the 
truth of value pluralism.  For many conceptions of life’s meaning and value are 
Monistic – their orientations are such as to be inimical to value pluralism’s central 
claim that genuine human goods are heterogeneous, and thus that there is no single, 
rationally-defensible summum bonum – no one best way for human beings to live.  
Thus, pluralist liberalism has only limited appeal as a public philosophy: limited 
capacity to command the allegiance and loyalty and hearts and minds of large swaths 
of the population. 
 But this latter objection requires fuller discussion on my part, as this charge 
has not gone un-considered by liberal pluralists like Galston.  Galston’s reply, for 
one, is that a critical elision is occurring here, in the form of a failure to distinguish 
politics and political theorizing.  In chapter eleven of The Practice of Liberal 
                                                 
96 For an instructive survey of much of this literature, see Galston [2004, chp. 2] 
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Pluralism, and also in chapter five of Liberal Pluralism, Galston distinguishes the 
‘civic’ from the ‘political’ roles of political philosophy.  He marshalls this distinction 
in support of the claim that a political regime’s philosophical justification need not be 
mirrored by its ‘public justification’, or by the principles admissible in the ‘public 
reasoning’ conducted within that regime.  So, in our context, we might speculate that 
political philosophers eventually all come to be convinced as to the superiority of 
liberalism, and they do so on grounds of their having been convinced of the truth of 
value pluralism, and of the cogency of the argument linking the two.  Even so, 
Galston suggests, these political philosophers might recognize the limited appeal of 
value pluralism as a public philosophy – that is, they may recognize the cogency of 
what I’m here presenting as the ‘broad concern’.  But, since the ‘political’ role of 
political philosophy need not be constrained by the same considerations that are 
operative in its ‘civic’ functioning, political philosophers committed to pluralist 
liberalism need not require liberalism to be promulgated in terms that explicitly link 
its validity to the truth of value pluralism.  Nor must political philosophers themselves 
publicly advocate for the necessary link between value pluralism and liberalism.   
But how far can Galston’s distinction actually be maintained?  I am not sure 
that, ultimately, it is tenable.  This worry is perhaps best expressed negatively by 
(what is typically inadmissible) shifting the burden back to the liberal pluralist.  The 
real challenge for liberal pluralists who avail themselves of this argumentative 
strategy, I think, is to show how the distinction between a regime’s true, philosophical 
justification and its publicly promulgated justification can be maintained without 
resorting to something like Plato’s ‘Noble Lie.’  For that is the vision Galston offers 
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us here, is it not?  We – the enlightened philosophers – come to recognize both the 
truth of value pluralism, and the fact that value pluralism (properly understood) 
entails liberalism.  But we also recognize that many among the hoi poloi are 
irreversibly committed to value-schemes incompatible with pluralism – monistic 
value schemes, that is.  Thus, these members of the public cannot be persuaded to 
support a political regime whose true justification ultimately requires assenting to the 
truth of a doctrine which is, by their lights, heretical.  Requiring these citizens to 
assent to liberalism on the basis of the truth of value pluralism actually requires them 
to deny crucial features of their most fundamental views – or, at least, requires them 
to re-conceive their cherished notions of life’s meaning and value, in ways they might 
reasonably reject.  So we, the enlightened philosophers, endorse public justifications 
of liberalism that surreptitiously avoid a controversial reliance on value pluralism.  In 
our public roles, as actors in the political sphere, we enlightened political 
philosophers are required to formulate inauthentic arguments, offered up in bad faith, 
in support of a ‘Noble Lie’ to sustain liberalism. 
 
10.2 Formulation Challenges 
The two Formulation Challenges, meanwhile, are as follows: 
(3) According to Galston, pluralist liberalism is (to borrow terminology from 
John Rawls) a ‘comprehensive’ account, rather than a ‘free-standing’ one.  
Crowder likewise explicitly characterizes his view as representing a 
Perfectionist version of liberalism, as opposed to a Neutralist one.  These 
observations in themselves might not seem to constitute a criticism of pluralist 
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liberalism – after all, plenty of theorists are quite happy to defend 
comprehensive and Perfectionist strands of liberalism – until we note the 
manner in which these features of the pluralist liberals’ views stand in tension 
with their seeming commitment to a stance of maximum feasible 
accommodation (MFA) with respect to the conditions of Diversity.  For a 
comprehensive, perfectionist understanding of liberalism is more apt to 
endorse coercive interventions into the internal lives of voluntary associations 
not organized along liberal lines (thereby running afoul of this commitment to 
MFA), than is a free-standing, neutralist liberalism.  Call this the ‘Non-
Interference Challenge.’ 
(4)  Pluralist liberal public policy is problematically indeterminate in cases where 
equally-legitimate but incompatible values come into conflict.  Call this the 
‘Practical Impotence’ Challenge.   
Let us consider each Challenge in turn. 
 
10.21 The Non-Interference Challenge 
 There are two ways we might choose to express this worry: in terms of the 
distinction between ‘comprehensive’ versus ‘freestanding’ views (following 
Galston’s own formulation), or in terms of the distinction between Perfectionist and 
Neutralist accounts (following Crowder’s own formulation).  Take the former mode 
of expression first: the distinction between ‘freestanding’ and ‘comprehensive’ 
liberalisms comes from John Rawls’s Political Liberalism.  Comprehensive doctrines 
are those that apply to “a wide range of subjects, and in the limit to all subjects 
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universally,” including “conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of 
personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational 
relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life 
as a whole.”97  Whereas a freestanding conception “can be presented without saying, 
or knowing, or hazarding a conjecture about, what such doctrines it may belong to, or 
be supported by.”98  Now take the latter mode of expression, already very familiar to 
us: Perfectionist understandings of liberalism are those that identify some particular 
value or clusters of values, or some conception of the Good (or cluster of 
conceptions) as authoritative for public purposes.  Neutralist regimes, by contrast, 
aspire to some sense of neutrality with regard to competing understandings of value, 
or the human Good.  In this sense, Perfectionist polities are more disposed to 
recommend paternalistic policies than are Neutralist ones – more likely, that is, to 
mandate some activity, or to prohibit some other activity, because doing so is good 
for its citizens, or promotes the values that it regards as publicly authoritative, and so 
on. 
Among the reasons to favor a freestanding or Neutralist conception of politics 
over a comprehensive or Perfectionist conception, the following is especially salient: 
comprehensive/Perfectionist regimes run the risk of interfering with the internal 
affairs and ordering principles of voluntary associations not organized along liberal 
lines: the Catholic Church, for example.  Mark Henrie expresses this worry very well 
in his article “Understanding Traditionalist Conservatism.”  In this passage, he’s 
                                                 
97 Rawls [1996, 13]. 
98 Ibid., p. 12. 
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distinguishing traditionalist conservativism from what he calls ‘compleat liberalism’: 
this latter view holds that  
some form of the principle of consent and the natural 
rights of individuals is justice, simply.  What is more, justice so 
understood has primacy over all other dimensions of the human 
good.  Any deviation from this principle is ipso facto 
illegitimate.  Where hitherto held in abeyance, it must be 
pressed forward to completion.  Anything – any human 
institution or rule of life – that we have hitherto valued that 
cannot stand under the conditions of liberal justice has no 
‘right’ to exist; the failure of any human institution when 
exposed to liberal principles is prima facie evidence of the 
prior existence of injustice in that institution.99   
 
A comprehensive/perfectionist understanding of liberalism is more apt to endorse 
coercive interventions into the internal lives of voluntary organizations.  A liberal 
polity understood in more free-standing or Neutralist terms, on the other hand, 
refrains from endorsing any ‘thick conception of the good’ as authoritative for public 
purposes, and thus is less likely to feel itself justified in interfering with the 
fundamental ordering of voluntary associations, when their ordering principles are 
illiberal. 
Note that this is not in itself a criticism – plenty of other political theorists 
happily characterize their own views as being comprehensive or Perfectionist.  
                                                 
99 Henrie [2004, 15]. 
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Furthermore, plenty of theorists are happy with this result – happy, that is, to endorse 
state intervention in circumstances when private organizations run afoul of liberal 
norms that are operative in public life.  So why should pluralist liberals like Galston 
and Crowder be any different?  The answer is that their doing so seems to stand in 
tension with their commitment to a stance of maximal accommodation.  A liberal 
polity whose fundamental organizing principle is a commitment to effecting 
‘maximum feasible accommodation’ of divergent conceptions of the Good Life 
should be hesitant to license too many Perfectionist intrusions into the lives of its 
citizens – even when these intrusions are (purportedly) justified in the name of 
promoting liberalism. 
 
10.22 The Practical Impotence Challenge 
 Proponents of pluralist liberalism like Galston and Crowder make many 
passing references – and others not so passing – to concrete policy measures they 
believe would be justified in a regime organized along the lines of pluralist liberalism.  
Conspicuous by its absence in their writing, however, is anything resembling a 
‘demarcation criterion’ distinguishing between, e.g., legitimate and illegitimate uses 
of state coercion to suppress citizens’ efforts to live lives which conform to their 
cherished notions of life’s meaning and value; legitimate and illegitimate models of 
human flourishing or ‘experiments in living’; legitimate and illegitimate public 
purposes; and so forth.  These authors seem to assume that the content of the value 
pluralist view will itself settle all such matters.   
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There are two possible ways in which they seem to believe this might happen.  
One is through what we might call value pluralism’s ‘positive dimension.’  Pluralists 
like Crowder and Galston often allude to a set of universal or basic values that every 
legitimate conception of human flourishing must recognize and embody.  Galston 
says they are “basic” in the sense they “form a part of any choiceworthy conception 
of a human life.”100  We might think of this as something like an ‘overlapping 
consensus’: despite their varying valuational structures, all legitimate modes of 
human life overlap on a set of fundamental values.  (However, these authors often 
seem hesitant to enumerate these shared values.)  If we did have a definitive list of 
these universal or basic values, or even if we had a few that we were confident would 
be included on this list, we could use these values to guide public policy.  Perhaps we 
would favor policies that promoted or prescribed pursuit of these values; additionally, 
we might proscribe activities or forms of life that are inimical to these values. 
The second way in which pluralist liberals seem to think that the content of 
value pluralism will itself offer sufficiently determinate guidance to public policy is 
through value pluralism’s ‘negative dimension.’  Galston and Crowder often speak of 
pluralist liberal states as accommodating “legitimate variation in ways of life”, 
“legitimate” diversity in conceptions of the good, and of allowing a range of activity 
“compatible with the broad limits of acceptable variation countenanced by value 
pluralism.”  At the same time, though, these authors speak of some ways of life as 
being simply “beyond the pale.”  Again, conspicuous by its absence is any 
enumeration of such ways of life.  But still: assuming we were to produce such an 
enumeration, we might find that this list also provides a serviceably determinate 
                                                 
100 Galston [2002, 6] 
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guide to public policy in a pluralist liberal state.  For we might then legislatively 
proscribe the forms of life that are beyond the pale, or proscribe certain activities that 
can only be seen as instantiating ‘illegitimate values’, and so on. 
 However, in the absence of such explicitly articulated demarcation criteria, we 
seem to be left with the worry that pluralist liberalism will be problematically 
indeterminate.  To illustrate this point, we can draw upon two contemporary 
examples: same-sex marriage and public school curricular controversies.  First, let us 
look at same-sex marriage.  Assume for the moment that both the proponents and the 
opponents of same-sex marriage are reasonable and well-intentioned.  Suppose 
further that each side is articulating a perspective that is firmly grounded in a 
legitimate set of values, or a genuinely valid conception of life’s meaning and value.  
Each perspective is to be firmly endorsed as reasonable and legitimate, from the 
perspective of value pluralism.  (I do not believe we must be overly-charitable 
towards either set of disputants, in order to make these assumptions.)  How should a 
pluralist liberal regime respond to this stand-off?  It seems that either way – whether 
it restricts civil marriage to heterosexual couples, or extends the institution to same-
sex couples as well – such a state is going to run afoul of the cherished values of some 
of its citizens.  In cases like this one, it seems that the liberal pluralist state is 
condemned to take a position opposed to one (reasonably) held by a large swath of its 
citizenry – to embody values contrary to those (legitimately) affirmed by many.  
Furthermore, no practical guidance seems to be forthcoming. 
 A second example pertains to education policy, as it relates to the issues raised 
by the recent controversy surrounding the teaching of ‘Intelligent Design’ (ID) theory 
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in schools.  This controversy does not necessarily revolve around a conflict between 
opposed values – though similar curricular disputes could.  (For instance, we can 
easily imagine similarly-structured curricular controversies where the object of 
dispute is which one of two value schemes – each with a seemingly legitimate claim 
to validity, but each in many ways opposed to the other – is to guide a school 
system’s curriculum in ‘values inquiry.’)  But the conflict surround ID does illustrate 
another kind of clash in values: the tension between parents’ legitimate interest in 
fashioning the content of their children’s education, and the state’s legitimate interest 
in the same.  Here again, assume that each party to the dispute is articulating a 
standpoint which, judged from the perspective of value pluralism, is reasonable and 
legitimate.  Here again, it seems the pluralist liberal state faces a deliberative stand-
off.  What is it to do?  It seems that offending some significant portion of its citizenry 
is unavoidable.  Pluralist liberalism is problematically indeterminate and unhelpful 
here.  All the pluralist can say is that here, as in many circumstances, difficult and 
painful choices are required – choices wherein there is no way to avoid genuine loss. 
 Indeed, it seems we have hit upon a general feature here: it would seem there 
is a theoretical roadblock to the very notion of public education in the liberal polity.  
Again, Mark C. Henrie has articulated this challenge forcefully:  
 
… liberalism’s boast is that it chastely denies to itself any thick 
theory of the good.  Thus, it uniquely does not need to indoctrinate its 
citizens with controversial orthodoxies.  But when the liberal state 
appropriated to itself the business of education with the advent of the 
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‘common school,’ it seized the responsibility of soulcraft – without 
really admitting to that fact.  Education is, in its nature, value-laden.  
Liberalism’s principled refusal to speak in teleological terms of a 
summum bonum, therefore, renders it a much-abashed patron of the 
schools.  For, as every parent knows, children ask Why? And continue 
to ask Why? Until they come to the end of the matter.  A consistently 
liberal schooling must always stop short of that end, satisfying no one.  
For most of American history, the common school surreptitiously 
reflected shared local values while the central organs of government 
looked the other way, a reasonable strategy for muddling through a 
theoretical inconsistency.  Lately, however, courts have insisted on 
enforcing liberal norms on the schools …101 
 
10.3 Should pluralist liberals be Accommodationists? 
 My third criticism of pluralist liberalism relies heavily on the observation that 
this view sees as the state’s raison d’etre the need to create a secure public space 
within which a multitude of individuals and communities can flourish.  My fourth 
criticism trades heavily on the worry that – though it predicts that fundamental value 
conflicts are the inevitable result of the free unfettered exercise of human reason – 
pluralist liberalism offers little in the way of guidance as to how to effect political 
resolutions of these conflicts when they arise.  In this section, I will argue that by 
restricting its activities to those licensed by Coercion, the Accommodationist state 
better comports with the understanding of politics to which the pluralist liberal should 
                                                 
101 Henrie [2004, 23]. 
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be led.  A state limited to the fundamental tasks of protecting citizens against 
violence, theft, and fraud, enforcing contracts, providing a limited range of ‘public 
goods’, and so forth, is a state that truly affords maximum feasible accommodation of 
citizens’ efforts to live out their diverse conceptions of the Good.  To support this 
claim, let us now examine how Accommodationism is immune from the two 
Formulation Challenges, and how instead it offers novel solutions to these 
difficulties. 
 
10.31 Accommodationism: A Free-standing, Neutralist View 
 Recall that the first Formulation Challenge comprised a worry about the 
danger of governmental overreach vis-à-vis the internal workings of private 
associations organized along illiberal lines.  This concern is less likely to arise in 
states restricting their activities to those countenanced by Coercion.  The reason for 
this is simple: the less a state does, the fewer are its opportunities to impede 
impermissibly its citizens’ expressive liberty.  A state that does not undertake to 
promote values that it deems central to the pursuit of human excellence, or does not 
endeavor to stamp out practices that, though harmless to others, it deems wicked or 
depraved, is a state that is not very likely to interfere with practices embodying 
genuine values.  From the value pluralist’s perspective, this is a desirable result.  
Unless we know with utter confidence which are the universal values, and which 
ways of life are simply ‘beyond the pale’ (and recall the pluralists’ seeming 
reluctance to put forth any conjectures as to what these lists might look like), it seems 
that the value pluralist will want to honor a strong presumption in favor of individuals 
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leading their lives as they see fit, and banding together in voluntary organizations as 
they see fit.  This presumption is threatened by states organized along Perfectionist 
lines, and those that embody ‘comprehensive conceptions’ of liberalism, but is 
honored and protected in the limited state envisioned by Accommodationism. 
 
10.32 Accommodationism: Serviceably Determinate Policy Prescriptions 
 Recall that on the issue of same-sex marriage, there was seemingly ‘no way 
out’ for the pluralist liberal: either policy seems bound to offend the deeply-held and -
cherished beliefs of significant segments of the populace.  But, it might be objected, 
this challenge is not unique to pluralist liberalism: any liberal polity, organized along 
any lines, will face this dilemma.  But this objection is without merit.  For consider 
the Accommodationist’s response here: she will maintain that the intractability of the 
dispute itself bears witness to the wisdom of the limited state.  For what is the proper 
stance for the state to take with regard to the proper scope of the institution of 
marriage?  The proper stance is no stance at all, claims the Accommodationist: the 
state need not – and, as current controversies exhibit, ought not – be in the business of 
ratifying marriages in the first place.  On this view of things, the ever-expanding role 
of the state, which can be metaphorically depicted as an evolution from the night-
watchman state of classical liberalism to the welfare state of modern liberalism, 
merely represents an ever-expanding arena in which the state’s coercive power can 
(and must) be thrown behind this or that disputed value.  Again, from the pluralist 
liberal’s perspective, this should be viewed with regret.  The more ubiquitous and 
expansive is the reach of government action and regulation, the more frequent are the 
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painful occasions where the state must interfere – often coercively interfere – with 
some of its citizens’ legitimate efforts to lead lives responsive to genuine values. 
 Let us turn our attention now to the issue of curricular controversies.  Recall 
the particular charge that pluralist liberalism is incapable of offering principled 
resolution to controversies such as those surrounding the proper content of public 
school science curricula.  Recall also Mark Henrie’s more general allegation that, 
insofar as it involves the task of “soulcraft”, the project of public education poses a 
challenge to the any liberal regime, pluralist or otherwise.  I will now argue that 
Accommodationism is better-suited than is pluralist liberalism to meet the challenge 
posed by curricular controversies such as the one surrounding ID, and that the 
mechanism by which it meets this challenge serves as an adequate response to the 
general challenge issued by Henrie. 
 An Accommodationist liberalism is going to seek, insofar as is practical and 
possible, to refrain from privileging any particular conception of the Good.  However, 
privileging one or another conception of the Good is bound to be the inevitable result 
of assuming direct responsibility for public education.  So is the solution here similar 
in form to the solution offered above, as a response to the seeming dilemma posed by 
the controversy surrounding same-sex marriage?  Must a state organized according to 
the principles of Accommodationism refrain from providing public education?  
Certainly not – a well-educated populace is a public good (a good whose spontaneous 
provision in the marketplace is precluded by a market failure), and thus a legitimate 
arena for state action.  How to resolve the dilemma, then?  How can the state perform 
the legitimate service of supplying a public good while avoiding the sin of trespassing 
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on citizens’ expressive liberty?  Well, the answer lies in the observation that there’s 
more than one way to skin a cat.  In this case, there’s more than one way to make 
provision for a public good: in the arena of public education, perhaps (and in other 
similar areas besides), a liberalism of accommodation should seek indirect ways of 
providing public goods.  For example, it may create the market conditions required 
for an adequate system of public education spontaneously to arise by granting 
vouchers to all families with school-aged children.  Schools would then be free to 
teach Intelligent Design or evolution (or both) as they chose, but a certain landmine 
would be avoided inasmuch as the state is not throwing its coercive power behind one 
or another controversial value.  (This seems unavoidable in situations wherein local 
school boards – instruments of the state – must choose between the equally 
unattractive options of offending the scientifically-minded or offending the 
religiously-minded with their choice of curricula). 
 
We should conclude, then, that pluralist liberals are better-served offering a 
vision of politics more in line with the limited state countenanced by 
Accommodationism.  For the resources of Accommodationist thought provide for a 
more natural expression of a political morality dedicated to effecting wide 
accommodation of divergent conceptions of human flourishing.  So, even if pluralist 
liberals are right that value pluralism can and should be used to ground liberal theory 
– that is, even if their distinctive vision of the justification of liberalism holds up 
against my first two criticisms – their distinctive vision of the content of liberal theory 
ought to be revised, more in the direction of our own view: Accommodationism. 
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Appendix:  Modesty, Authenticity, and Difficulty  
 More can be said about how exactly I envision Modesty and Authenticity to 
work together to ground Neutralism.  Here is how I see the terrain.  Anyone who 
accepts Modesty will be disposed to accept some formulation of the neutrality thesis.  
Likewise for anyone who accepts Authenticity.  The purpose of including both 
claims as constituents of our defense of Neutralism, then, is to capture the allegiance 
of persons – reasonable, we may suppose – who reject one of the two claims while 
still accepting the other.  This suggests at least four classifications of persons, 
categorized according to their various (dis)avowals of Modesty and Authenticity:  
 
(a) Those who accept both Modesty and Authenticity; 
(b) Those who accept Authenticity but reject Modesty; 
(c) Those who accept Modesty but reject Authenticity; and finally 
(d) Those who reject both Modesty and Authenticity. 
 
Persons in categories (a), (b) and (c) are all disposed towards Neutralism; only those 
in category (d) reject it.  Those in category (a) stand in no particular need of 
elucidation (indeed, by now it is assumed as understood that the author inclines this 
way, and hoped that – by essay’s end – the reader will as well), so we will pass over 
them in what follows. 
Henceforth it will be assumed that all who accept Modesty do so on grounds 
of Difficulty.  This encompasses those in categories (a) (whom we have already 
elected to ignore for time being) and (c).  But the converse does not hold: rejection of 
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Modesty can follow, either because of a rejection of Difficulty, or in spite of an 
acceptance of Difficulty.  This invites a further sub-categorization of groups (b) and 
(d) into: 
 





(b-ii)/(d-ii) Those who reject Modesty on grounds of their rejection of 
Difficulty. 
 
Our full rendering of the relevant possibilities then, is as follows: 
 
 (a)     Those who accept both Modesty and Authenticity; 
(b-i)  Those who (in spite of their acceptance of Difficulty) reject Modesty, 
but embrace Authenticity. 
 (b-ii) Those who (on grounds of their rejection of Difficulty) reject Modesty, 
but embrace Authenticity. 
 (c)     Those who endorse Modesty but reject Authenticity; 
 (d-i)   Those who (in spite of their acceptance of Difficulty) reject Modesty, 
and who furthermore reject Authenticity; and finally 
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 (d-ii)  Those who (on grounds of their rejection of Difficulty) reject Modesty, 
and who furthermore reject Authenticity. 
 
We can represent these possibilities in graphical form, with the help of a Venn 
Diagram, as in Figure 1: 








The shaded area (Modesty/non-Difficulty) represents our provisional assumption, 
from just above, that no one accepts Modesty except on grounds of Difficulty. 
To make these abstract categorizations more concrete, let us consider illustrations of 
the relevant possibilities, beginning with (b-i)102 and proceeding in alpha-numeric 
order.103  
                                                 
102 Recalling our stipulation above that category (a) calls for no particular elucidation. 
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(b-i): D, ~M & A 
We first countenanced the possibility of this category of persons when we 
made the acquaintance of ‘the Anointed’ in section 4.3.  We can think of the 
Anointed as those who accept the truth of Difficulty but demure at the inference from 
Difficulty to Humble.  On the categorization and graphical representation set forth 
above, the Anointed occupy categories/regions (b-i) and (d-i).  Our immediate 
concern is with those in category (b-i) – those who also accept Authenticity.  We 
might further moniker these folks the Anointed Existentialists, in recognition of their 
hard-won (yet confident) insight that certain twentieth-century continental European 
thinkers got it right: as Sartre, Camus, and their ilk argued, a condition of anyone’s 
living a valuable and worthwhile life is that that person endorses as authentically 
one’s own his or her projects, values and commitments.  Accordingly, the Anointed 
Existentialist favors a state policy of neutrality (as a means of securing the conditions 
under which persons are free to genuinely endorse (or reject), as genuinely their own, 
their various commitments) on grounds of their acceptance of Authenticity, even 
while they reject Humility and, therefore, Modesty.  (Recall the Anointed 
Existentialist’s confidence in the verities propounded by Sartre and Camus, even 
while they recognize that subjective recognition of these Truths is hard to come by – 
perhaps one needs to major in English truly to appreciate them.) 
(b-ii): ~D, ~M & A 
Some reasonable persons might reject Modesty on grounds of their denial of 
Difficulty – ‘Confident Believers’ of many stripes are apt to reason this way, no 
                                                                                                                                           
103 Note that this ordering can be represented graphically as well: we start with the center-most region 
(category (a), the one that requires no further characterization) and spiral outwards in clockwise fashion. 
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doubt.  These are people confident that their preferred understanding of life’s 
meaning and value is the correct one, and who see no particular reason why everyone 
shouldn’t come to share their convictions: finding, as they do, that the reasons 
supporting their Theory of the Good are obvious and open to all.  But many (though 
of course not all) of these folks will agree that conformity to the tenets of their faith – 
while better to be had than to be lacked – is actually best when gained freely.  A life 
lived in conformity with the Gospel is better (and, some would say, only possible in 
the first place) when it results from, say, a genuine, un-coerced appreciation of the 
reasons favoring it, or from a direct and genuine experience of God’s redeeming 
grace.  Or we might say that devotion to the Principles of the Enlightenment can ipso 
facto (because they place such a premium on autonomy, say) redeem one’s soul only 
to the extent that they are embraced voluntarily.  In either event, we might feel that 
affirmation of the One True Faith is of less value when it results from Official State 
Decree.  A person’s salvation, many feel, is a matter to be worked out in fear and 
trembling between she and her God; the state may not trespass against the inviolable 
citadel that is the conscience, even if its intent is to enforce conformity with True 
Doctrine.  Here then we see examples of persons inclined towards a neutrality thesis 
on grounds of Authenticity but not Modesty.  We might choose to term those who 
subscribe to a neutrality thesis in this way our ‘Theologically Liberal Protestants’ (if 
you are not averse to religious terminology), or we might opt for ‘Humane 
Enlightenment Apostles’ (for those more comfortable with more secular 
terminology).  Perhaps, in the spirit of neutrality, we shall term them simply our 
Enlightened True Believers. 
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(c): D, M, & ~A 
Similarly, we can construct examples wherein reasonable persons may reject 
Authenticity, yet retain an affinity for Neutralism on account of their epistemic 
humility – and thus, their endorsement of Modesty.  Consider the case of those we 
might term the ‘Platonic Republic-ans’, including the hyphen here to emphasize this 
term’s genesis as an adjectivization of the title and subject matter of Plato’s greatest 
work, rather than in any relation to the contemporary American political party of the 
same name.  Having worked their way to an appreciation of their faith (call it ‘Middle 
Platonism’) only after years of laborious study, these Republic-ans are keenly aware 
of the elusiveness of Truth in this realm.  The tenets of Middle Platonism demand that 
they go forth, back into the Cave, and make converts of all, bringing each person 
(whether they come willingly or not) to live a life of Justice (that is, a life in 
conformity with the relative admixture of bronze, silver or gold found in their souls).  
Nevertheless, these would-be philosopher-kings actually demur at the suggestion that 
they carry out this demand of their faith by enforcing their vision of the Good Life.  
They demur at this possibility because they lack the level of confidence in the truth of 
Middle Platonism sufficient to warrant their coercively imposing it upon resistant 
dissenters.  (Aware that their souls have not yet taken leave of their bodily prisons, 
these Republic-ans – in contrast to their teacher – elect instead to conform to the 
principles of their spiritual and intellectual grandfather, who (perhaps not without 
some degree of irony) counseled epistemic humility by famously claiming to know 
only one thing: that he knew nothing.)  They’re True Believers, yes, just like the ones 
considered above – but they are epistemically humble True Believers. When it comes 
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to visions of the Good Life, they do believe that they have got things right, and that 
what is right requires forcing others to toe the party line – it is simply that their belief 
is not confident enough to spur them to go the extra step and enforce it upon others.  
They suffer from a failure of nerve when it comes to effecting the enforcement of 
Middle Plationism – an enforcement which the tenets of Middle Plationism requires.  
After all, it took them fifteen long years of studying Dialectic (and that after many 
more years of Music and Gymnastics) to get to the point where they were finally able 
to contemplate the forms of Beauty, Truth, and Justice – to the point where they grasp 
“true reality . . . intangible, visible only to Reason.”104  Mightn’t it be possible that 
they erred somewhere along the way?  Granted, there is a whiff of paradox here105, in 
that we are simultaneously attributing to these Republic-ans (i) a degree of confidence 
in Middle Platonism sufficient to warrant their rejection of Authenticity (insofar as 
they accept as a consequence of their faith the directive to subjugate the unruly 
inhabitants of the Cave); and (ii) a certain lack of confidence in Middle Platonism, 
where such lack is sufficient to warrant their endorsement of Modesty, or at least of a 
general attitude of epistemic humility.  But if such a scenario is not in fact 
paradoxical, if such a position is indeed possible and reasonable (and I am prepared to 
argue that it is), then we have just countenanced the possibility of someone who 
rejects Authenticity while remaining inclined towards neutrality, presumably on 
grounds of something like Modesty (via Difficulty).  We might term these Republic-
ans Frost-y True Believers, not out of recognition of their less-than-torrid 
                                                 
104 See Plato’s Phaedrus 247c. 
105 Not to mention a whiff of the surreal, in that we are even attributing epistemic humility to people we’re 
calling ‘Republic-ans’ in the first place. 
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commitment to the central claims of their faith106, but rather in honor of Robert 
Frost’s pithy characterization of a liberal as a man “too broadminded to take his own 
side in an argument.” 
(d-i): D, ~M, & ~A 
If we are to take our own side in our argument so far, it seems we must 
conclude that the only class of (putatively reasonable) persons not inclined towards a 
principle of neutrality at this point are those folks who reject both Authenticity and 
Modesty (or some suitably-modified general position of epistemic humility).  So 
what sorts of persons are we parting company with, at this stage in the argument?  
And should we care?  The people I have in mind here are those who (sensibly 
enough, we might imagine) reject Authenticity and who (how sensibly we may 
debate) are disinclined towards Modesty, either because they reject the inference 
from Difficulty to Humble and/or Modesty, or because they decry the possibility of 
their own fallibility outright – because they deny Difficulty, that is. 
We can get a sense for the former response by considering a modified version 
of our Platonic Republic-an example.  This time, instead of the humble philosopher-
kings I just described, we might imagine public-spirited philosopher-kings.  Their 
position can basically be expressed as follows: “Wow, it sure is a good thing that at 
least some of us undertake to perform this rigorous fifteen-year course of study, so 
that All might benefit from the Truth grasped by we Some.  It is thus our privilege – 
nay, our obligation – to return to the Cave and spread that Noble Lie, so that all might 
                                                 
106 Though being luke-warm with regard to the essentials of your Faith is not a position you want to be in . 
. . as the Church at Laodicea will learn, and as these Republic-ans would have known, had they lived 
several centuries later and had the benefit of the Apostle John’s vision of God’s letter to the Laodiceans: 
see the ‘other John 3:16’: the Revelation to John (not the Gospel According to John), 3:16. 
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conform to the Principles of Justice that only we (thanks to years of rigorous training 
– not to mention the fortunate endowment of a gold-intensive soul) may know.  Now, 
of course, I do not expect most of these cave-dwellers to understand the Truth even 
once they’re told it.  So I might have to twist their arms a bit to get them to live the 
Good Life.  Furthermore, I may even occasionally have my own doubts as to the 
verities of Middle Platonism.  Yet I must press forward in the task of implementing 
Justice: I would be derelict in my duty as a Philosopher, were I to do otherwise.”  
Here we have precisely the case of someone who affirms Difficulty but nevertheless 
rejects Modesty, and who (owing to her rejection of Authenticity) arrives at a 
Perfectionist, rather than a Neutralist, conception of politics. We might term such 
Republic-ans Courageous True Believers107, in honor of their steely determination to 
press on with their imposition of Middle Platonism, even in the face of their own 
doubts as to its accuracy (arising out of a genuine appreciation for the difficulties 
attendant to the quest to acquire such a creed).  Again, there may appear to be a whiff 
of paradox here in my characterization of these Republic-ans’ cognitive profile , but 
the claim that such a mindset is genuinely incoherent or impossible can be sustained 
only at the cost of gross insensitivity to the richly complicated phenomena of actual 
human belief and epistemic commitment. 
(d-ii): ~D, ~M, & ~A 
Lastly, it remains to us to consider even the case of someone who rejects 
Modesty/Humble as a result of his rejection of Difficulty.  To get a picture of what 
                                                 
107 In the parlance we adopted above, these Republic-ans are members of the ‘Anointed’, inasmuch as they 
accept the truth of Difficulty, but without therefore endorsing Humble.  Note that there are many 
different ways of belonging to the class of the Anointed – the example of the Courageous True Believers 
represents one way of doing so, as does the example of the Anointed Existentialists.  Again, what they all 
have in common is the acceptance of Difficulty simultaneously with avowal that, the difficulty of the task 
notwithstanding, they have the Truth. 
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such a person may look like, let us imagine that, many years hence, widespread 
consensus is attained as to the fundamental tenets of the Good Life for Man, after all.  
We might imagine, that is, that the empirical truth of Diversity is an empirical truth 
no more.  It may turn out that proponents of the Enlightenment from Voltaire through 
Sam Harris are proved correct, and that – once unbound from the shackles of 
intellectual distortion perpetrated by religious traditions – the human race comes, in 
short order, to embrace the articles of faith of a fairly determinate conception of 
secular humanism.  How would we, were we the sorts of individual now under 
consideration, propose to treat those few benighted souls who will inevitably persist 
in clinging to the superstitions of the past, and no doubt in offering up tribute to ‘the 
gods’?  We might well decide that, for their own good, they need to undergo a 
program of re-education into the ways and whys of newthink.  We would, that is, 
share a collective confidence in the truth of our conception of the Good, and in the 
relative ease with which such truth can be attained by all – a confidence sufficient to 
warrant our coercive imposition of a life in conformity with the tenets of (say) 
‘Astrofuturism’108 (for those who prefer the church of Carl Sagan to the cult of 
Richard Dawkins) upon those who stubbornly resist recognition of its truth.   We may 
(admittedly less-than-charitably) term proponents of this viewpoint Bigoted, 
Ragingly-Intellectualist God-Hating Triumphalists: ‘BRIGHT’s, for short. 
 
                                                 
108 A choice that some may regard as appropriate here, since it accentuates the science fiction-y feel of this 
thought-experiment.  See De Witt Douglas Kilgore’s  book Astrofuturism: Science, Race, and Visions of Utopia 
in Space (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003) for a survey of the development of ‘astrofuturism’  - one 
example of such a triumphalist, utopian, enlightenment vision – from the 1930’s to the present. 
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 To recap our discussion of Difficulty, Modesty, and Authenticity, and the 
relevant possible permutations of commitments thereto, let us revisit our 
categorization and graphical representation from above – substituting in now the 
names of the figures we used to illustrate these various possibilities: 
(a)   The Author; 
(b-i) The ‘Anointed Existentialists’; 
(b-ii) The ‘Enlightened True Believers’; 
(c)    The ‘Frost-y True Believers’; 
(d-i)  The ‘Courageous True Believers; and finally 
(d-ii) The ‘BRIGHTS’ 
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So again, we find ourselves seemingly unable to avoid a modest retreat from a fully-
diplomatic embrace of all possible understandings of the Good.  Recall that we had 
considered the possibility that, when it comes to defending a neutrality thesis, we 
might have to agree to disagree with adherents of Authenticity-denying conceptions 
of the Good Life (if even such interlocutors could be persuaded to disagree about 
such important matters, especially inasmuch as they would thus be agreeing to 
heresy).  Upon closer investigation, we now see that we need part ways only with 
those Authenticity-denying conceptions that also refuse to be epistemically humble: 
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we shall part company only with the BRIGHTs, the Courageous True Believers, and 
their ilk – we need not even bid adieu to our Frost-y Republic-an friends.  Whether 
such a result is tolerable or not I shall leave ultimately to each reader to decide for 
herself; for my part, I shall take leave of our separated brethren without second 
thought.  In doing so, I return to our articulation (in chapters seven through nine) of 
the neutrality principle best-grounded in the principles of Difficulty, Charity, 
Modesty, and Authenticity.   
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GLOSSARY of TECHNICAL TERMS 
 
• Abstinence: The conjunction of a Humble epistemology with the decision to 
chastely demur at the prospect of making confident positive claims about what 
(if anything) endows life with meaning and value.   
• Accommodationism: By restricting its actions to those licensed by Coercion, 
the state embraces a stance of Maximum Feasible Accommodation with 
regard to its citizens’ efforts to live according to their competing conceptions 
of life’s meaning and value – the result of its Modest assessment of its own 
ability successfully to ameliorate the fact of Diversity by any other means. 
• Authenticity: A life lived in accordance with the (or a) valid conception of 
human flourishing is, ceteris paribus, of more value to the person living that 
life when that life is freely chosen.  Such a life is of less value when it results 
from external imposition. 
• Burden: Morally speaking, whenever one agent claims the right to exercise 
coercion over another agent, in the name of some belief held by the claimant, 
that claimant thereby assumes a higher burden of epistemic proof, for 
establishing the truth of said belief, than that claimant would need to meet 
otherwise.   
• Coercion: As a means of implementing its attitude of maximal feasible 
accommodation with regard to its citizens’ efforts to live, free from coercive 
interference, lives that accord with their preferred visions of life’s meaning 
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and value, the state claims for itself a monopoly on the authorization of the 
legitimate use of coercion. 
• Charity: Ceteris paribus, we ought to assume that adherents of the conflicting 
faiths that constitute the circumstance of diversity are all reasonable and well-
intentioned.  
• Confident: Given the proper exercise of their mental faculties, it is fully 
within humans’ cognitive abilities to obtain knowledge about the best path(s) 
to human flourishing.  
• Difficulty: Determining which account(s) of life’s meaning and value are true 
(if any are) is a difficult task. 
• Diplomacy: To the greatest extent possible, we should avoid engaging with 
citizens’ efforts to articulate and defend conceptions of the Good in terms 
other than those which the citizens accept. 
• Diversity: Human beings disagree about the best way to live. 
• Easy: Ascertaining the truth about matters of ultimate concern is easily within 
the grasp of all normally cognitively-functioning human adults. 
• Falliblism: The conjunction of a Humble epistemology with any of the 
metaphysical possibilities considered in Chapter Two.  Those with a strong 
affinity for splitting (as opposed to lumping) are invited to make the obvious 
further sub-division of Fallibilism into its three sub-components: Fallibilist 
Nihilism, Fallibilist Monism, and Fallibilist Pluralism.  
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• Humble:  This final stance involves making a modest – yet not necessarily 
skeptical – assessment of humans’ epistemic abilities with regard to questions 
of Ultimate Concern.   
• Epistemological Question: What attitude ought we to take with regard to our 
epistemic abilities vis-à-vis knowing the Good?   
• Epistemological Question′: What attitude ought we to take with regard to our 
epistemic abilities vis-à-vis knowing the Good – a Confident, Pessimistic, or 
Humble one? 
• Legitimate: The use of coercion is legitimate only when necessary to prevent 
a person’s coercively impeding another person’s efforts to live according to 
his or her conception of life’s meaning and value – only, that is, to prevent 
one person’s violating another person’s right to expressive liberty. 
• Legitimate′: The use of coercion is legitimate only when required to prevent a 
person’s coercive interference with another person’s behavior, period. 
• Metaphysical Question: How many (if any) of the accounts of the Good, 
now holding currency, are true or valid?   
• Metaphysical Question′: How many (if any) of the conceptions of the Good, 
now holding currency, are true or valid – None, One, or Some? 
• MFA: Fully cognizant of the force of Modesty and Authenticity, the state 
should adopt an attitude of ‘Maximum Feasible Accommodation’ with regard 
to its citizens’ efforts to live lives in accordance with their diverging 
conceptions of life’s meaning and value. 
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• Modesty: The state should take a humble attitude with respect to its own 
ability to make accurate judgments concerning the content of the true 
conception of the Good. 
• Monism: The conjunction of a Confident epistemology with the 
metaphysical claim that only One conception of the Good is true or valid.  
This stance holds that the persistence of disagreement represents nothing more 
than the persistence of error on some persons’ parts, and that reasonable and 
well-intentioned individuals (and institutions) can, with a sufficiently high 
degree of confidence, come to know the Truth about life’s ultimate meaning 
and purpose. 
• Neutrality: The state’s most appropriate response to Diversity is to strive for 
neutrality with regard to the conflicting conceptions of the Good holding 
currency amongst its citizens.  This neutrality is to be defended by appeal to 
Modesty and Authenticity, and is to be conducted according to the principle 
of MFA. 
• Nihilism: The conjunction of a Confident epistemology with the 
metaphysical claim that None of the conceptions of the Good on offer – and 
no possible future conception – are verisimilitudinous.  Nihilism is the 
confident conjecture that there is simply no truth of the matter concerning the 
human Good – no possible truth-makers for any sort of claim to the effect that 
human flourishing consists in X, or that life’s true meaning and value consists 
in Y. 
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• None: Nary a single person who regards him- or herself as accurately tracking 
the Good with his or her value judgments is correct in this self-assessment. 
• One: There is only ‘One True Faith’: one true account of life’s meaning and 
value; one true characterization of human flourishing. 
• Pessimistic:  The opposite response from Confident, Pessimistic constitutes 
(ironically) a confident despair at humans’ abilities to come to know the Truth 
about life’s ultimate meaning and purpose.   
• Pluralism: The conjunction of a Confident epistemology with the 
metaphysical claim that Some (in our (more colloquial) sense of ‘several’ – 
not in the logicians’ sense of ‘at least one’) of the conceptions of the Good 
Life currently on offer are true or valid.  This stance regards the observed 
doxastic diversity as the expected outcome of the unfettered exercise of 
human reason, given that the nature of the ‘valuational universe’ is itself 
heterogeneous.  On this account, genuinely valid modes of human flourishing 
embody incommensurable values, and thus are bound to conflict. 
• Political Question: How should polities respond to the truth of Diversity? 
• Political Question′: How best should polities respond to the truth of 
Diversity – by organizing themselves along Perfectionist lines, or along 
Neutralist lines? 
• Political Question″: How best should polities respond to the truth of 
Diversity – by affirming Nihilism, Monism, Pluralism, Skepticism, 
Falliblism, or Abstinence? 
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• Some: Despite deep differences in their patterns of living, in their beliefs and 
practices, adherents of rival and competing visions of the Good Life are still 
living lives of genuine truth and value.  (Not necessarily all such folks are, 
however – perhaps some are just plum mistaken in their beliefs about the 
Good.)     
• Skepticism: The conjunction of a Pessimistic epistemology with its 
concomitant agnosticism with respect to the question of which (if any) 
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